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 Abstract 
 
 
Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
Experiences of Forest Land Redistribution           
in Indonesia 
 
In recent years (after Indonesia’s1998 reforms), through a long process of 
struggle between the Ministry of Forestry, the National Land Board, the 
private sector, local government, and peasant movements there have been 
some cases where upland peasant communities succeeded in being allocated 
individual land rights from the forest converted areas under the public land 
redistribution policy.  For reasons of food security and bowing to pressure 
for land by the landless peasants, the MoF gave a ‘green light’ to implement 
land reform through land redistribution to the tillers on a small scale in sev-
eral densely populated areas of Indonesia in Java and Sumatra.  The state 
(forest) land redistribution here is a process of redistribution of so-called 
state (forest) land to the tillers that are already cultivating the land in tradi-
tional mixed farming. The ‘state’ lands redistributed to the peasants were 
not an empty space, but land which has already been subject to an informal 
tenure system and provides them with individual land ‘ownership’ (meaning: 
land may be bought and sold, and transferred from one generation to the 
next, even though it does not have formal private ownership status).  
What kind of agrarian communities are emerging as a result of this pro-
cess? What kind of processes and relationships are at work to promote or 
counter the emergence of inequality in access to and control over the land 
and resources? Who are excluded and who included in the process? The 
study aims to explore these questions through in depth research into two 
local cases of state (forest) land redistribution.   The study analyzes the 
changing agrarian structure in two locations in Indonesia, eight to ten years 
after a land reform process redistributed forest land under individual land 
xvi Contents 
 
title to peasants that had been cultivating the forest areas. It aims to ques-
tionwhether individual private ownership tenure is the appropriate form of 
tenure in land redistribution programmes, by analysing the emergence of 
inequality in access to and control over land and resources from the early 
stage of the land redistribution process until approximately eight toten years 
after land classified as private lands at Indonesia context. The research was 
conducted in two sites of upland mixed farming (agroforest) communities in 
Java and Sumatra where so-called state forest areas were transferred to tillers 
after the 1998 political reforms.  
The first site is in Garut district, West Java Province, specifically Sagara 
village where 1500 hectares of former forestland was devolved by the for-
estry agency (Dephut) to the land agency (BPN) to be redistributed to peas-
ants for agriculture purposes through individual land titling in 1997 after a 
long struggle of the peasant movement.  In depth interviews were carried 
out in Ciniti Hamlet (100s households). The process of land redistribution 
was declared finished by the land agency in 2003 and the lands were redis-
tributed to the peasants who were farming the land in traditional mixed 
farming (talun) and currently developed to more intensive rubber monocul-
ture farming.      
The second site is in Bengkunat County, West Lampung District (cur-
rently Pesisir Selatan district), Lampung Province, specifically in the village 
of Tanjung Kemala (currently re-named Tanjung Rejo). In depth interviews 
were conducted in Simpang Duren Hamlet (76 households) where part of 
the former forest land was devolved by the MoF to the land agency (BPN) 
to be redistributed to migrants and local peasants for agriculture purposes 
through individual land titling in 2001 through a long bureaucratic process. 
The land was cultivated by tillers in traditional mixed farming, which after 
the land redistribution was replaced by coffee and pepper agroforestry.     
In both the Ciniti and Simpang Duren cases, the land redistribution was 
able to provide access to land, which potentially could bring benefits, and 
security to all landless peasant households. But a few years after the land 
redistribution, significant numbers of landless peasant households had ap-
peared, due to the effects of open competition and surplus appropriation by 
other classes. In both sites, there were also newcomer landless households 
that had migrated to the hamlet and increased the number of landless 
households. They provide their labor as sharecroppers to the middle peasant 
and rich peasant class or as paid labour to nearby plantations. Rich peasant 
households have also appeared in both sites both during and after land re-
distribution, which reflects the fact that the land was not distributed equally, 
 Abstract xvii 
 
and those who controlled more land under informal tenure before the land 
redistribution received more formal individual land title. In both sites, the 
rich peasant households were predominantly those households that were 
rich before the land redistribution, they owned other land in their own vil-
lage/hamlet outside the area of the land redistribution program, they were 
dominant actors in the struggle for land redistribution, and/or had a large 
number of household members. Some of them were able to accumulate 
more and become landlord households through involvement in trading 
(opening small shops/kiosks in the village or hamlet).  
The premise of the evolutionary theory of land rights that individual land 
ownership would address the problems of tenure security, productive farm 
investment, access to credit etc., was only proved valid for some of the 
peasant households in both sites, especially the better off peasant house-
holds, those who belong to the landlord class and especially the absentee 
land owners from the cities. For those from the lower social economic class, 
the near landless and some of the middle class peasant household, they were 
dispossessed and became landless only a few years after the land was redis-
tributed. Those who could maintain control of their land are those few 
peasant households who are extra diligent, hard working and thrifty and 
those that have other income from non farming activities, such as those 
who received remittances from household members in the cities and those 
who run small shops that extract surplus through usury and unequal terms 
of trade from the other peasant households in the hamlet.  
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 Samenvatting 
 
 
Participatie, uitsluiting en veranderingen in de 
landbouw: Ervaringen met herverdeling van 
bosgrond in Indonesië  
 
De afgelopen tijd (na de hervormingen van 1998 in Indonesië) zijn 
boerengemeenschappen in berggebieden er in sommige gevallen in geslaagd 
om individuele rechten op grond te krijgen in bosgebieden die vallen onder 
het beleid inzake de herverdeling van openbare grond. Hieraan is een lange 
strijd tussen het ministerie van Bosbouw, de Nationale Dienst 
Grondbeheer, de private sector, de lokale overheid en organisaties van 
boeren voorafgegaan. Met het oog op voedselzekerheid en onder druk van 
boeren zonder land heeft het Ministerie van Bosbouw het groene licht 
gegeven voor de implementatie van landhervormingen door kleinschalige 
herverdeling van grond onder de boeren in een aantal dichtbevolkte 
gebieden op de Indonesische eilanden Java en Sumatra. Bij deze 
herverdeling wordt zogenaamde (bos)grond van de staat herverdeeld onder 
de pachters die al traditionele gemengde landbouw bedrijven op dit land. De 
‘staats’grond die aan de boeren is toegewezen was geen braakliggend terrein, 
maar viel al onder een informele pachtregeling. Nu zijn de boeren 
individueel ‘grondeigenaar’ geworden (dit betekent dat de grond verhandeld 
mag worden en van de ene generatie op de andere mag worden 
overgedragen, hoewel er geen sprake is van formele privé-eigendom).  
Welke typen agrarische gemeenschappen ontstaan er hierdoor? Wat voor 
processen en onderlinge relaties bevorderen of belemmeren het ontstaan 
van ongelijkheid in de toegang tot en controle over de grond en 
hulpbronnen? Wie worden er uitgesloten van het proces en wie participeren 
erin? Om deze vragen te beantwoorden zijn twee gevallen van herverdeling 
van (bos)grond van de staat diepgaand onderzocht. De veranderende 
landbouwstructuur wordt geanalyseerd op twee locaties in Indonesië, acht 
tot tien jaar na een proces van landhervormingen waarbij bosgrond werd 
 Abstract xix 
 
herverdeeld en boeren die bosgebieden cultiveerden individuele 
eigendomsrechten kregen. Het onderzoek werpt de vraag op of individueel 
particulier pachtrecht de juiste vorm van grondbezit is in programma’s voor 
de herverdeling van grond. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, wordt het 
ontstaan van ongelijkheid in de toegang tot en controle over grond en 
hulpbronnen in de Indonesische context geanalyseerd vanaf het begin van 
het herverdelingsproces tot ongeveer acht tot tien jaar nadat de grond als 
particulier bezit was aangemerkt. Het onderzoek is uitgevoerd in twee hoger 
gelegen gebieden met gemengde landbouw (agrobossen) op Java en 
Sumatra, waar zogenaamde staatsbosgebieden aan pachters zijn 
overgedragen na de politieke hervormingen van 1998.  
Het eerste gebied ligt in het district Garut in de provincie West-Java. In 
het dorp Sagara is 1500 hectare voormalige bosgrond door het ministerie 
van Bosbouw (Dephut) overgedragen aan de dienst grondbeheer (BPN) om 
herverdeeld te worden onder boeren die in 1997 individuele 
eigendomsrechten op de grond kregen na een lange strijd van de 
boerenbeweging. Er zijn diepte-interviews gehouden in het dorp Ciniti 
(ruim 100 huishoudens). Het proces van herverdeling van de grond werd in 
2003 afgerond door de dienst grondbeheer en de grond werd herverdeeld 
onder de boeren die op dit land al traditionele gemengde landbouw (talun) 
bedreven. Op dit moment vindt een omslag plaats naar een intensievere 
vorm van landbouw waarbij rubber als monocultuur wordt verbouwd.  
Het tweede gebied ligt in het gewest Bengkunat in het district West-
Lampung (wat nu het district Zuid-Pesisir is) in de provincie Lampung. Het 
onderzoek is uitgevoerd in het dorp Tanjung Kemala (tegenwoordig 
Tanjung Rejo). Er zijn diepte-interviews gehouden in het gehucht Simpang 
Duren (76 huishoudens), waar een deel van de voormalige bosgrond door 
het ministerie van Bosbouw (Dephut) is overgedragen aan de dienst 
grondbeheer (BPN) om als landbouwgrond herverdeeld te worden onder 
migranten en lokale boeren die in 2001 individuele eigendomsrechten op de 
grond kregen na een lang bureaucratisch proces. Dit land werd door 
pachters (penggarap) al gebruikt voor traditionele gemengde landbouw. Na de 
herverdeling kwam hier boslandbouw met de teelt van koffie en peper voor 
in de plaats.  
Zowel in Ciniti als in Simpang Duren had de herverdeling van grond tot 
gevolg dat er grond beschikbaar kwam voor boerenhuishoudens, waarvan 
alle huishoudens zonder land zouden kunnen profiteren en wat 
bestaanszekerheid zou kunnen bieden. Maar een paar jaar na de 
herverdeling van grond was het aantal boerenhuishoudens zonder land 
xx Contents 
 
aanzienlijk gestegen ten gevolge van vrije mededinging en toe-eigening van 
overschotten door andere klassen. In beide dorpen waren er ook 
nieuwkomers, waardoor het aantal huishoudens zonder land toenam. Zij 
boden hun diensten aan als deelpachter bij rijke boeren of boeren uit de 
middenklasse of als arbeidskracht op nabijgelegen plantages. Er zijn in beide 
dorpen zowel tijdens als na de herverdeling van grond ook rijke 
boerenhuishoudens bijgekomen, wat erop wijst dat de grond niet gelijk 
verdeeld is, en dat degenen die al meer grond hadden bij de informele 
pachtregeling die voor de herverdeling van kracht was, ook meer formele 
individuele eigendomsrechten op de grond kregen. In beide dorpen geldt 
dat rijke boerenhuishoudens meestal voor de herverdeling van grond al rijk 
waren. Ze bezaten al grond in hun eigen dorp/gehucht dat buiten het 
gebied van het herverdelingsprogramma lag; ze speelden een dominante rol 
in de strijd om tot herverdeling van grond te komen en/of hun huishouden 
bestond uit een groot aantal mensen. Sommige huishoudens slaagden erin 
om meer bezit te vergaren en pachtheer te worden door handel te drijven 
(kleine winkeltjes/kiosken te openen in het dorp of gehucht).  
De vooronderstelling van de evolutietheorie van landeigendomsrechten 
dat individuele landeigendom een antwoord zou zijn op de problemen van 
pachtzekerheid, productieve landbouwinvesteringen, toegang tot kredieten 
etc., bleek alleen op te gaan voor sommige boerenhuishoudens in beide 
dorpen: vooral voor de rijkere boerenhuishoudens, huishoudens die tot de 
klasse van de pachtheren behoren en met name voor de afwezige 
grondbezitters uit de steden. Huishoudens uit de lagere klassen, 
huishoudens die vrijwel geen grond bezitten en sommige 
boerenhuishoudens uit de middenklasse werden onteigend en raakten hun 
land kwijt; dit gebeurde maar een paar jaar na de herverdeling van de grond. 
Slechts enkele boerenhuishoudens wisten hun land te behouden. Dit waren 
de boeren die extra toegewijd en spaarzaam zijn en het hardste werken, en 
de huishoudens die nog andere inkomsten hebben dan uit de landbouw, 
omdat ze toelagen krijgen van familieleden die in de stad wonen, of kleine 
winkeltjes hebben waarmee ze met woekerpraktijken en oneerlijke 
handelsvoorwaarden de andere boerenhuishoudens in het gehucht uitbuiten.  
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1 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change in Land Redistribution 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This study analyzes changing agrarian structures in two locations in In-
donesia, eight to ten years after a land reform process was implemented 
toredistribute forest land under individual land titles to peasants who had 
been cultivating these forest areas. It aims to address the questionwheth-
er individual private land ownership is an appropriate form of tenure 
within land redistribution programmes. It does so by examining the 
emergence of inequality in access to and control over land and resources 
from an early stage of the land redistribution process, extending several 
years after the redistributed land was classified as private property. The 
research was conducted in two upland sites in Java and Sumatra, inhabit-
ed by mixed farming (agroforest) communities, where areas of ‘state’ 
forest1 were transferred to tillers following the 1998 political reforms. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
The Indonesian National Land Agency, BadanPertanahanNasional (BPN) 
is mandated to administer the entire land base of Indonesia according to 
Agrarian Law no. 5/1960. This law serves as the basis for defining and 
classifying land as public (state) land or private land, and for allocating 
land for large-scale plantations such as rubber, coffee, and tobacco, with 
a more recent emphasis on converting forest areas into oil palm planta-
tions.2The Ministry of Forestry (MoF) claims that the prevailing forestry 
legislation (Law no. 5/1967 and Law no. 41/1999) classifies two-thirds 
of Indonesia’s total land area as state forest areas, and that this land is, 
therefore, under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Land tenure arrangements 
implemented under each of these two sets of legislation conflict with 
each other,3 resulting in the two concerned agencies being locked in 
competition over the control of vast areas of land4 in which18,000 to 
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30,000 villages5 and adatcommunities6and their land are located. In prac-
tice, BPN does not provide a land titling service to peasants located 
within areas classified as state forest areas, despite being mandated to do 
this by the Basic Agrarian Law 5/1960. Upland peasants living outside 
state forest areas are often too remotely located to be reached by land 
agency officials. Thus, vast areas of the rural uplands, including privately 
held lands, are located in  areas classified as state forest areas or ‘political 
forests’ (Peluso& Lund, 2011), or have already been enclosed as corpo-
rate forests, as has happened in other parts of the world (Sikor, 2007). 
This land includes settlement areas, productive agricultural lands and 
some areas under shifting cultivation, none of which are actually forests.7 
Almost 50 million Indonesian peasants live in and around these politi-
calforests and, therefore, cultivate land under conditions of unclear and 
insecure land tenure. Of these peasants, 10 million (25% of all poor In-
donesian households) are living below the poverty line, according to In-
donesian Statistics 2005 and MoF data (MoF, 2006:6).8Access of local 
communities to land and natural resources is restricted through regula-
tions that do not allow the cutting of trees, hunting, cultivating landor 
house construction. In several cases, a local community’s access to land 
and natural resources has been completely terminated by leasing rights 
over the land and resources to private sectorcompanies within produc-
tion forests, or by classifying the area as protected forests (Fauzi, 1997).  
There are few options in Indonesia for peasants to gain secure tenure 
for their settlements, and for farming and mixed farming (agroforests) 
within areas classified as forest areas. Since 1995, the MoF has experi-
mented with Hutan Kemasyarakatan(HKm), a collective community for-
estry stewardship programme under state forest areas, to provide upland 
farmers with limited access to land and resources, and since 2007, Hu-
tanDesa (HD), a village forest stewardship programme (under state forest 
ares), has also been in effect. However, these initiatives have resulted in 
very few pilot projects or forest stewardship contracts.9 While indige-
nous cultural community forests (HutanAdat) are an alternative tenure 
option for communal forest ownership (non state forest areas), they en-
tail complex administrative requirements which none of the intended 
beneficiaries are able to fulfil.10 
Land tenure security through stewardship contracts, which is provid-
ed for under both of the above-mentioned programmes (HKmand DH), 
does not permitresidential settlements in these areas. These programmes 
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were exclusively designed for timber-based farming or forest protection, 
and do not, therefore, include food-based agriculture and indigenous 
mixed farming (agroforestry).11 Moreover, the MoF has rejected a pro-
posal by the local government and BPN for re-designating state forest 
areas – which have been actively managed by peasants as forestry-
agriculture mosaics – as non–state forest areas. 
The 2013agricultural census reveals that the Indonesia population has 
reached 259millionpersons, out of which 104.5 million person are peas-
ants (40 per cent of the total population). Of this number, 55.3 percent 
of peasants are almost or completely landless (controlling less than 0.25 
ha of land), and most are living below the poverty line.Between 1998 and 
2013, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line 
showed a significant decrease from 24.2 percent to 11.4 percent. How-
ever, the percentage ofpeople living below the poverty line in rural areas 
remains quite high at 14.4 per cent (17.92 million people) compared with 
8.5 per cent (10.63 million people) in urban areas (BPS, 2014& 2011). 
These figures reflect the location of the poor within rural areas in Indo-
nesia, where most are engaged in the agricultural sector. The poverty gap 
index (GPI) and the povertyseverity index (PSI)in Indonesia’s rural areas 
are quite high (a GPI of 2.4 and a PSI of 0.6 in September 2013) com-
pared with corresponding values for urban areas (a GPI of 1.4 and a PSI 
of 0.4in September 2013). The statistical data shows increases in these 
indexes from time to time, which reflectgrowing inequality of expendi-
ture in rural areas. Parallel to this trend, large-scale agriculture and forest-
ry-based industries have rapidly penetrated the uplands. There is serious 
competition and conflict over land allocated for large-scale, commercial-
ly orientedconcessions and upland peasant farming. There are also seri-
ous issues of inequality within upland peasant societies that are engaged 
in multiple opportunities provided by large-scale agricultural and forestry 
concessions.12 The manifestations of this inequality are clear: land con-
flicts between peasants and the state over large-scale forestry conces-
sions, plantations and other allocations of state land for forest conserva-
tion and protection, mining and oil palm plantations; a high rate of land 
degradation;13 and a considerable proportion of households living below 
the poverty line, as indicated by the statistical data. 
In recent years (subsequent to the 1998 reform), a long struggle be-
tween the forest agency, land agency, private sector, local govern-
mentsand peasant movements has culminated in some cases where up-
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land peasant communities have succeeded in obtaining individual land 
rights within converted forest areas under the public land redistribution 
policy.14 For reasons of food security and submission to pressure for 
land demands by landless peasants, the MoF gave the ‘green light’ for the 
implementation of a land reform through small scale state (forest) land 
redistribution to tillers in several densely populated areas in Java15 and 
Sumatra.16 
Specific cases of public land redistribution have emerged in Indonesia 
in recent years that differ from those described in the literature onredis-
tributive land reforms, which emphasise redistribution of private land 
holdings to small and landless farmers (Borras2006a: 123). By contrast, 
the land reform process in Indonesia has entailed redistribution of ‘state’ 
(forest) land to tillers who, prior to the reform were cultivating this land 
using traditional mixed farming methods. In these cases, ‘state’ lands 
were redistributed to peasants not as an empty space, but rather as land 
which was already subject to an informal tenure system, and already allo-
cated for long term lease to forest concessions (state own logging con-
cessions and timber plantation) or converted to other large scale conces-
sions (palm oil plantation and mining concessions). As a part of the 
conflict resolution process, the land was taken from the state owned 
concessions without any compensation and providedto the tillers as in-
dividual propertyin the sense that land could be bought and sold, as well 
as transferred from one generation to the next. 
The questions that consequently arise are: what kinds of agrarian 
communities are emerging as a result of this process? What kinds of pro-
cesses and relationships are at work to promote or counter the emer-
gence of inequality in access to and control over land and resources? 
Who is being excluded and who is being included in this process? This 
study aims to explore these questions through an in-depth examination 
of two cases of state (forest) land redistribution. Indonesia is at a cross-
roads in seeking a solution to the issue of land tenure relating to former 
state forest areas, which are being cultivated by peasants for forestry-
agriculture activities. Without having a complete picture of past results of 
this kind of land redistribution process carried out in early 2007, the 
government subsequently announced a plan to redistribute eight million 
hectares of former forest areas to peasants under a land reform pro-
gramme, the National Programme on Agrarian Reform (PPAN). This 
programme prioritises 33 districts in the southern regions of the island 
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of Java17 for land redistribution. However, in 2011 the pace of PPAN 
slowed down due to the shifting politics of land allocation, which result-
ed in priority being given to the granting of large-scale concessions, 
mainly outside Java, tosupport the National Master Plan for the Acceler-
ation and Expansion of Indonesian Economic Development (Masterplan 
Percepatandan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia/MP3EI), estab-
lished through Presidential Decree no. 32/2011. The MP3EI has been 
revoked by the new cabinet which took office in October 2014, and the 
land reform agenda is put back on the table with a new target of 9 mil-
lion hectares in 5 years, as promised by the elected president and vice 
president  (Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, 2014& Sekans Jokowi 2014). Reformula-
tion and reorientation of PPAN is, however, necessary. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
The World Bank report on forests and poverty prepared by Chomitz et 
al. (2006) showed that the majority of people in rural tropical areas — 
about 800 million — live in or around vulnerable forests or woodlands, 
and depend heavily on them for their survival. A study by Ellsworth and 
White (2004) indicated that about 80 percent of the world’s extreme 
poor, that is, those living on less than one US dollar a day, depend on 
forest resources for their livelihoods. One billion people depend almost 
entirely on forests for their medicinal resources, and about the same 
number depend on forests for their fuel needs. 
Chomitz et. al. (2006) highlighted distinct priorities for individual 
forest types, each of which entails a different interplay of deforestation 
incentives, remoteness, forest rights and environments. In agricultural 
frontier areas and disputed areas, sorting out and guaranteeing forest 
rights is critical for mitigating deforestation, reducing conflicts, and im-
proving rural livelihoods. In areas situated beyond agricultural frontiers, 
such as the Amazon and Congo Basins and the heartlands of Borneo, 
New Guinea and Sulawesi (Indonesia), prompt action is required to 
avoid future agricultural expansion.18 
In recent years land reform, which had virtually disappeared from the 
agenda of the international development agencies in the 1980s, has re-
gained a place in their agenda. But most agencies now promote the so 
called ‘market oriented’ land reform, which promotes the public/state 
communal lands as the object of land reform, increased productivity, 
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land tenure security, and community based management (Borras, Kay, 
Akram-Lodhi, 2008; 31). This situation could be further seen in the 
World Bank’s 2006 forestry report and the recent Word Bank review on 
the land sector in (Forest and Non-forest) Indonesia (2014, recommen-
dation 7) which argue for the need to provide clear property rights such 
as ownership and conversion to small holdings with high agricultural re-
turns19in areas cultivated by peasants, or to transfer forest areas to local 
communities including adat communities, and increase the security of 
holders of land without trees.20Corriveau-Bourque (2014) reports the 
following: 
Between 2002 and 2013, the proportion of forests 
owned or controlled by Indigenous Peoples and local 
communities increased from just over 11 percent of the 
global forest estate (at least 383 Mha) to 15.5 percent (at 
least 511 Mha). The proportion owned by individuals and 
firms only increased by 0.6 percent over this same time pe-
riod.The bulk of the global forest tenure transition toward 
indigenous and local community control and ownership 
took place in low and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) from 2002 to 2013. In fact, almost all (97 percent) 
of the global change in the recognition of community rights 
over the 2002-2013 period took place in LMICs. More spe-
cifically, the proportion under community ownership or 
control in LMICs rose from just over 21 percent of forest 
area (at least 353 Mha) to 30 percent (at least 478 Mha) in 
2013. This equates to an increase of at least 125 Mha of forests in 
which communities’ rights have been recognized. More than 62 per-
cent of these 125 Mha are owned by communities. Howev-
er, there is considerable regional variation in statutory 
recognition of forest land rights, with most of the tenure 
transition taking place in Latin America, and the implemen-
tation of reforms in sub-Saharan Africa lagging far behind 
the other regions. …… On the other end of the spectrum, 
many of the countries with the world’s remaining tropical 
forests have failed to implement meaningful tenure reforms 
in terms of recognizing local rights. Ninety-nine percent of 
the forests in the Congo Basin and peninsular Southeast 
Asia remain under government administration.21 
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The World Bank promotes clear property rights, which are seen as 
necessary not only for providing high agriculture returns but also for 
managing mixed farms (White and Martin, 2002). Similarly, in the con-
text of the Indonesian uplands, Suyanto et al. (2007:743) have also advo-
cated individualisation of property rights in the Sumatera uplands to re-
spond to the evolution of farming systems from shifting cultivation 
towards more intensive tree-based agroforestry, such as rubber, coffee 
and cinnamon farming. However, the adoption of this tenure change by 
the Indonesian government in response to evolving farming systems has 
been very slow, as reported by Corriveau-Bourque (2014). 
This kind of suggestion is not only coming from the World Bank 
foresters but also from the rural development lawyers such as Proster-
man (2003: 1). He suggested that land reform in the 21stcentury should 
provide land tenure security but at the same time create a market for 
land, through land sale, lease, and mortgage.  The beneficiaries of the 
land reform should be cultivators in rural areas who lack ownership of 
the land that they cultivate, those on state or collective farms, and those 
who occupy public lands. The beneficiaries should include as much as 
possible those who are pensioners, tenants, and agriculture labourers. 
But the object of the land reform should be limited to land that could be 
cultivated by the household (Prosterman, 2003; 17-22).     
This argument for privatisation of individual holdings is supported 
de Soto’s (2003) statement that while the poor in underdeveloped coun-
tries have assets, their real property is often informally owned and  can-
not, therefore, be used to generate capital. As a result, the crucial role of 
real property is simply absent in underdeveloped countries. De Soto 
(2003) proposes a ‘trickle up economics’22 solution for formalising in-
formal property rights so that both the rich and poor benefit economi-
cally. This analysis, however, assumes that ‘the poor’ are a homogeneous 
and undifferentiated mass (Home and Lim, 2004:145). It also ignores the 
possibility that ownership rights do not only open up opportunities for 
accessing capital, but may equally increase the possibility of rapid dispos-
session through the sale or mortgaging of holdings.  
Micro level research is commonly neglected within mainstream dis-
courses such as national policy and the international policy debate on 
forestry and agriculture.23 Seven years before de Soto, Platteau (1996) 
already highlighted the problems in the policy trend of individualising 
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and formalising property land rights for upland communities in Sub-
Saharan Africa by criticizing the theory of evolutionary transition of 
communal land property rights to private property rights, the so-called 
‘evolutionary theory of land rights’ (ETLR). He unravelled four basic 
assumptions held by advocates of the ELTR. These were: 1) security of 
individual land tenure; 2) expansion of land markets; 3)increasing credit 
and investments; and 4) increasing demands for land titling. 
Based on his intensive analysis of the post-land reform period in Sub-
Saharan regions, Platteau (1996) questioned the relevance of the four 
assumptionson the ground. He argued that individual land tenure was 
not secure for those denied legal recognition of their customary rights to 
land during the registration process. Moreover, the insecurity of other 
contractual users, who could use the land only at the sufferance of the 
owners after the reform, was even greater. He further showed that the 
elites were able to adjudicate or manipulate the registration process to 
their advantage. Platteau (1996: 41–49) concluded that land registration 
created land disputes as people not in possession of land titlescame un-
der the threat of eviction from registered proprietors.  
Platteau challenged the second assumption by providing evidence 
thatthe land market has not functioned effectively because the majority 
of land parcels continue to be transacted through customary channels 
(lending, gifts, inheritance or non-registered sales) and, therefore, mar-
kets for leaseholds appear to be relatively rare. Consequently, land sales 
tend to be the result of distress conditions due to the absence of insur-
ance markets, imperfect credit markets, and declining self-insurance ca-
pacities on the part of rural dwellers. This situation tends to worsen the 
imbalance in factor proportions between larger and smaller holdings 
(Platteau, 1996:49–60, see alsoBoucher et al 2002, regarding the result of 
land reform in Nicaragua and Honduras). 
Platteau further demonstrated the negative impact of the thir-
dassumption on credit and investment. He found no significant relation-
ship between the percentage of households receiving credit and the pro-
portion of land held with individual land rights. This situation mostly 
occurred as a result of administrative cost considerations that led many 
banks to set a minimum land area for obtaining credit, often exceeding 
the capital needs of smallholders(Platteau, 1996: 60–66). On the invest-
ment side, there have been various findings, including those of Suyanto 
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et al. (2007), that titling in Indonesia has increased capacities for invest-
ment but not willingness to invest inland improvements. 
Lastly, Platteau challenged the fourth assumption, showing that de-
mand and supply for land titling does not work since the main concern 
of poor peasants is clearly security of land tenure for their own use, and 
for transmission to their children. Most vulnerable populations, namely, 
women, pastoralists, former slaves, and other groups, have traditionally 
had weak tenure arrangements as a result of being granted only subsidi-
ary or derived rights to land. They may, therefore, prefer to have indi-
vidual land ownership granted through the state, if they can afford to pay 
for the land redistribution process to obtain the land through fair and 
just process. However, if they believe that the local chief is trustworthy, 
they may alternatively preferto have collective rights rather than individ-
ual titles to ensure continuance of customary overlapping rights(Platteau, 
1996: 66–72). In summary, land registration or titling of individual prop-
erty rights in land is not a neutral process. It clearly favours more influ-
ential classes of cultivators and excludes others (including women). Ul-
timately, it may end up creating less and not more security of tenure 
(Platteau 1996:39–49 in White et al. 2012).  
The kinds of policies and practices in the forestry sector described 
above, have largely ignored the highly differentiated and unequal struc-
tures that exist within rural communities (Hobley 2007: 56). Herring 
(2006: 58) reminds us that: 
A generation ago, Myrdal (1971, 275) pointed out that poli-
cies for agricultural reform that ignore the problem of ine-
quality are not likely to achieve major and, especially, lasting 
results. Promotion of social-economic equalities is a pre-
condition for attaining substantial long-term increases of 
production, which will lead to poverty alleviation. Genuine 
agrarian reform, land reform or land redistribution sets the 
stage for [a] new social dynamic and opens possibilities for 
alternative trajectories. 
Borras (2006b: 129) describes several alternative outcomes that can 
arise from public land redistribution policy (see Table 1). These can in-
volve contestation of land, redistribution of public landsand the multi-
pleinterests of the state agency and its staff, which have been shown to 
co-opt the land redistribution programme. He describes five possible 
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existing conditions of land tenure conflict where the landed elite (non-
poor) exert influence to maintain the land under their individual or fami-
ly control. This may result in various possibilities (outcomes one to five). 
This study focuses on cases of forest land where the pre-existing condi-
tions prior to land redistribution are marked by landed elites (forest con-
cessions) imposing tenurial relations upon peasants, and peasants were 
paying a form of rent to the non-poor or the officials (existing type 1 & 
2). 
Individual property ownership rights were targeted in land redistribu-
tion to poor peasants. However, several years after redistribution had 
occurred, the land may have ended up in the hands of the landed elite 
(outcome one), the non-poor (outcome two), the poor peasants (out-
come four and five), or a combination of these three options may have 
occurred, involving a change in the social structure. 
The accumulation of land by landed elites, or other non-poor and 
non-peasants as an outcome of land redistribution might not only result 
from the type of individual private land tenure provided by the land re-
distribution program. Griffin, Khan & Ickowitz  (2002: 285-289) high-
light some other factors that affect the result of land redistribution. The 
fragmented market might exclude peasanthouseholds from large scale 
concession that operates in the area; this also could happen to labour 
due to discrimination by race and ethnicity, origin, age class, gender dis-
crimination. These two factors are important elements that will change 
the tenancy system in the rural areas, which depend much on the politi-
cal economic context of the land redistributions in each specific site. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 11 
 
No Existing Conditions 
Type
Property  rights prior to 
Land Distribution
Property Rights after the 
Land Distribution 
Formal Effective Formal Effective
1 Landed elite (forest 
concessions) imposing 
tenurial relations with 
peasants.
State Land Private 
Landed Elite
Private Outcome1
Landed Elite
2 Non-poor (but not 
major landed elite) 
imposing tenurial
relations with peasants
State Land Private Non 
Poor
Private Outcome 2
Non Poor
3. Poor Peasant control 
and working on the
land
State Land Private Poor 
peasants
Private Outcome 3
Landed elite 
or non poor
4. Poor Peasant control 
and working on the
land
State Land Private Poor 
Peasants
Private Outcome 4 
Poor peasant
5 Landed elite imposing 
tenurial relations with 
peasants
State Land Landed Elite Private Outcome 5 
Poor Peasant
Table 1.1 
Possible alternative outcomes of the land redistribution process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Borras (2006b: 129) 
 
1.3.1 Experiences of Public Land Redistribution in Other Coun-
tries 
There is a need to revisit problems encountered during past processes of 
public land redistribution in several countries, and to highlight under 
what conditions these land reform efforts occurred. This section elabo-
rates on the findings of several studies on land redistribution and land 
certification under individual land titling in the Philippines, Laos, Vi-
etnam, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mexico and Indonesia. These findings 
may guide us in identifying inter-linkages of land tenure arrangements 
within macro policy contexts that have promoted individual land owner-
ship through micro processes. These include agrarian classes and class 
dynamics, household reproduction and accumulation processes and sur-
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plus land transfers that occur as consequences of these macro policy set-
tings. 
Previous studies have highlighted the fact that during the first stage 
of public land redistribution, much of the land could not be redistributed 
to the tillers due to technical problems in classifying the land (Franco, 
2005).24 Landed elites who have an interest in the land use various poli-
cies and tactics to counter or avoid the land redistribution process. The 
land has subsequently been redistributed only after strong collective ac-
tion was organised by peasants and their supporters within the govern-
ment. The process of implementing land redistribution programmes in-
volves formal lists of beneficiaries prepared by local governments. 
However, these formal lists do not reflect actual membership of landless 
and near landless peasant groups within the community. When a bureau-
cratic land redistribution programme and registration process occurs, it 
mostly accommodates the formalisation and privatisation of the informal 
land tenure structure, thus further cementing existing inequalities 
(Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008:4).  
The process of certifying and issuing individual titles for land that was 
formerly declared as forest land (or political forest, as explained above) 
creates winners and losers among the peasantry, and also leads to exclu-
sion from land access through state and non-state regulations or the use 
of force. Peluso and Lund (2011:671) and Hall (2011:14) have summa-
rised the three processes of exclusion underway in frontier land as fol-
lows: enclosure (conversion of common property to private property), 
primitive accumulation (the state’s transformation of non-capitalist social 
formations into capitalist formations through its policies and practices) 
and accumulation by dispossession (through the transformation of non-
capitalist social formations into capitalist formations from below, or by 
local communities and their elites).  
De la Rosa (2005) has highlighted the gendered nature of the land re-
distribution process in a former banana estate in Davao del Norte, Min-
danao, and the Philippines. In this area, married woman beneficiaries 
were excluded because of their marital status, and the land was registered 
by the Land Agency in the names of their husbands. Giusta (2008) and 
Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud (2002: 137) have described this phe-
nomenon as an interlocking disadvantage where in the disadvantaged 
beneficiary group (women in this case) have strong ties with groups who 
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suffer from the same lack of resources and are, therefore, subjected to 
the three kinds of exclusion described above. 
Most of the landless peasants in De La Rosa’s (2005) study and else-
where were too poor and were not able to allocate their time to partici-
pate in meetings and were further excluded from the programme. Stud-
ies of social exclusion have generally found that those who are excluded 
through discrimination, geographic location and cultural identification 
are trapped within a complex of interlocking disadvantages (Burchardt, 
Le Grand, and Piachaud, 2002). Several kinds of social exclusion have 
been observed during land redistribution in Negros Occidental, in the 
Philippines (Feranil, 2005), and in the redistribution of plantation land in 
Java, Indonesia (Chrisantiny, 2007). In these cases, following the redis-
tribution of public land to the landless/near landless, landed elites effec-
tively reacquired and consolidated their control of the land by purchasing 
or leasing it from the peasants and hiring them as waged labour in large-
scale agriculture estates that they consequently created. Another study in 
Bac Lang, Vietnam showed that the process of forest land redistribution 
during the first Forest Land Allocation Project (FLAP) was similarly cap-
tured by a few locally influential individuals and their households, result-
ing in a concentration of land in the hands of a few, including former 
local officials. As a result, poor peasants faced the threat of being en-
closed out of the land (Franco, 2008:38; Borras, 2007: 5). Similar exclu-
sionary processes have also occurred in Lao, accompanied by extensive 
displacement, during the Lao Forest Allocation Programme (LFAP) 
(Rigg, 2006:127).  
The major issue here is whether individual private land ownership ac-
quired through land redistribution is an appropriate form of tenure for 
creating relatively egalitarian, stable, smallholder-based farming commu-
nities. The case studies from the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Mexico and 
Indonesia, described above, draw attention to processes of exclusion and 
inclusion wherein lies the basis of inequality in agrarian structures.  
There have been several critiques of individualisation of land owner-
ship in Sub-Saharan Africa (see, e.g., Cliffe et al., 2011; Scoones et al. 
2012; Moyo,2011). Moyo undertook a detailed examination of the status 
of peasants who had received individual tenure under Zimbabwe’s Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), and found the emergence of 
a class dynamic a decade after the land reform had been implemented. 
14 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
He categorised peasants into several classes: those who were ‘dropping 
out’ (chronically poor); those who were ‘hanging in’ (asset-poor farm-
ing); those who were ‘stepping out’ (survival through income diversifica-
tion); and those who were ‘stepping up’ (rich farmers). These studies 
show that redistributive land reform resulted in the formation of several 
classes of households that emerged from class dynamics. The proportion 
of these groups were: 10 percent, 33.6 per cent, 21.4 per cent and 35 per 
cent for the dropping out, hanging in, stepping out, and stepping up categories, 
respectively (Cliffe et al. 2011; Scoones et al. 2012: 512). 
Large sections of the stepping out farmers are peasant households that 
received relatively small plots and have no other income besides farming. 
The stepping up classes of households are mostly part-time farmers whose 
primary source of support was from off farm activities, including accu-
mulation of wealth and assets from above through patronage and cor-
rupt practices. A large section of the class of hanging in households, be-
side managing their farms, were selling their labour to the more 
successful middle farmer group, and some were able to practice accumu-
lation from below. However, there were also dropping out households that 
were unable to benefit from acquisition of new land. 
The programme did not facilitate farmer beneficiaries to acquire agri-
cultural credit; nor could it provide secure tenure for individual land 
ownership through market penetration in rural areas. Scoones et al. 
(2012: 515) also found a highly complex pattern of livelihood differentia-
tion in post-land reform regions of Zimbabwe. Here too, there were sig-
nificant groups whose livelihoods remained vulnerable and whose pro-
spects for accumulation were limited; middle farmer groups who were 
able to accumulate wealth and assets from below; and elites who prac-
ticed ‘accumulation from above’ through patronage and corrupt elite-
capture practices (Scoones, 2012 e al: 524). 
Thus, Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programme resulted in expand-
ing numbers of small and middle level agriculture producers and recon-
figured labour relations. Pressures of land transfer and perceptions of 
land as a commodity that could be sold and mortgaged have prevailed. 
Land transfers have increased because of informal land rentals and sales 
(Moyo, 2011). Both Cliffe et al. (2011) and Scoones et al. (2012) have 
aptly described the agrarian structure that existed before and after land 
redistribution in Zimbabwe after the land reforms. Cliffe et al. (2011: 
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928) have suggested that future research should be broadened to en-
compass empirical knowledge of this process in different geographical 
regions, such as Asia, as well as thematic issues that have remained large-
ly unexplored to date. 
These studies from various countries indicate the importance of a 
careful and thorough case-based examination of Indonesia’s experiences 
of local land redistribution, specifically focusing on processes of inclu-
sion and exclusion, and post-redistribution processes of agrarian change. 
The relevance of local contexts can also be better understood by choos-
ing two contrasting sites: one in Java where the individual land owner-
ship tenure system is better known and practiced, and the other located 
in a different island where the informal land tenure system is undergoing 
a process of evolution towards an individual land tenure system. 
 
1.3.2  Relevance and Scope of the Study 
There are many gaps in our knowledge regarding the outcomes of (state) 
forestland redistribution. The processes and relations that result in the 
formation of new agrarian structures need to be comprehensively under-
stood to address inequalities in access to and control over land and re-
sources. This is especially the case in an agrarian country like Indonesia 
where forests areas are dominated by the state, which makes continual 
promises to undertake extensive redistribution of land to peasants (BPN, 
2008; MoF, 2008; SeknasJokowi, 2014).  
The situation of state (forest) land redistribution in the uplands 
through the provision of individual land titles has not received much 
scholarly attention in the twenty-first century. Especially in the uplands, 
peasants do not have much experience of dealing with individual land 
titling systems involving their engagement in multilevel land contesta-
tions at intra-household and societal levels, and with the private sector 
and several state actors. In-depth study of local-level casesshould pro-
vide a better understanding of how state forestland redistribution 
through individual land titling could affect the structure of upland agrari-
an society in Indonesia. 
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1.4 Redistributive Land Reforms and Agrarian Change: 
Towards an Analytical Framework 
This section introduces several concepts, notably agrarian structure (en-
compassing the social, political and economic formation and agrarian 
relations), as well as the process of agrarian differentiation (and the 
competing theories that underlie them) as conceptual tools to analyse the 
growing inequality that has been evident in the years following land re-
distribution. This section also develops an analytical framework that 
combines some of these concepts. These are then related to the Indone-
sian context to guide the formulation of the research questions. Careful 
analysis of agrarian structures, pre- and post-land redistribution, and the 
process of agrarian differentiation is crucial for understanding processes 
of agrarian structural changeseveral years after the implementation of 
land redistribution 
 
1.4.1 Agrarian Structure 
According to modernisation theorists such as Tuma (1965:13), there are 
three basic elements that structure agrarian societies:theland tenure sys-
tem, the pattern of cultivation and thetenancysystem. In line with Tu-
ma’s view on the importance of the cultivation pattern, Hayami and 
Kikuchi (1980) argued that technological change brought impacts leading 
to changes of the agrarian structure. This view assumes that the engine 
of agrarian structural change is population growth andmodernisation 
ofthe cultivation system. However, political economists such as Hart 
(1986: 9) have argued that the important element in understanding agrar-
ian change is the connection between macro political-economic forces 
such as technology, and demography and labour processes at the local 
level. Hart’s (1986) study of a local level rural labour market in lowland 
Java showed that each household and its members within different social 
classes had differential access to the various labour and remuneration 
opportunities available in and around the village as a result of ‘imperfec-
tions’ of the labour market. This differential access to the three basic el-
ements of land, labour and capital created further unequal agrarian rela-
tions.  
Li (1999) has described how unequal agrarian structures in Indone-
sia’s upland communitiesare simultaneously shaped by three processes. 
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The first is a long process of political, social and economic marginaliza-
tion of upland communities by the state, together with a perception of 
their backwardness by lowland communities .The second process entails 
the regeneration of power relations of patronage by maintaining the de-
pendency of upland elites on lowland elites and tyingupland peasants to 
those elites with access to state protection, authority and sources of capi-
tal. The third and final process entails changing the production mode in 
the uplands by opening up access to the market, and introducing high 
yielding cropvarieties through state sponsored or local community initia-
tives that further strengthen ties of dependence between upland elites to 
the local government staffsand the local elites with the commoners.  
To examine agrarian structures more closely, there is need to under-
stand the inter-linkages of their two components in the formation of so-
cial, economic and political class/classes, and the relations between these 
classes, including non-agrarian actors/absentee land owners (agrarian 
relations).  
 
1.4.1.1 Social, Economic and Political Formations 
Access to and control of land, followed by labour and capital mobilisa-
tion, are the major factors shaping class formation in most upland socie-
ties.Wiradi (1985: 48) elaborated on the process of capital accumulation 
in Java’s lowland communities where landlords who had more land ex-
tracted surpluses from their farms and had better opportunities for in-
vesting this surplus in farm or non-farm activities. By contrast, landless 
or near landless peasants lacked these privileges, and were compelled to 
continue working as labourers on farms or in non-farm activities.25The 
unequal distribution of access to and control of land has been the key 
element that shapes the social, economic and political formation of land-
lord, middle peasant and the near landless and landless peasant class 
within lowland communities, as described by Kano (1984: 249).This situ-
ation has also been found by Li (1996) in upland areas of Indonesia. It 
marks the process of generating and regenerating the dominant class 
within this society. 
However, this process of evolving social, economic and political for-
mations in upland communities in Java (Hefner, 1990) and in the Outer 
Islands (Li, 1996) also encompasses non-economic dimensionssuch as 
morality and identity. Ethnicity, religion and gender identity, as well as 
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class, become crucial factors in the local power relations in which certain 
ethnic groups, or religious and political factions in village institutions are 
dominant, and the division of labour is based ongroup identities. These 
units of identity can cut across a social economic class, thus revealing the 
complexity of social economic political formations in the upland com-
munities examined in this research.  
These components of social, economic and political formations (eth-
nicity, gender, class, age, education etc.) have enabled the classification, 
in this study, of those who were better or worse off in relation to land, 
labour and capital within this society during the pre- and post-land redis-
tribution periods, based on social, economic and political classes (such as 
landless, near landless, middle class peasant, rich and land lords). This 
lens provides greater clarity for identifying who are the non-agrarian ac-
tors such military staff, civil servants, migrant labour and other extra ru-
ral actors who exert some influence over access to land and resources. 
However, to understand relations between different interconnected clas-
ses within the agrarian structure, it is necessary to examine agrarian rela-
tions, which constitute the second component of the agrarian structure. 
 
1.4.1.2 Agrarian Relations 
Agrarian relations were examined in this study to develop an understand-
ing of relations between groups or classes in rural society such as the 
landless and near landless, middle and rich peasant as well as landlords; 
relations within these classes; as well as relations with non-agrarian ac-
tors within and outside of the village (absentee land owners, traders, civil 
servant etc). This conceptual frame allows for a better understanding of 
the types of relationships that exist among households belonging to cer-
tain classes located within and outside of this society. As discussed earli-
er, the land redistribution process has led to changes in class formation 
through greater class differentiation. Agrarian relations are evident from 
surplus extraction patterns, as described by Sinaga and White (1979), and 
more specifically by applying the conceptual framework developed by 
Deereand de Janvry (1979) to explain patterns of surplus extraction 
through a variety of possible mechanisms. 
In their study of Javanese villages, Sinaga and White (1979)showed 
that the surpluses of landlords, which doubled in non-land based agricul-
ture, were invested in non-agricultural sectors such as transportation, 
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buying real estate in the cities, as well as investing in political positions to 
maintain surplus accumulation. This resulted in the generation and re-
production of rural social differentiation processes. In this research, 
agrarian relations were determined through the flow of surplus transfer 
from upland households in the form of (in-kind) commodities, labour 
and cash. Deere and de Janvry (1979) identified eight potential flows of 
surplus transferfrom peasant households to other agrarian groups as fol-
lows: rent in labour, rent in cash, rent in kind, wages in cash, wages in 
kind, extraction via terms of trade, usury and taxes. The changes ob-
served in patterns and mechanisms of surplus extraction before and after 
land redistribution help to explain the kind of agrarian relations resulting 
from this kind of land redistribution. There is also a power dimension 
(political or economic) involved in some of these surplus transfer pro-
cesses between direct producers and non-producers who claim a part of 
their produce. In the pre- and post-land redistribution phases, these 
changing relationships between peasants, and between peasants and non-
peasants, need to be critically examined. To analyse these complex power 
relations, there is a need to incorporate the concept of agrarian differen-
tiation. 
 
1.4.2 Agrarian Polarisation and Differentiation 
Before discussing agrarian differentiation, it is necessary to introduce the 
concept of agrarian polarisation. Studies on agrarian issues in the nine-
teenth century held that due to the penetration of capital or commoditi-
sation of production factors (including land, labour and capital) in rural 
areas, a process of ‘depeasantisation’ was underway, resultinginpolarisa-
tion between the two rural proletariat classes (the landless and near land-
less) and the agrarian bourgeoisie (the landlords), and the disappearance 
of the peasant class. This was seen as a gradual process that first passed 
through a differentiation phase before completepolarization occurred 
(Lenin 1899:133). Kautsky (1899) referred to this process as a polarisa-
tion towards proletariats and bourgeois, the creation of two opposing 
classes, the landless proletariat and the landlord or capitalist farmer class. 
However, Chayanov (1929, cited in Van der Ploeg, 2013) believed that 
for the most part, the situation was not so simple because of the con-
tinuing existence of a majority of small and middle peasants and near 
landless peasants. These groups were striving to maintain a balance be-
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tween the use of commodities for production and reproduction, while 
utilizinginternal and external resources, maintaining autonomy and de-
pendence, and sustaining the scale and intensityoftheir farms.26 Given 
that most upland agrarian structures—and indeed, most agrarian socie-
ties worldwide—are not completely polarised, there is a need to pay 
closer attention to the differentiation phase by applying the conceptual 
lens ofagrarian differentiation. 
 
1.4.2.1 Agrarian Differentiation 
White (1989: 19-20) has described agrarian differentiation as follows:  
Agrarian or rural ‘differentiation,’ as the term implies, is a 
dynamic process involving the emergence or sharpening of 
‘differences’ within the rural population, but it does not it-
self consist of (and in some cases, at least in the short term, 
may not even involve) increasing income inequalities.  Its 
not about whether some peasants became richer than oth-
ers, but about the changing kind of relations between them 
(or between peasants and non-peasants, including extra ru-
ral groups), in the context of the development of commodi-
ty relations in the rural economy.  
 
This concept can be used as an analytical tool, to analyse whether and 
how identifiable agrarian classes emerge and are differentiated within 
post-reform peasant communities; whether and how non-productive 
classes (i.e. absentee land owners) emerge or persist; and whether and in 
what ways they extract and accumulate surplus from the peasantry.  
In this situation, there is no guarantee that equal access to land, as 
promised by the land redistribution process, can prevent the exacerba-
tion of differences between advantaged and disadvantaged groups (peas-
ants, non-peasants and extra rural groups). Nor is there any guarantee 
that accumulation of the means of production (land, labour and capital) 
by this advantaged class can be prevented, if the process of exclusion 
and inclusion continues to be generated and reproduced. Agrarian differ-
entiation is also based on unequal access to other means of production 
such as labour, capital as well as political support. 
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1.4.3 Commercialisation in Rural Areas  
This section explains commercialisation patterns in rural areas. Specifi-
cally, this involves the commercialisation of agriculture inputs, land, agri-
cultural products and labour resulting fromcommoditisation of produc-
tion in rural areas. 
The process of commercialising land, labour and products in rural ar-
eas is driven by larger power structures and macro political-economic 
forces, such as government policies and institutional structures, as well as 
the penetration of private capital into rural markets. In situations of land 
commercialisation in countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Phil-
ippines, where the rationale of national policies that are oriented towards 
individual land ownership is security of land tenure, existing inequalities 
are further reinforced and opportunities for land grabbing are opened up 
(Hirsch, 2011). Further, as Hall et al. (2011: 14) explain, the process of 
individual land titling was not only part of a process of capital penetra-
tion from above (state primitive accumulation), but also a process of mi-
cro-enclosure that occurred from below through internal community 
processes.  
As mentioned earlier, the success of a forest land redistribution pro-
ject in providing equity and access to land through a particular regime of 
property rights may or may not be achieved in the long term. This de-
pends on the structure’s power relations and the capacities of individuals 
at the level of the household. Decisions to register redistributed land 
through individual land certificates, or, in the longer run, to sell or buy 
land, are formally issues of those individuals (men, women or children) 
who are named in the land title. However, this decision, which is sup-
posedly made at the household level, may be influenced by (a) larger, 
supra household structural forces and (b) intra-household contestation 
based on power relations among household members (Li, 1996). 
Land titling in the name of the ‘head’ of the household—usually a 
male in rural patriarchal culture—also impacts on relations between the 
members of the household, and their participation in decisions regarding 
the purchase or sale of land, and the intra-generational transfer of the 
land. This can also become a contested arena in which legally document-
ed ownership of land is used to compel household members to 
acknowledge ownership or registration of the land in the name of the 
household head. Integrating the property within the household (in the 
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name of the household head) creates tension, especially when women 
(wives) inherit land from their families (Li, 1996). 
Land policies based on individual titles may have aimed to open up 
equal opportunities for men and women to own land. However, a fre-
quently observed consequence has been to limit women’s possession of 
previously collective rights to land, while at the same time excluding 
them from effective individual land ownership.  
In the case of redistribution of land formerly under sugar cane planta-
tions in Indonesia (Chrysantini, 2007), poor peasants could not afford to 
access the individual land titling system. These lands were controlled by 
them, but were not registered formally as private property, and so they 
did not have long-term security of tenure. Consequently, these poor 
peasant households decided to rent their land back to the sugar cane 
plantation and seek employment as off-farm labour. 
Actors at the micro-level of society use policies and institutional ar-
rangements as well as private capital to address their own livelihood 
strategies collectively or individually (Hart, 1986:13). Hart and Peluso 
(2005) found that there was a dramatic shift in the commercialisation of 
rural areasin Java after the 1998 reform in terms of livelihood strategies. 
Before the reform, there was a trend towards enhancing incomes 
through men’s off farm work in urban construction, and women’s labour 
as urban domestic helpers. However, these patterns are currently shifting 
to men working as labourers in plantations or in the mining industry and 
women becoming domestic workers in the cities, or migrant workers in 
Malaysia and the Middle East. Occupational diversity, which was a 
household strategy in the past, has now become an individual survival 
strategy.  
Land redistribution has broadened the scope for landless and near 
landless peasanthouseholdsin upland settings to revitalise their mixed 
farming activities that have proven profitable,27 as well as to expand sus-
tainable ecological production, as suggested by Sangkoyo (2002). To un-
derstand these processes at the micro level, there is need to draw on an-
other concept, applied in this study, which is the interaction of structural 
constraints and actors’ initiatives. 
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1.4.4. Structures, Actors and Classes in Agrarian Change  
Social structures (economic, political, and social/cultural) are restruc-
tured and reproduced by ‘actors’ or ‘agency’. However, individuals are 
not ‘free’ actors in effecting social change, but are subject to structural 
forces and constraints. In this study, actors and structures are conceptu-
alised not as being independent and opposed but as being interrelated 
through mutual social practices within a dynamic of ‘constrained agency’ 
(Giddens, 1986). 
The peasant household is taken as the main unit of analysis in the 
sense that household members are seen as family labour; capital (earn-
ings and savings) of household members is seen as family capital; and the 
land belonging to household members is seen as familyland (Van der 
Ploeg, 2013: 24). Peasant households may coexist within a differentiated 
rural community consisting of several classes, for example, the landless, 
near-landless, middle and rich peasants (Bernstein, 2010: 4). This unit of 
analysis has been used for the purpose of identifying: 1.) agrarian classes 
and class dynamics; 2) analysing household reproduction and accumula-
tion processes; and 3) analysing surplus transfer among households. 
Bernstein (2010: 3-4), proposed the following concept of a household 
peasant unit and its peasant farming: 
 
The term like ‘peasant’, ‘small’ or ‘small-scale’ farmer, and 
‘family’ farmer often used interchangeably in ways that are 
easy confusing.... In my view, the terms ‘peasant’ and ‘peas-
antry’ are best restricted to analytical rather than normative 
uses and to two kinds of historical circumstances: pre-
capitalist societies, populated by mostly small-scale family 
farmers and process of transition to capitalism.... Finally 
the, the term ‘family farm’ often conflates farms that are 
family owned, family managed or worked with family la-
bour. Some ‘family farms’ combine all three characteristics, 
but others do not. 
 
Broader use of this unit of analysis allows for an analysis of inter-
household processes of surplus transfer from household members and 
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of intergenerational and gender relations with inhouseholds. This can 
furtherour understanding of household members’ strategies for fulfilling 
their individual and common goals. To conduct an analysis at this level, 
the household unit of analysis was disaggregated in parts of this study to 
include individuals in the household, age class (generation) and gender 
differences. 
In this study, peasant households from different social political and 
economic formations were selected as units of direct production and re-
production of family labour power (Deere and de Janvry, 1979: 602).The 
land that was redistributed to the peasants was viewed as the production 
base of raw materials (land and water). 
Examined in a broad context, the land redistribution process is not 
only based on the responses of beneficiaries (individual household 
members), but also depends on political structures such as regulations 
and their implementation and the land property structure. This is evident 
in land distribution experiences in the Philippines and Indonesia (as de-
scribed in section 3.1). A clear political structure does not manifest on its 
own, but is based on negotiations between and among the beneficiaries 
and the government during the implementation process.  
For the purpose of this research, the interrelationship of the three 
concepts described in this chapter: commercialisation in rural areas, the 
agrarian structure and agrarian differentiation formed the basis of the 
analysis in explaining how exclusion and inclusion processes were pro-
duced and reproduced in particular classes of households prior and sub-
sequent to the land redistribution process. 
The organisational framework of peasant households before and after 
land redistribution, used in this study, is a simplified version of the 
framework originally developed by Deere and de Janvry (1979). This 
helps to clarify the mechanisms of surplus extraction (shown in white 
circles in Figure 1.1) within the process of physical production and mon-
etary circulation.  
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Figure 1.1 
Organisation of peasant households 
 
Source: simplified by the author from Deere and de Janvry (1979: 603) 
There are three key processes at work within the organisation of a 
peasant household through which surplus extraction may occur. These 
are evident at the levels of the home production process, the wage la-
bour production process and the monetary circulation process. These 
processes reveal how surplus is transferred from (or, in some cases, pos-
sibly to) a peasant household, and lead to further questions. These in-
clude, for example, how much surplus has been extracted, and to whom 
has the surplus been transferred (other peasant households or non-
productive actors)? These processes, reproduced within society over 
time, may produce agrarian differentiation as an outcome.  
The process of agrarian change, as described above, is analysed to as-
sess how land redistribution, and its exclusions and inclusions, leads to 
agrarian differentiation in rural areas.  
   
Stock of 
Means of 
Production:
•Land & 
Water
•Means of 
Work
•Labour
Physical variable of Production 
& Reproduction:
•Home Production       
(Commodity & Use value of Local 
Consumption)
•Wage Labour Production  
Process
Circulation of 
Monetary Variables:
•Circulation process 
of supply (Gross 
Income)
•Circulation process 
of demand (Nett 
Income)
Means of Consumption
Means of Work
Raw Materials
Term of  Trade                         
Rent in Cash, 
Wage in Cash  
Cash Taxes, Usury
Rent in kind, Rent  in 
Labour, Wages in 
kind, Taxes in Kind 
Surplus value
At household level 
26 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
The primary research question that this study addresses is as follows: 
How does (forest)land redistribution,based on individual land ti-
tling,contribute to processes of change in the agrarian structure of up-
land communities?  
Several secondary and associated sub-research questions that elabo-
rate on the main research question are presented below: 
1. What patterns of exclusion and inclusion occurred in(forest) land 
redistribution in upland areas?  
1.1 How and for what purpose werethe policy and institutional 
arrangementsforforest land redistribution established? 
1.2  How far-reaching was forest land redistribution for landless 
peasants? What explains the patterns of exclusion and inclu-
sion? 
2. What kinds of agrarian structures and relations have been emerg-
ing in the years since (forest) land redistribution? 
2.1 How did agrarian classes and class dynamics emerge after 
land redistribution? 
2.2 How have patterns of surplus transfer, peasant household re-
production and accumulation changed as a result of land dis-
tribution? 
2.2 What kinds of agrarian structures and bases of inequality are 
emerging as a result of these processes? 
 
1.6 Research Strategies and Methods 
This section describes the methodological design of the study, including 
the selection of sites, methods, techniques, as well as the questions asked 
during the interviews. At the end of this section, some remarks are made 
regarding the scope and limitation of the field work. The field work took 
place in two sites in Indonesia (one in Java, one in the ‘Outer Island,’) in 
various phases between December 2008 and February 2011, with the 
help of two research assistants in both sites. During this period the au-
thor made a total of five visits of approximately two weeks to each site, 
i.e. a total of about two and half months in each site. The assistants 
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stayed for longer periods in the field, particularly for completion of the 
household surveys. 
 
1.6.1 Selection of Sites 
There is a tradition in forestry as well as agrarian studies in Indonesia of 
dividing the archipelago between Java and the Outer Islands. This may 
be based on colonial traditions where by the Dutch administration, 
where policy was made and implemented, was centralised in Java,. The 
separation is based on the assumption that different patterns of agricul-
ture and agrarian differentiation developed in Java and in the Outer Is-
lands. The individual land tenure system was better known in the upland 
areas of Java, while in the Outer Islands, there was a shift from an in-
formal tenure system towards household or individual tenure system. 
The situation, however, changed after the 1998 reforms, with the centre-
periphery configuration spreading across lower scales and divisions of 
upland and lowland. The lowlands became the centre and the uplands 
became the periphery both in Java and in the Outer Islands. 
Based on the above assumptions, research sites were chosen with the 
purpose of capturing the agrarian differentiation process in areas of up-
land Java and in the Outer Islands which have been experiencing forest 
land redistribution under individual land titling. There are few areas 
demonstrating these criteria, since the concerned MoF staff  denies the 
existence of state forest area redistribution, which is consequently not 
recorded in forestry statistical data, though it happens on the ground.28 
Two sites were identified from some NGOs and Peasant Unions work 
on the ground and selected in Java and Sumatra after an initial visit to 
these areas in 2007 to check the availability of data and key informants 
from among several actors involved in the process, and their readiness to 
tell their stories. 
The first site is Sagara village, in Garut district, West Java Prov-
ince,where in 1997, after a long peasant struggle, 159 hectares of former 
forest land, was devolved by the forestry agency (MoF) to the land agen-
cy (BPN) to be redistributed to peasants for agricultural purposes 
through individual land titling. In-depth interviews with 16 households 
were carried out in Ciniti Hamlet (composed at the time of 105 house-
holds; during the household survey in 2010 the household total was 115). 
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The process of land redistribution was declared to be completed by the 
land agency, and the land was redistributed to the peasants who were 
tilling the land according to traditional mixed farming methods (talun). 
This area is currently being developed into more intensive rubber mono-
culture farming.29 
The second site is Tanjung Rejo village (formerly part of a village 
known as Tanjung Kemala, before sub-division in 2013) located in 
Bengkunat County, West Lampung District (currently in PesisirSelatan 
district) in Lampung Province. In-depth interviews with 14 households 
were conducted in Simpang Duren Hamlet (composed of 75 house-
holds) where part of the former forest land was devolved, through a long 
bureaucratic process, by the MoF to the land agency (BPN) to be redis-
tributed to migrants and local peasants for agricultural purposes through 
individual land titling in 2003.30The land was cultivated by tillers (peng-
garap) using traditional mixed farming methods, which after the land re-
distribution, were replaced by coffee and pepper agroforestry.31 
 
1.6.2. Types of Data 
Primary and secondary data from the two sites were collected and ana-
lysed in relation to the study’s three focal areas: the agrarian structure 
and agrarian relations prior and subsequent to forest land redistribution, 
and processes of forest land redistribution.  
 
The data collection was done during various periods between 2008 and 
2010-2011 in both sites, combining interviews and household survey. 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out in 2008, the household sur-
veys in 2010, followed by another round of in depth interviews in 2011 
to clarify some findings related to agrarian structure and agrarian rela-
tion. The data collection process, techniques, and groups covered at each 
step, are summarized in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2 
Data Gathering Technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6.2.1. Secondary Data and Material 
Five main types of secondary data and material were collected. These 
were: official statistical data, historical background research and pub-
lished documents on the sites, government policy related to public (for-
est) land redistribution, public opinions gathered from the media, and 
the results of research and consultations on this topic. The data obtained 
were scattered across several institutions and in three languages: English, 
Indonesian and Dutch. The main secondary data used to anchor the 
study are the cadastral maps and recapitulation of the individual land 
ownership during the land redistribution that documented the location 
of each plots, size, name of the owners, and areas, as recorded by the 
District BPN offices (Figure. 3.3 & Figure 4.4).32 
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1.6.2.2. Primary Data Compilation and Gathering Techniques 
Primary data were collected from household members at hamlet and-
village level using two methods: 
a. A household survey was conducted in 2010 to gather infor-
mation on the numbers and names of the households mem-
ber, ethnicity or hamlet of origin, role during the land strug-
gle, beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries of the land 
redistributions, main occupations and location of the settle-
ments, total area of land and other assets during the early 
stage of land redistribution (1999 at Ciniti & 2001 at Simpang 
Duren). The household survey reconstructed the peasant 
household land-based classes at the time the land redistribu-
tion had happened, which includes the non beneficiaries of 
the land redistribution in the hamlet and the beneficiaries 
that were inside and outside the hamlet (presented in Figures 
3.4 & 4.4). The household survey also captured the land-
based classes in the hamlet eight to ten years after the land 
redistribution from the former beneficiaries of the land redis-
tribution, currently located both in the hamlet and outside 
the hamlet, non beneficiaries from the hamlet, new comers 
to the hamlets, and new absentee land owners (presented in 
Figures 3.7 & 4.5). These data were collected for the purpose 
of capturing changesin the agrarian structure and also helped 
the researchers in identifying key informants for the inter-
views (semi-structured and in-depth interviews).     
These household survey data were later compared with 
the cadastral recapitulation map and data from BPN to de-
velop an understanding of the agrarian structure at the be-
ginning of the process and subsequently after eight to ten 
years. These data were collected with the help of three assis-
tants from local NGOs (Mr. Saifullah from Kawan Tani, 
Lampung, Mr. Husni and Mrs. Ayi from Yapemas, Garut) 
See Appendix 1. Table of household survey. 
b. Semi-structured interviews based on guiding questions were 
conducted in 2008& 2010with 14 key informants from 12 
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households from Ciniti hamlet and 11 key informants from 9 
households from Simpang Duren hamlet. The informants 
represented different agrarian classes, such as non-rural farm-
ing households, land lords, rich peasant households, middle 
peasant households, and landless and near landless peasant 
households, including new landless comers to the hamlets, 
that was part of the of the 2010 household survey (identified 
from the 2010 household survey). Key informants also in-
cluded beneficiaries, and non-beneficiaries of the forest land 
redistribution programme, as well as officials who were in-
volved in the process of adjudication and land distribution. 
The aim of these interviews was to gather information on the 
changing mechanisms of surplus transfer that occurred 
among households (as illustrated in Figure 1.1) from the early 
stage of land redistribution up to a period of eight to ten 
years following its implementation. This research com-
menced with those who were involved in the struggle to get 
the land back as their names appear in several secondary data 
sources, in addition to being mentioned by several key in-
formants. Subsequently, those who were not involved in the 
process were approached.  
c. In depth Interviews were carried out in 2011 with 5 addition-
al households in Ciniti and 4 households in Simpang Duren, 
that were not among the beneficiaries of the land redistribu-
tion program (see Appendix 2. List of key informants).These 
households from different classes were taken as illustrative 
cases to be analysed, following relations of surplus extraction 
between productive and non-productive actors. In-depth in-
terviews enabled a description of pre-land redistribution 
agrarian relations. Similarly, the same households were inter-
viewed to obtain a description of agrarian relations eight to 
ten years after land redistribution had taken place. (see Sum-
mary of the interview process in Table 1.2) 
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Table 1.2 
Interview Process during the Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To ensure that key informant interviews did not leave out any signifi-
cant groups, especially those who had moved from the village due to 
their being excluded from the land redistribution process, or who lost 
land for other reasons, as well as extra rural actors who did not reside in 
the village, BPN cadastral mapsand recapitulation during the land redis-
tribution were used as references to triangulate the data before and after 
land redistribution. These cadastral maps and recapitulation show the 
size of the land plots, location of the plots and individual names who 
received the individual land titles. Combining these two sources of data 
made it possible to triangulate the data of each individual whose name 
appeared in the cadastral maps and recapitulation data, to and place them 
back in each of their households, and later position the household within 
the class formations.Those who left and new comers in the hamlet were 
included in the 2010 household survey, and represented in the 2008 and 
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2011 interviews. To protect the key informants the names appear in the 
study were presented in pseudonyms. 
The language used by officials is Indonesian, but the interviews with 
peasants in Garut were held in the local Sundaneselanguage. The inter-
views with peasants in Lampung were held in different languages de-
pending on the interviewees’ origins. Interviews with local residents of 
the West Lampung coast were conducted in the Pesisir language, facilitat-
ed by research assistants, to enable the discussions to be a more com-
fortable for respondents. The other language groups in Lampung are 
Sundanese and Javanese. 
 
1.6.3 Data Analysis 
The data were analysed in several steps. First, data from the 2008 inter-
views were analysed to elicit the agrarian structure prior to the an-
nouncement of land redistribution. Second, the 2010 interviews and sec-
ondary published data regarding the two cases were reviewed to show 
the agrarian relation before the land redistribution. Third, the 2010 
household survey and the Cadastral BPN data were triangulated (as de-
scribed above) and analysed to depict the agrarian structure during the 
land redistribution, and eight to ten years after the land redistribution 
using utilizing simple frequency distributions and percentages to present 
the 6 land based classes in both sites and their changes over time. 
Fourth, the 2010 and 2011 interview data were analysed to explore pro-
cesses of change in agrarian structure ad agrarian relation eight to ten 
yearslater.  Having obtained a good picture of the agrarian structure be-
fore and after the land redistribution, and the change of agrarian relation 
within this specific context, the in-depth interviews in 2011 were used to 
cross-check the previous data and to fill in some gaps in understanding 
the process of change in agrarian relations.  
 
1.6.4 Scope, Limitations andField Work Obstacles  
The study is not intended as an evaluation of the two land redistribution 
programs. There were obstacles regarding the data collections since 
some households had already moved out from the hamlet and new 
household coming in to the hamlet. A good data set is needed as a relia-
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ble basis both for quantification ofland ownership and forqualitative 
analysis of individual experiences and expression of feelings,  as well as 
suitable methods for triangulating the interview results. There were also 
external considerations such as the rivalry between the two government 
agencies (the forestry and land agencies) that at the beginning were reluc-
tant to release relevant secondary data to support the research. Later in 
2009 the two District BPN offices (BPN Lampung Barat, and BPN 
Garut) released the cadastral map and recapitulation of the land that had 
been redistributed, which showed the object and subject of the land re-
distribution. Until the end of the data collection, the MoF did not release 
the latest data of the forest delineation process in the area, that might be 
use to over triangulate the object of the land redistribution.  In that situa-
tion, the cadastral maps and recapitulation of the land ownership re-
leased by BPN during the land redistribution became the anchor of the 
data in the research.  
 
1.7 Organisation of the Study 
This study has five chapters and two appendices. 
Chapter 1 has introduced the research issues and located them with in 
wider debates about redistributive land reform based on individual land 
titling. It provides an overview of the key concepts that have been used 
in land redistribution research, particularly forest land redistribution, and 
describes the research methodologies and data collection strategy. 
Chapter 2, based on a literature review, describes the shifts in Indone-
sia’s forestry and land policies, especially with regard to the evolution of 
state ‘forest’ land reform during the twentieth century. It discusses the 
three main options for addressing forest land conflict in Indonesia and 
giving local communities access to the land. These are: 
a. Stewardship contracts for state forest land under the Communi-
ty-Based Forest Management (CBFM) programme (Safitry, 
2010); 
b. Recognition of adat forests under the category of private forest 
land. However, as indicated by the Judicial Review of Forestry 
Law in 2013, this policy is not currently well developed. 
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c. Conversion of forest land to non-forest areas and the land redis-
tribution to tillers under individual land titling. 
This chapter aims to address the following research question: How 
and for what purpose were policy and institutional arrangements for for-
est land redistribution established, and what were the underlying assump-
tions? 
Chapter 3 first discusses the history of the hamlet of Ciniti in Garut, 
its people, and their conflict and collaboration with PerumPerhutani (PP, 
a state own timber plantation) and the Ministry of Forestry (MoF). The 
subsequent section utilises primary data to describe the agrarian structure 
and agrarian relations prior to land redistribution and its consequences 
ten years after land redistribution occurred at Ciniti Hamlet. The Chapter 
describes how far-reaching was forest land redistribution for landless 
peasants, the pattern of exclusion and inclusion in the forest land redis-
tribution process in this egalitarian peasant upland community. The later 
parts of the chapter analyze the formation of new agrarian structures and 
agrarian relations in Ciniti, as reflected in the changing pattern of surplus 
extraction as a consequence of the acceleration of commodification in 
local economy following land redistribution.   
Chapter 4: repeats the same format as Chapter 3 for the analysis of 
the second case, Simpang Duren Hamlet in Lampung. 
Chapter 5 as the last chapter starts with a summary of findings from 
the two case studies. Based on these findings, it offers some reflections 
on the necessity and the future of forest land redistribution in Indone-
sia’s upland areas, following land redistribution from former forest areas 
and their conversion to individual land ownership. It discusses the simi-
larities and differences of both cases in terms of the dynamic of land 
tenure system from time to time due to the forestry policies and agrarian 
class formation after implementation of the land redistribution process. 
Changes in agrarian relations are analysed on the basis of several surplus 
transfer mechanisms. This leads to further critical reflections on the evo-
lutionary theory of land rights and the future of upland communities in 
Indonesia that were prompted to register their farms under individual 
land ownership under the forest land redistribution program. At the 
conclusion of the chapter, recommendations based on the study are pre-
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sented relating to several policy interventions and suggestions for civil 
society and peasant movements. 
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Notes 
1The term ‘State’ Forest were used here to describe the situation that the land which own informally 
by local community communally or own informally by household but claimed one sided by the 
MoF as State Forest, even though the MoF did not followed its own administrative procedures, ie. 
forest delineation and  reach consensus with the local communities regarding the status f the land 
(Colchester, Sirait & Widjarjo, 2003).        
2Colchester et al. 2006 
3Moniaga(1993); Soemardjono (1998); Fay and Sirait (2004). 
4Richards, J (2002: 18) states that:‘ Foresters have however consistently fought for the territorial integrity of their 
bounded state-owned forest lands….’ 
5The MoF  (2007 & 2009) publication based on statistical village data (Podes) that assesses the sta-
tus of the villages located in and around forest areas, where complete villages or sections of them 
are located in areas designated as forest areas. A total of about 30.000 villages in Indonesia (40 per 
cent) were classified as being in forest areas; from total 75.000 villages in Indonesia.  According to 
MoF statistics 2014, that 12.000 villages has been formally excised from forest area for its housing 
and settlements, which meant that their farm and forest land still under the classification of forest 
areas. 
6There are no data on the overlap of the land of adat communities (masyarakat hukum adat) with 
forest areas. Aman (2013) stated that about 40 million hectares of adat communities’ land over-
lapped with forest areas. A total of 7 million hectares was mapped in 2013 and a further40 million 
hectares of adat land situated in forest areas will be mapped in 2020 (see  
http://www.hijauku.com/2013/08/26/ aman-targetkan-40-juta-hektar-wilayah-adat-terpetakan-
pada-2020/). 
7It is evident from an analysis of satellite images taken in 2001that 24 million hectares of the forest 
zone are not covered by forests (Santoso, 2002) 
8This shows that even though the population living in and around forests is not considerable, as 
shown in MoF data, these inhabitants make up 25% of the Indonesian population living below the 
poverty line. 
9Kemitraan (2014) and the National Forestry Council (DKN, 2013) have calculated that since the 
programmewas developed in 1995, only 0.5 million hectares were allocated under the CBFM 
scheme (0.51% of the forest area), and 99.5% of this area was allocated for large-scale concessions. 
Local communities registered their complaints with the Ombudsmen in 2013, regarding the MoF’s 
mal-administration and discrimination in the allocation of forests for large-scale concessions com-
pared with CBFM schemes (http://seg.mitra.or.id/2013/04/ laporan-kemitraan-2012/). 
10Bachriadi and Lucas (2002); Safitri(2007); Sirait et al.(2001). 
11Safitri, (2010). In practice, exceptions have occurred where mixed agroforestry was practiced in 
forest areas of Lampung under the HKM program. 
12See White (1999) regarding inequality of access to land and resources as the consequences of the 
large-scale Nucleus Smallholder Estate Programme implemented in upland Java. Only 0.25 million 
hectares were allocated under the CBFM scheme compared with 35.8 million of hectares allocated 
to 531 large-scale private and state forest concessions under terms of long lease (Sirait et al. forth 
coming: 45). 
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13Indonesia was ranked poorly at 102 out of 149 countries in the 2008 Environmental Performance 
Index published by Yale and Columbia universities. In FAO's State of the World's Forests (SOFO) 
Report for 2008, Indonesia was assessed as a global leader in land-based, or terrestrial carbon emis-
sions, with approximately equal emission rates from above-ground carbon stock (mostly trees) and 
belowground carbon (mostly peat lands).See Ekadinata et al.(2010). 
14Affif et al. (2005:27), who shows how the Indonesian state, as biggest and most powerful landlord, 
was challenged during this era of reform. 
15Rachman (2003b). 
16Fathullah et al. (2003) and Bachriadi and Sardjono(2006). 
17Jakarta Post(2006) on PPAN (the National Programme on Agrarian Reform) as well as the BPN 
5008–2009RAJASELA programme (Southern Java Agrarian Reform). 
18Chomitz et al.(2007: 212). 
19White and Alejandra (2002);the study for the FAO by Romano and Reeb (2006); as well as Sun-
derlin, Hatcher and Liddle (2008) who argue for the need to provide clear land tenure security 
through private ownership in Southeast Asian forests. 
20Chomitz et al.(2007:7–8) provide definitions of forest-agriculture mosaic landsandfrontier dis-
putedareas.In the former, land ownership is usually better defined, population densities are higher, 
markets are nearer, and, from the landholder’s perspective, natural forest management often cannot 
compete with agriculture or plantation forestry. Although forest is sparse in these areas, deforesta-
tion rates are high, and unique biodiversity is threatened. In frontier and disputed areas, pressures 
due to deforestation and degradation are high or increasing, control is often insecure, and conflict is 
common. 
21Corriveau-Bourque (2014) Terra Nullius: What future for reform? Tracking changes in forest 
tenure since 2002. (See:http://www.rightsandresources.org/news/ terranullius-what-future-for-
reform-tracking-changes-in-forest-tenure-since-2002/). 
22This argument has also been made by other groups such as the Resource Right Group (2007: 11): 
‘Without secure rights to own and use their assets, indigenous and other local community groups 
lack long-term financial incentives for sustainable use of their forest resources for their own devel-
opment’. 
23With the exceptions of Scoones et al.(2012);Cliffe et al. (2011); and Moyo (2011), who carried out 
micro level studies in Zimbabwe and compiled an edited book on the outcomes of post-2000 Fast 
Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe (Cliffe et al. 2013), most of the previous research and policy has 
neglected micro level analysis. See the Revitalization Agenda of Indonesian Agriculture (2005) 
(Agenda Revitalisasi Pertanian 2005), as well as the Indonesian Agricultural, Fishery and Forestry Revi-
talization (2005) (Revitalisasi Pertanian, Perikanan dan Kehutanan, 2005). See also Menkoekuin, (2005) 
and Jamal (2006) who emphasise the development of agro-industries and village-based industries. 
The Strategic Plan of the Indonesian Forestry Department (2005–2009) (Rencana Startegis Kementrian 
Kehutanan, 2005–2009) places emphasises on balancing the supply and demand of wood to support  
forest-based industries, and points to a lack of studies on peasant agro-foresters. However, the 
World Bank’s Agriculture for Development Report (2008) did not place enough emphasis on de-
scribing the problems faced by peasant agro-foresters. For details, see 
http://www.rimisp.org/consultwdr2008/. This report has been commented on by several experts, 
who still believe that wealth is redistributed to the poor by virtue of the market. The ADB’s (2006) 
report on Indonesia’s Strategic Vision for Agriculture and Rural Development also emphasises the 
problem of land tenure security and recommends land redistribution through individual and com-
munal land titling. The UNPF(2007) only makes minor references to problems faced by peasant 
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agroforesters (see Humphrey’s 2006 critique). In contrast to these reports, the World Agroforestry 
Centre (a CGIAR research centre, formerly known as ICRAF) has published reports since the 1980s 
that aim to foster a better understanding of peasants who practise agroforestry in third world coun-
tries (see www.worldagroforestrycentre.org). 
24Franco (2005)has shown that in the Bontoc Peninsula in the Philippines, most of the area’s land is 
classified not as Alienable and Disposable (A&D) land, but as Timber Land (public forest areas). 
25Sinaga and White (1979) presented a diagram of the relation between land control, source of in-
come and distribution of income that has been widely used at several seminars to illustrate capital 
accumulation by landlords and income deficits of landless and near landless peasants. 
26Thoner et al.(1986) and Van der Ploeg (2013: 48–77). 
27Budidarsono et al. (1998); and Budidarsono et al. (2000a, 2000b) for profitability analyses of sever-
al mixed farming practices. 
28From several interviews with the directorate of planology MoF, in 20 October 2007,MoF  denies 
declassified some part of the forest land and redistribute to the tillers after the 1998 political reform, 
this has happened to void further precedence to other areas. 
29Lukmanuddin (2002); and Aji (2005) for discussions of peasant struggles under the Pasundan Peas-
ant Union (SPP) to regain their land 
30Fathullah et al, 2005 on the land redistribution in Bengkunat. 
31Budidarsono et al.(1998, 2000a, 2000b) for a financial analysis of  mixed farming; Ekonesia (1995) 
on the social values of Damar Agroforest for local peasants; Colchester et al,(2006) on private sector 
interests regarding former forest land. 
32The Cadastral Maps and Recapitulation of Individual Land Ownership data produced by dis-
trict office of BPN in both districts has been triangulated with the key informants data certifi-
cates which showing the consistency and considered as a reliable data to conduct this research. 
Without access to this data, the research might not be possible. 
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2 The Emergence of Forest Land Reform 
in Indonesia 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes shifts in forestry and land policies in Indone-
sia, especially with regard to the evolution of public forest land reforms 
since the mid-twentieth century. Part of this chapter has appeared as a 
World Agroforestry Centre working paper (Sirait, 2009).1 Forest land 
reform has recently been accepted as a strategy by the MoF to avoid fur-
ther conflict with local peasants, where by responsibility for redistrib-
uting disputed agriculture lands is devolved to another state agency, the 
BPN, for individual land titling. There has been no radical change in In-
donesian forestry policy, but the forest land redistribution process cre-
ates a window of opportunity for the emergence of forest land reform 
that can potentially address inequalities within agrarian structures and 
relations. This chapter aims to answer the following question: How were 
policy and institutional arrangements for forest land redistribution estab-
lished, and to what purpose? 
National forest management in Indonesia commenced with large-
scale forest exploitation during the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 
(Dutch East India Company/VOC) period of the eighteenth century. At 
this time, the export of timber products grew rapidly to replace non-
timber forest products (NTFPs) as Indonesia’s major export commodity. 
In particular, this included teak (Tectona grandis) from Java and other 
hardwoods such as iron wood (Eusideroxylon zwageri) from Kalimantan. 
Teak was used for building ships and iron wood was used for harbour 
construction. In the late eighteenth century Java experienced considera-
ble environmental impacts due to the unsustainable exploitation of teak 
forests. This resulted in considerable forest loss and floods in Java, and 
forced the Dutch administration as the successor to the VOC, to take 
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 41 
 
serious action. In response, the wood harvest quota was cut by 50%, alt-
hough belatedly.2 
The Dutch administration transplanted ‘modern’ German forestry 
practice to Java through the introduction of teak planting and harvesting 
by German forestry scholars as well as German-trained Dutch scholars.3 
These foresters were sent to Indonesia to tackle the problem of floods 
and the decline in teak wood production in Java in 1849.4 Several policies 
were based on the principles of the German forestry school, which en-
tailed three key concepts described by Rajan (1999; 324-333) as: 
Minimum diversity aimed at harvesting as much of the same timber 
product as possible from a limited land area. A consequence of this was 
the clearing of other trees of less commercial value. 
Balance sheets aimed at converting the standing timber stock into a 
numerical value, and also calculating the optimum harvesting age of the 
trees.  
Sustained yields aimed at maintaining a logging cycle rotation over 
several decades, which required a system of forest cut blocks and an an-
nual allowable cut (AAC). 
As a result, previously random exploitation of teak forests was re-
structured, forest districts were created, and more forest agency staff 
were trained in ‘modern’ forest management.5 This forestry system was 
mathematically predictive and prescriptive6 and had two main conse-
quences: forestry activities were segregated from agricultural activities, 
and forest areas were relegated to the state domain. This separation was 
supported by a Dutch colonial policy, Domeinverklaring, in 1870 that 
claimed all land that could not be verified as private lands was state land. 
This principle was also applied outside of forest areas and large areas of 
land were allocated for export- oriented crops such as coffee, rubber, 
quinine and tea. 
To enable the application of the prescribed and ‘mathematically pre-
dictable’ German forestry system, forests were further segregated and 
allocated for several purposes within the forestry domain: timber pro-
duction, soil and water protection and biodiversity conservation. Forest 
blocks were created and forestry staff assigned to utilise, manage and 
guard forest areas. To be able to freely allocate huge areas of land, the 
new forestry system depended on a strong state to declare and defend 
forest areas as a state domain.  
42 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
This system replaced local agroforestry management practices, which 
were also known as shifting cultivation (or locally as huma). It compelled 
peasants to either fully engage in work in the forestry sector or to be-
come farmers, such as occurred within the lowland peasant society in 
Java.  
At the same time the German ‘modern’ forestry system strengthened 
the monopoly of the state over forest lands and forest products, and its 
dominance over peasants in areas surrounding forests. This process also 
occurred in other parts of the world, and has come to be known as the 
state forest enclosure process (Sikor & Thanh, 2006: 647; Hall et al. 
2011: 13). Vandergeest & Peluso 1995 and Tania Li (1999) describe this 
as a process of state territorialisation and peasant disciplining with the 
aim of being able to extract upland surpluses effectively. 
Further consequences of this system were developments in state poli-
cy that separated the peasantry from the forest and as well as from the 
state forest domain. Hall et al. (2011) have described this process as 
‘primitive accumulation’; a process that separates workers from direct 
access to the means of production. During the Dutch colonial period, 
peasants were obliged to participate in timber forest exploitation (Blan-
dong Dienst) in teak forests, and could use this as payment in lieu of the 
head tax. They were only allowed to collect NTFPs from the forest. 
Teak and other varieties of economically valuable timber were monopo-
lised by the state. The practice of shifting cultivation (Huma) was com-
pletely forbidden in Java in the 1930s.7 
 
2.2. Market Liberalisation in the Forestry Sector 
Due to the influence of Prof. Van Vollenhoven of Leiden University, 
who pointed out that the peasantry in Java was becoming progressively 
poorer,8 coupled with land conflicts over forest areas,9 an Agrarian 
Commission (Agrarische Commissie) was established in 1928 to review the 
concept and implementation of the domain of state lands in Indonesia. 
The Agrarian Commission examined the claims of the forestry agency 
over forest areas and advised the agency to revise its forestry regulation 
(Boschordonantie) in 1927. The Senior Foresters Staff Association (Va-
binoi)10 held a special meeting to address this issue in 1932, but rejected 
the Commission’s proposal, responding that German (‘modern’) forest 
management could only be effective within a domain of state lands. The 
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Association claimed that if the theory of land domains was not applied 
to forest areas, this would lead to management of forest land by an inca-
pable local peasantry (petani) and by indigenous cultural institutions such 
as marga, huta, banjar, kampong and binua. The forestry agency backed the 
position of Prof. Nolst Trenit (who opposed that of Prof. Van Vol-
lenhoven) to retain the forest domain. This meant that forest land should 
be expropriated from the possession of the owners.11 Peluso (1992) 
states that the foresters thought that they were acting on the basis of sci-
entific neutrality, but, in fact, their actions were based on their own in-
terests and those of the MoF aimed at liberalising the forestry sector in 
the hands of private logging companies.  
The state’s claim over forest areas grew rapidly following its definition 
of planted teak forests and natural teak forests as state domains and its 
subsequent claim overall natural forests over  800 meters above sea level, 
including shifting cultivation land, as a state forest domain. According to 
Article 2 of the 1927 legislation for Java and Madura, known as Boschor-
donantie, the forest domain consisted of all lands that were: natural vege-
tative forests, including bushes and bamboo; forests planted by the MoF; 
forests planted by the state; forests planted under the instructions of the 
state and other non-forested and proposed areas to be forested 
(Soepardi, 1956: 205).  
Discourse on policy changes relating to the concept of state domain 
emerged in 1960 with the establishment of the Indonesian Basic Agrari-
an Law (BAL), which rejected the concept of state land domain. BAL 
declared that the state controls and administers the land and other agrar-
ian wealth, but does not own it. However, the forestry agency continued 
to act as if all forest areas constituted a state domain. This situation con-
tinues in the present despite the fact that Forestry Law No. 41/1999 ex-
plicitly states that forests are not owned by the state; rather, they are con-
trolled and administered by it.12 
Currently, the forestry agency claims that 63% of Indonesia’s land ar-
ea falls within the forest zone, which is classified in several forest func-
tions (see Table 2.1). According to Lynch and Talbot (1995), around 40–
60 million people live as members of forest communities. Most of these 
people are peasants who practise some form of mixed farming (agrofor-
estry) within and around forest areas. These peasants access land and 
resources in all of the areas classified as forest: Production Forests (lim-
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ited production forests and permanent production forests), Nature Re-
serves, Protected Forests and Conversion Production Forests. 
Table 2.1 
 Forest classifications in Indonesia in 1982, 2004 and the projected plan for 
2030 
No. Forest Function Area (Ha), in 1982 
Area (Ha), in 
2004* 
Projected Area 
(Ha), in 2030** 
1 Nature Reserves  19,152,885 
 
24,000,000 26,820,000 
2 Protection Forests 29,649,231 
 
30,000,000 27,670,000 
3 Limited Production 
Forests 
29,570,656 30,000,000 19,680,000 
4 Permanent Production 
Forests 
33,401,655 
 
32,000,000 38,160,000 
5 Conversion Production 
Forests 
30,000,000 5,000,000 0 
 T O T A L 141,774,427 121,000,000 112,340,000 
Sources: Contreras & Fay 2005, Ministry of Forestry Statistics (2005)*, Long-term National For-
estry Plan/RKTN (2011–2030)** 
 
The process of claiming forest areas to be classified as state forest ar-
eas should be followed by processes of forest designation, forest delinea-
tion and recognition by villages and local communities who have claims 
over the land. The progress of these subsequent processes has, however, 
been slow. In 2001, administrative procedures had been completed for 
only 11 per cent of the land  (Colchester et al., 2003) and by 2014, for 
only 14 per cent of the land (MoF, 2014). The land status of approxi-
mately 100 million hectares designated by the MoF as state forest areas, 
as well as the status of local community land inside and surrounding the 
forests remain unclear (Safitri, 2010). 
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2.2.1. A Window of Opportunity for Forest Policy Reform during 
the 1998 Reform Era  
Several months before the fall of President Soeharto, under the direction 
of the MoF, a special decree recognising the indigenous agroforestry sys-
tem of the community which managed the damar agroforest in Krui, Su-
matra, was issued via  Ministerial Decree No. 47/1998 pertaining to are-
as for special purposes (KDTI). This entailed a lengthy negotiation 
process between the former logging concession holder and the Farmers’ 
Association (PMPRD), facilitated by ICRAF (Interntional Centre Re-
search in Agroforestry, an international research institution) and 
FORDA (Forestry Research and Development Agency, under the MoF). 
The ministerial decree allowed the community to continue managing an 
agroforest area of 25,000 hectares, and to extract timber and non-timber 
products, but on condition that the land was recognised as a state forest 
area. This policy was a breakthrough in Indonesian forest policy as it al-
lowed a local community to continue managing their natural resources, 
as long as they did so sustainably.13 This regulation was issued during the 
last year of the weakening Soeharto regime, a populist move leading up 
to the 1998 election.14 
Following the May 1998 reforms, several policies were changed in a 
very short time span, some of which involved days of intensive expert 
participation to formulate policies such as the revised community forest-
ry policy and programme whereby communities became the main actors 
in managing forests and were able to access timber and non-timber 
products.15 Besides policy reformulation at the government level, rallies 
and demonstrations directed at the MoF were held almost daily outside 
the parliamentary offices. One of the participating groups was 
KUDETA (Koalisi Untuk Demokratisasi Sumber Daya Alam), or the Coali-
tion for the Democratisation of Natural Resources, a network composed 
of 82 Indonesian NGOs and student organisations. This coalition urged 
the transitional government to ensure that the management of natural 
resources, and the benefits derived from them, should be returned to 
local communities (Fay & Sirait 2002). There were three main demands: 
1. Redefine the boundaries of state forests, and return the lands to 
local communities through a land reform programme; 
2. Restructure the Ministry of Forestry and merge it within a broader 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources; and 
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3. Redirect all development efforts and programmes towards com-
munity-based resource management. 
 
The legality of the state’s claim on forest areas was questioned by 
peasants’ organisations, indigenous peoples, and academics, as well as 
NGOs.16 Civil society groups also organised their efforts through the 
FKKM (Forum Kerja Kehutanan Masyarakat or Communication Forum on 
Community Forestry), which was established eight months before 
Soeharto’s resignation. Its founders included several Indonesian NGOs, 
university professors and students and reform-minded forestry officials. 
During its first year of existence, the FKKM became an increasingly ef-
fective voice for local communities located within state forest areas, and 
an important counter balance to the ‘modern’ forestry mindset within 
the MoF. The forum had a broader base than KUDETA and its work 
centred more on developing detailed critiques of forestry policy and ad-
vocating a new paradigm for natural resource management. Its strategies 
focused on the use of media, meetings with high level forestry officials, 
including the Minister, and lobbying Parliament members. FKKM takes 
the position that genuine reform can only occur after the government 
recognises the failure of previous forest management practices. It calls 
for a new paradigm which is politically, socially, economically and envi-
ronmentally sustainable to replace the focus on timber management, and 
which adopts a strategy for forest ecosystem management to counter the 
concept of the ‘modern’ forest management system.17 At the provincial 
level, civil society groups amplified similar issues relating to the return of 
forest to the people and the redefinition of state forest areas through 
community mapping.18 
The period prior to the Reformasi and the early Reformasi era were seen 
as windows of opportunity for bringing the ‘populist’ agenda to the table 
of policy makers to effect policy changes. Parallel with the policy reforms, 
forest concession holders and forest industries collapsed due to misman-
agement and debt (NRMP, 2001). Foresters started to look for alternative 
systems of forest management to replace modern forestry. At this time of 
turmoil, high-level decision makers were seeking ways to appear in a posi-
tive light. Community forestry options were explored through several pilot 
projects and a national program was initiated (see Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2 
Tenure arrangements under several social forestry policy options 
No. Programme Policy Areas Target group 
Tenure 
arrange-
ments 
Benefit 
sharing 
1 CBFM (HKM) Ministerial 
Decree 
no. 
677/1998 
jo 
31/2001 
All forest 
areas 
excluding 
conserva-
tion areas 
Farmer 
Coopera-
tives 
5 year tem-
porary per-
mit and 25 
year stew-
ardship 
agreements 
Open for 
negotia-
tion with 
the pri-
vate sec-
tor 
2 PrivateForest 
(HR) 
Ministerial 
Decree 
1997 
Private 
lands 
Individual 
and Col-
lective  
Individual 
land owner-
ship 
Open for 
negotia-
tion with 
the pri-
vate sec-
tor. 
3 Area with 
Special Pur-
poses (KDTI) 
Ministerial 
Decree 
no. 
47/1998 
All forest 
areas 
Collective No time 
limit; evalu-
ationsdone 
every 5 
years  
Sharing 
benefits 
among the 
group 
4 Co-
Management 
(PHBM) 
PP Direc-
tor Decree 
2001 
Produc-
tionForest 
in Java 
Farmers’ 
Groups 
10 years 
stewardship 
agreement 
with state-
owned com-
pany (PP) 
25% farm-
ers, 75% 
company 
Source: Sirait and Fay (2001) 
The slogan ‘Forests for the People’ featured prominently in the early 
speeches of Nasution, the Forestry Minister, as he laid the groundwork 
for developing a populist image during the 1998 Reform Era. At the core 
of his reformist approach was a strategy of redistributing benefits de-
rived from forest resources. Another important initiative by Minister 
Nasution was the creation, in June 1998, of the Forestry and Estate 
Crops Reform Committee (FECRC), an independent body tasked to 
make recommendations on the continuing process of forestry reform.19 
One of the FECRC tasks was to undertake preparations for the revi-
sion of Forestry Law No. 5/1967. The process of preparing forestry law 
was limited and there were several stakeholders involved in this process. 
Kartodihardjo & Jamthani (2006), classify four main agendas of the 
FECRC;  
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a.) policy reform to initiate solutions to the issue of who actually 
owns the forest and to accommodate local forest management. 
This group was supported by NGOs and academics,  
b.) redistribution of assets through smaller lease sizes and involve-
ment of new forest actors such as cooperatives, religious groups 
and local communities. This group was supported by the Forest-
ry Minister and the Ministry of Cooperatives,  
c.) policy reform for better and more efficient forest utilisation, and 
to regain control over the concessions. This group was supported 
by private concessions, and  
d.) nationalise forest management through state-owned companies, 
pushed by FECRC.  
However, the Ministry of Forestry took a different view of redistributing 
small lease permits, and the FECRC was dissolved.20 
 
2.2.2. Forest Reform: Progress or Regression? 
In January 1998, during the economic crisis, some months before Presi-
dent Soeharto stepped down, Indonesia signed a letter of intent (LoI) 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the loan pro-
gramme, specifying ten main targets for forestry reform that had been 
developed without much consultation with broader stakeholders (IMF, 
1998) These targets were: 
1. To increase forest taxes, establish a resource rent tax and intro-
duce a performance bond; 
2. To uphold policy barriers for forest business; 
3. To allow foreign investment in the forestry sector, especially en-
try into the forestry and estate crops (oil palm) sectors; 
4. To create a performance bond for forest business; and 
5. To limit forest conversion. 
6. To channel reforestation funds (DR) into the state budget; 
7. To decrease the timber export tax; 
8. To cancel the timber export quota; 
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9. To issue a policy for enabling long leases of forest concessions 
(100 years) through auctions, and also to run the community for-
estry program; and 
10. To allow transferability of forestry concessions and eliminate the 
requirement for concessionaires to own processing facilities 
 
In 1999, the World Bank’s Policy Reform Support Loans (Projects 1 
and 2) agreements were signed, totalling US$1.5 million as loans to In-
donesia. While the conditions of the loans were similar to those of the 
IMF, the loans had a clearer agenda and were to be implemented within 
6 months, 18 months, and over the long term. The IMF and World Bank 
prescriptions did not work well due to the lack of a sense of ownership 
by the Ministry of Forestry staff, ambiguity regarding the process of lib-
eralising the oil palm estate sector, and the lack of permission to further 
convert forest areas (point 3 and 5).21 Further funds were released 
through a Sectoral Adjustment Loan (SAL) of US$43 million.22At that 
time, donor countries that were members of the Consultative Group on 
Indonesia (CGI) put forward forest policy reform as one of their terms 
for loan restructuring, and formed the Inter-Departmental Committee 
on Forestry (IDCF). They also prepared a 12-point programme, which 
included solving the problem of land tenure insecurity in forest areas 
(point 12) (IDCF, 1999). 
At the same time, in 2001, the newly elected legislative council, with 
support from NGOs, academics, the indigenous people’s alliance and 
peasant unions, issued the Legislative Act on Agrarian Reform and Nat-
ural Resource Management (TAP MPR No. IX, 2001), which set the 
agenda and principles for agrarian reform and the future of natural re-
source management. This legislative act mandated the government and 
the legislature to review and revise the law according to the principles of 
sustainable development, national integrity, human rights, legal suprema-
cy, justice, democracy, participation and peoples’ welfare, taking into 
consideration the social, economic and cultural conditions of communi-
ties and the ecological functions of natural resources.  
The MoF responded by creating five priorities to be followed during 
the following five-year term (MoF 2001);  
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1. Eradication of illegal logging from forest areas and of the illegal 
timber trade through forest patrols and forest operations; 
2. Revitalization of the forest sector, especially the forest industry, 
through the implementation of sustainable forest management 
certification; 
3. Rehabilitation and conservation both inside and outside forest 
areas, reforestation and establishment of new conservation areas; 
4. People’s economic empowerment within and outside of forest 
areas through co-management in Java and CBFM in the Outer 
Islands; and 
5. Determination of forest areas, making every effort to complete 
the process of forest delineation and formal gazettement of state 
forest areas, with the consequence that villages and peasant farm-
ing areas would be reclassified as non-forest areas.23 
At the global level the discourse on who owns the forest, and espe-
cially the future of areas cultivated by peasants, was addressed by the 
World Bank in its 2006 Forestry Report and the 2014 World Bank Land 
Review in Indonesia which recommended the provision of clear proper-
ty rights such as ownership in these areas and their conversion to obtain 
high agriculture returns.24 It recommended transfer of forest areas to the 
hands of the local communities using forest land (forest land redistribu-
tion) but at the same time to provide them with land tenure security, in 
the form of individual land titles, i.e. the titling policy that had been criti-
cized by Platteau (1996) and others as described in Chapter 1. 
 
2.3. Forest Land Redistribution Discourse and Policies 
The priorities established by the MoF appear to accommodate all of the 
interests of the private sector, IMF-WB, regional trade, as well as NGOs. 
Indonesia is well known for its politics of accommodation whereby the 
government attempts to accommodate all interests. However, the prob-
lem was that the private sector agenda, reflected in priorities 1 to 3, 
clashed with the social agenda (priorities 4 and 5). This could be seen as 
‘Cannibalism Reform’, entailing competition between reform agendas 
and their negotiation based on power.25 
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Forest land redistribution was not a MoF priority. However, the Min-
istry responded to the movement for reclaiming forest areas initiated by 
local communities with regard to several forest areas (Bachriadi & 
Sardjono, 2005; Affif et al. 2005). Its inclusion in the agenda can be seen 
as an indication of the strength of the groups pushing for resolution of 
tenure conflicts between MoF and local communities. Following the fall 
of Soeharto, more and more forest concessions, nature reserves and pro-
tected forests have been re-occupied by peasants, who have been re-
claiming lands that they were forced to abandon during previous dec-
ades. Community forestry could not address the massive issue of land 
reoccupation as most of the peasants who had struggled for land reform 
had bitter past experiences with the community forestry program, the 
forestry agency and timber concessions. The peasant movement for land 
reform was gaining strength and momentum with the support of NGOs 
as well as the BPN (Rachman 2003a). Thus, the forestry agency now 
found it difficult to deal with this social agenda in an unprecedented pol-
icy setting, while maintaining its overarching interest of gaining revenue.  
Responding to these tensions, in September 2006, a special cabinet 
meeting was held and the government announced that a reform program 
for state land redistribution, known as the Program Pembaruan Agraria Na-
sional (National Agrarian Reform Programme or PPAN), would soon be 
launched. The MoF followed this announcement with its own an-
nouncement that it would allocate and distribute up to eight million hec-
tares of forest areas to peasants.26 Because of the difficulty it experienced 
in implementing the community forestry program, MoF devolved the 
issue of land redistribution to BPN, adopting an approach which had 
been promoted by the Word Bank to strengthen land tenure through 
individual land ownership. This sequence of events implies an assump-
tion that social conflicts in state forest areas can be solved by providing 
peasants with tenure security through individual land titling.27 
 
During the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development (ICARRD), held in Porto Alegre, Brazil 2006, the Indone-
sian delegation reported its achievement of redistributing around 1.5 mil-
lion hectares of land between 1965 and 2005 (Delri, 2006). While this 
report did not provide many details, it confirmed that not only had land 
redistribution occurred during the Soekarno era (1945–1966), but that a 
similar quantity of land was redistributed during both the Soeharto post-
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reform era (1966 up to now) without attracting much attention from 
scholars, the media and NGO activists (see Table 2.3 on the total land 
redistributed from 1966–2005). 
Table 2.3 
Total land redistributed (1966–2005) 
No. Province 
Area Redistributed 
(Ha) 
Number of House-
holds 
Area Received 
Per Household 
(Ha) 
1. Sumatra 255,392  270,808 0.943 
2. Java and Bali 546,849 905,398 0.604 
3. Kalimantan 104,031 77,911 1.335 
4. Sulawesi 172,562 185,688 0.929 
5. 
Nusa Tenggara and Ma-
luku 77,833 68,840 1.131 
6. Papua 2,860 2,117 1.351 
 Total 1,159,527 1,510,762 0.768 
Source: Delri 2006; ICCARD (2006) Indonesia Country Report 
 
Significant conversion of ‘public’ forest land has taken place since 
1998 when the MoF reclassified almost 20 million hectares of state forest 
land and devolved this to BPN to be used by non-forestry sectors. How-
ever, most of this land was used to develop new large-scale palm oil 
plantations (Sawit Watch, 2014), and to expand cities and industrial es-
tates, with much smaller amounts allocated to transmigrants and as agri-
cultural land (MoF 2014).   
 
2.3.1 Forest Land Redistribution Policies 
The land redistribution process involving forest areas is regulated by 
several policies. There are several procedures and requirements regulated 
by the MoF, as well as a procedure regulated by BPN. 
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2.3.1.1 Forest Conversion: the process in the MoF 
To change the status of forest land, the MoF has three options. The first 
is under the regulation for conversion of forest areas to non-forest areas. 
Only forests classified as ‘conversion production forests’ (HPK) are al-
lowed to be converted to non-forest areas. To change the forest classifi-
cation of an area (Protected Forest, Production Forest, Nature Reserve 
etc.), an area must first be reclassified as a conversion production forest. 
After that, the MoF decides whether the area should be converted to a 
non-forest area and placed under the jurisdiction of the BPN. MoF De-
cree no. 74/ 2001 (now replaced by MoF Decree no. 27 & 28/2014) re-
garding the conversion of forest areas, which requires a multidisciplinary 
study by scientific authorities to recommend a change of land status. It is 
almost impossible, however, to follow this procedure to reclassify a for-
est area so that it can become an object for land redistribution.  
The second procedure for converting a forest area to non-forest sta-
tus is through re-designation of the entire forest area in a province 
through a MoF decree. This process does not involve reclassifying forest 
land as conversion production forests, but follows MoF decree no. 
31/2001 for the re-designation of forest areas (currently replaced by 
MoF decree no. 44/2012 and MoF decree no. 25 & 26/2014). This pro-
cess of forest reclassification must be integrated into the relevant provin-
cial spatial plan. Most of the negotiation process excludes local commu-
nities as well as district governments. Instead, it involves direct 
negotiations between provincial governments and the MoF. Much of the 
forest area in Indonesia’s Outer Islands was reclassified between 1999 
and 2001through this process. However, this mostly took place without 
the involvement of local communities. The reclassification of forest are-
as as conversion production forests has been driven by the rapid expan-
sion of oil palm plantations in Sumatra and Kalimantan.  
In both of these processes the final decision and veto power rests 
with the MoF. The results of multidisciplinary research as well as provin-
cial spatial plans become inputs for the ministry’s decision.  
The third procedure for converting the status of a forest area is 
through a court ruling. Not many cases have happened wherein the legit-
imacy of a national forest area has been challenged through the courts. A 
court decision is followed up by a joint ministerial decree of BPN and 
MoF, which emphasises the transition process of devolving the authority 
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over non-forest lands from the MoF to BPN. Court rulings open anoth-
er window of opportunity for local communities, together with BPN, to 
classify land as the focus of land redistribution and to avoid the veto 
power of the MoF.  
 
2.3.1.2. The Land Redistribution Process at the National Land Bureau 
(BPN)  
In 1980, through Presidential Decree no. 55/1980, several tasks were 
allocated between the government offices, the BPN national office, the 
provincial governor, and heads of the district, sub-district and county, as 
well as of the village, in operationalising the land redistribution pro-
gramme. Those lands that were classified for redistribution by the BPN 
provincial office were eligible for redistribution under individual land 
titles. BPN national decree no. 224/1961 provides detailed regulations 
on the entire redistribution process. This decree regulates the objects, 
subjects and process of land redistribution. The object of land redistribu-
tion could be state land or private land, and the land is divided into a 
number of blocks consisting of several parcels to be prioritised during 
successive phases of distribution. The subjects of land redistribution 
should be tillers of the land, namely landless peasants and those whose 
land amounts to less than the maximum land ceiling (Sukanti, 1985:39–
49).28 
There are two mechanisms for land redistribution: adjudication and 
redistribution of land. These guide the entire process and determine who 
will get land and the area of land they will get (Hermit, 2004: 102–109, 
183–205). 
During a land adjudication process, an adjudication team considers 
and decides on an application for land distribution submitted by a local 
community. The adjudication team consists of the village leader and 
his/her staff who are usually assisted by prominent persons or elders of 
the village who know the history of the land claims and controls. The 
adjudication team verifies the land reform application with each benefi-
ciary and considers the existing land claims and actual control of the 
beneficiaries over the land. This process usually supports socio-historical 
claims or factual control over the land. As a consequence, this process 
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tends to legalise existing agrarian structures without changing any land-
related inequalities in the agrarian structure. 
During the land redistribution process, minimum and maximum land 
areas are strictly applied, as stipulated in the Basic Agrarian Law (No. 
5/1960 Article 7), as well as in a government regulation to replace this 
law (Perpu 56/1960 Article 1.2, regarding maximum land ownership). 
Government Regulation no. 224/1961 on Land Redistribution also regu-
lates absentee land ownership, which limits the beneficiaries to peasants 
who reside in the same sub-district, with the exception of government 
officials (civil servants, police, military) who are serving outside the sub-
district. This exception is also valid for religious leaders who serve out-
side the sub-district. The regulation on land redistribution is quite explic-
it on preventing absentee land ownership, but, does not prevent the cap-
ture of the process by local elites, and is also weak in prioritizing the 
landless and near landless through the maximum land ceiling pertaining 
to land redistribution.29 
Both processes of land adjudication and redistribution are coordinat-
ed by the BPN district office, and are managed by a committee (panitia 
persiapan land reform) appointed by the provincial BPN office. The com-
mittee consists of staff of the BPN district office, village leaders and sub-
district staff. Following the procedures, beneficiaries are excluded from 
this committee. This is quite different to the 1960–1965 land reform 
procedures, that were conducted by land reform committees (panitia land 
reform),whose members included active members of the peasant union 
representing the nationalist, communist, and also religious peasant un-
ions at the village level (Presidential Decree no/ 263/1964). 
Most of the land reform and land redistribution policies were issued 
in the 1960s during the Soekarno Presidency era. However, the next 
president (Soeharto) did not regard land reform as one of his priorities. 
After the 1998 reform, a legislative act (TAP MPR) no. IX/2001 regard-
ing Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management was issued, urg-
ing the government to re-implement agrarian and natural resource man-
agement reforms in accordance with several overarching principles. The 
PPAN programme has been incorporated in the National Long Term 
Programme (2005–2025), regulated by law 17/2007. There are two kinds 
of land objects: 1.1 million hectares of state land that are directly con-
trolled by BPN, and 8.15 million hectares of forest area which 7 million 
hectares were categorized as unproductive  (Rachman, 2012: 102–104). 
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As reported by Rachman (2012), reluctance within state ministries to 
support the PPAN has hindered the redistribution of 474 areas in 17 
provinces. 
 
2.4. The Responses of Civil Society and Local Governments 
Responses of local governments as well as of civil society towards the 
window of opportunity available for the re-implementation of land re-
form in Indonesia have varied. Several field-based peasant unions and 
NGOs are of the view that land reform processes should commence 
from the (local) village level. These groups promote village regulations 
(peraturan desa) that regulate the entire process of land redistribution from 
forming their own land reform committees to identifying the object and 
subject of land reform, redistribution, as well as the range of the produc-
tion system.30 NGOs are also concerned with the equity of land allocated 
to the private sector and local communities (DKN, 2013). 
On the other hand, peasants view the land reform policy as an oppor-
tunity to gain legal rights over the land that they have reoccupied.31 But 
there are also peasant unions that have criticised the land reform agenda 
as a way of connecting peasant land to the market.32 
Some governments at the district and provincial levels have worked 
together with local communities to negotiate land redistribution with the 
MoF and BPN. Such cases include Ciniti in Garut, where the local 
community gained their land through land reform. This is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3. A second case, discussed in Chapter 4, concerns 
Simpang Duren in West Lampung, where district governments negotiat-
ed with the MoF to reclassify forest areas established since time imme-
morial.33 
On the other hand, private oil palm plantations, forest estate, mining 
companies and industrial and housing projects are also seeking land that 
has been or could be excised from forest areas. Many local governments 
are facilitating the land allocation for large-scale concession, but only a 
few of them are supporting excision of forest areas to be redistributed to 
peasants.34 
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2.5. Concluding Remarks 
Over the last decade, forest land redistribution in Indonesia has not fol-
lowed a clearly discernable pattern (e.g. market-led land reform or state-
society-driven land reform), as has been described by Borras (2006). The 
forestry land reforms are designed to address land conflicts between for-
estry concessions and other forest allocations and local communities and 
provide them with individual land titling as a market friendly tenure se-
curity. The goal of addressing unequal agrarian structures within local 
communities is hardly ever discussed in public discourses, policies, and 
government statements; this issue seems discussed only among some 
critical NGOs, Academics and POs (Peoples Organization). There are a 
number of lengthy bureaucratic processes to follow in the land redistri-
bution programme, that only few communities were able to get access 
to. The PPAN policy has developed with individual land ownership, tar-
geting public lands and the tillers as subjects, in a bureaucratic proce-
dure. Local communities have responded enthusiastically to the pro-
gramme, hoping to solve land conflicts, and especially to prevent the 
take-over of productive agricultural lands by the State as forest areas. 
It is important to bear in mind that there is no ‘panacea’ provided by 
any one national natural resource management policy or land tenure pol-
icy that can address the problem of agrarian differentiation among the 
peasant households. The next two chapters (3 and 4) reveal how limita-
tions of the policy process are clearly apparent at the local level. These 
chapters capture processes of social inclusion and exclusion that have 
occurred from an early stage of the land distribution process up to eight 
to ten years after land redistribution has occurred.  
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1See Working Paper no. 85/2009, published at World Agroforestry Centre-SEA 
http://www.worldagroforestry.org/sea/Publications/files/workingpaper/WP0122-09.PDF 
Special note has been mentionin page 3 of the 2009 working paper, acknowledging the work as  
chapter of the author’s  current PhD study at ISS. 
2Soepardi (1956). 
3Peluso (2006:65–69). 
4The German foresters sent to Indonesia in 1849 were the geodetic experts, Bennich and Mollier 
and Balzar, followed by Van Roessler in 1855, and lastly, German-trained Dutch foresters, namely, 
Beijerinck, Noodt, Stuffken and de Sturler in 1857. This occurred about 50 years after Van 
Hogendrop reminded the government that professional foresters should be employed in Indonesia 
(see MoF, 1986a: 71). 
5MoD (1986a: 72–73). 
6Rajan (1999:333). 
7Kools (1935). 
8The poor condition of the peasantry in Java as a result of the previous policy on the cultivation 
system, and the implementation of the Lands Domain were presented in the Mindervaart Report 
9Japing(1929) asserted that land conflicts had increased since a great number of forests were desig-
nated as state forest land. Riots occurred in West Sumatra after the Forest Service collected levies on 
all wood cut from forests by local people. Previously, the local people had been free to cut and col-
lect the wood for their daily use. 
10Vabinoi (Vereniging van Ambtenaren bij het Boschwezen in Nedetlandsch Oost Indie) was established in 
1907 and published in the Journal, Tectona, from 1908 to 1955. The association changed their name 
several times: Vhabinoi (1907–1927), Vhabinoi (1927–1945) (Vereniging van Hogere Amtenaren bij het 
Boschwezen in Nedetlandsch Oost Indie), Vhabi (1945–1957) (Vereniging van Hogere Abtenaren bij het 
Boschwezen in Indonesia).See MoF (1986a:118–120). 
11See Galudra and Sirait (2006). 
12See Fay and Sirait (2004). 
13See Fay, Hubert, Sirait and Tomich (1999). 
14Similar steps were taken by the Marcos regime; at the end of his term, Marcos issued a populist 
CBFM policy (see Moniaga & Sirait, 2004). 
15Kusumanto and Sirait(2002). MoF Decree no. 622/1995 only allowed local communities to man-
age non-timber forest products. This policy was replaced by MoF decree no. 677/1998 that allows 
local communities to manage both timber and non-timber forest products. 
16See KMAN (1999). 
17See FKKM(1999)Memulai dari Dasar yang Benar Jaman Baru Kehutanan Indonesia(‘The Right Starting 
Points towards the New Era of Indonesian Forestry’). 
18Tim Reformasi Kehutanan Lampung(1999); Tim Reformasi Kehutanan Kaltim (1999). 
19See Fay and Sirait (2002). 
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21Kartodiharjo and Jhamtani (2006:33–35). 
22Gellert(2006). 
23MoF (2006). The target in2009 was to complete delineation of up to 30% of the forest areas. 
However, in 2014, only 14% of these areas have been completely delineated. 
24See the FAO study by Romano and Reeb (2006), which also makes similar arguments to provide 
clear land tenure security through private ownership in Southeast Asian forests. 
25Tankha (2006)describes Cannibal Reform as a process in which areas of a reform agenda contra-
dict each other. 
26MoF(2006c). 
27See Gellert (2006) on the Word Bank’s engagement in land titling, as well as Contreras and Fay 
(2005) on the subject of land reform. 
28The land ceiling differentiates between irrigated rice farm and uplands, as well as the population 
density of the area. It ranges from five hectares in the most populated density irrigated rice fields to 
20 hectares of densely populated upland areas (see the Government Regulation to replace law no. 
56/prp/1960). 
29Nirwana, Fidro, Fauzi, and Hendro (2002: 70–93). 
30See Nirwana, Fidro, Fauzi, Hendro (2002: 117). 
31See Rachman (2003a) and Chrisantini (2007). 
32See Pembaruan (2004, March 2008:6). 
33See Fathullah et al.(2005). 
34See also related forest land court cases, handled by Anti Corruption Commission (KPK), which 
showed that Governor of East Kalimantan had bribed by a private company to facilitate reclassi-
fication of forest area and allocated for palm oil concession (Kompas, 2006), Governor of Riau 
bribed for facilitate reclassification of forest areas for large scale palm oil company (Kompas, 
2014c), legislative member bribed to facilitate reclasification of forest land for mining concession 
(Kompas, 2008), Bogor chief district that bribed for facilitate reclasification of forest land for 
housing project (Kompas, 2014b). These cases presented the high demand for allocating forest 
lands for large scale concessions that were caught red handed by the KPK. 
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3 
Land Redistribution and Agrarian 
Change: The Experience of Ciniti 
Hamlet (Garut) 
 
 
This chapter analyses the gradual changes that occurred in the agrarian 
structure and agrarian relations in Ciniti Hamlet (West Java) from the 
1990s to the period subsequent to land redistribution up to 2010. The 
first part of the chapter provides the historical context of the settlement 
and the changing landscape of land ownership influenced by the Dutch 
and the Japanese occupations. The second part describes the background 
of the agrarian conflict in West Java province based on secondary data, 
particularly around the issue of land claimed (occupied and cultivated) by 
Javanese landless peasants that has been systematically taken by the State 
ever since the Dutch occupation, and, until recently, and later classified 
as state forest land. 
Based on both secondary and primary data,the third part of the chap-
ter elaborates on conflict and collaboration between the local communi-
ty, the state-owned timber plantation, Perum Perhutani Unit III (PP) and 
the state-owned rubber plantation Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan 
Nusantara VIII (PTPN) in Garut district where Ciniti Hamlet is located. 
Subsequently, part four of this case study, based on primary data, pre-
sents the agrarian structure and agrarian relations before the 1999 land 
redistribution. 
Part five describes the process of land redistribution under individual 
land ownership, while part six explores changes in farming practices and 
the process of differentiation under individual land ownership between 
1999 and 2010. Part seven focuses on changes in the agrarian structure 
and agrarian relations that occurred after the land redistribution process 
until 2010. Finally, part eight offers conclusions on the case study, ad-
dressing the two research questions in this study. These are: first, how 
can patterns of exclusion and inclusion in the forest redistribution pro-
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cesses that occurred at Ciniti Hamlet be explained, and to what extent 
has the programme reached landless peasants? The second research 
question asks how this process has contributed to the formation of a 
new agrarian structure and agrarian relations. 
 
3.1 The History of the Settlements 
Garut district is located in Priangan Residency (currently located admin-
istratively in West Java Province) in the southern upland area of West 
Java Island, and spreading out from the mountainous area to the south-
ern sea. Most of the area is steeply sloped, making it a high-risk area for 
landslides. Currently, these areas are classified as protected forests, pro-
duction forests and non-forest areas, all of which are considered as state 
lands. Two large-scale state-owned companies were given rights to man-
age these state lands, namely the Perum Perhutani (PP) in relation to 
forest areas and PTPN in relation to non-forest areas. 
Ciniti Hamlet belongs to Sagara village, which was previously merged 
with Maroko village in Cibalong sub-district, Garut district. The main 
villages of Sagara and Maroko are located along the Cibaluk River where 
wet rice is grown along the banks. These villages are surrounded by sev-
eral small hamlets that are also located close to the stream, such as 
Lengkong, Citoe, Ciuda, Mancagahar, Cimerak and Bendungan, all of 
which have good irrigation systems for wet rice farming. Some hamlets 
such as Ciniti, Gunung Peer and Rancaherang, which are located on the 
ridge, have no access to irrigated rice farming. These hamlets mostly 
practise traditional Sudanese mixed farming (talun), which involves 
mixed plantation of upland rice  with fruitand timber trees, banana, cof-
fee and cocoa. The mixed farms were controlled under informal land 
tenureship by peasant households from the surrounding hamlets that did 
not have access to irrigated farming. Some of these households maintain 
temporary huts in Ciniti hamlet and have houses in the main village. The 
irrigated rice farms, on the other hand, were owned by several influential 
households in the hamlet. Access to and ownership of irrigated rice 
farms have been established since the Dutch and Japanese occupations, 
and were dominated by elders from the hamlets who claimed descent 
from the pioneer settlers. 
During the Dutch occupation in the seventeenth century,  Priangan 
Residency was allocated for estate plantations. Land for coffee, tea, qui-
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nine and rubber plantations was given to European companies as con-
cessions. Some of the densely populated areas in the lowlands were 
managed under a sharecropping system between local communities and 
the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), while some of the land in the 
upland area was allocated to private European companies and was inten-
sively planted with export-oriented crops. This system, known as Preanger 
stelsel (the Priangan system), was introduced by the VOC, and was adopt-
ed by the Dutch Government until 1916 (Breman, 2010 and Elson, 
1994).  
Members of Ciniti Hamlet reported that they were told by their 
grandparents that their village was originally named Maroko, and was 
established by a Dutch coffee company that opened a plantation in Saga-
ra in the seventeenth century. The company recruited local Javanese 
workers, promising them jobs with good salaries in Morocco (North Af-
rica), as well as a pilgrimage to Mecca. These Javanese workers were sent 
by ship to Morocco. However, their ship sank along the southern coast 
of West Java, near the coastal boundary of Sagara village where they set-
tled and were instructed on how to cultivate coffee.1 The Dutch superin-
tendent further instructed the workers to look for good areas for open-
ing coffee plantations along the ridge of the Cibaluk River. These areas 
were later named Maroko and most of the workers who stayed in these 
areas assimilated with the local Sundanese way of life and lived in the 
plantation area. However, the low elevation of Maroko village made it 
unsuitable for coffee plantation. The company, therefore, replaced the 
coffee crop with rubber and left some of the land to be managed by the 
local communities and workers as mixed farms (huma). It was assumed 
that this commodity change from coffee to rubber would happen during 
the early nineteenth century with the decline in the value and production 
of coffee. The surrounding areas were later developed as rubber planta-
tions and were owned on the basis of Particulier2 (leased right to private 
companies with certain level of autonomy) and Erfpacht3 (lease right to 
private companies for periods of 90 years) status by several European 
companies. 
The large-scale plantations and sharecropper scheme during the 
Preanger Stelsel created certain class differences between landless peasants, 
who worked as paid labourers and middle class and near-landless peas-
ants who worked as sharecroppers, superintendents (mandor), merchants, 
local aristocrats (menak and sentana) and plantation owners (Breman, 
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2010). Shigeru (1994:87) reported that due to foreign investments in 
plantations in Priangan Residency, landholding concentration rapidly 
arose and by 1905, 61 per cent of the peasants were landless and were in 
chronic debt to the merchants.   
During the Japanese occupation in 1942, the Japanese army interned 
the European owners of plantations and the Dutch controllers.They 
then persuaded the peasants and plantation workers (mostly landless and 
near-landless) to open up particulier, erfpacht and forest lands for food 
production (Rachman, 2012:9). The local aristocrats were legitimised as 
village leaders (pangreh-praja) and were forced to create village administra-
tive structures within the villages and hamlets, known as Rukun Warga 
and Rukun Tangga (RW and RT).4 Right after the occupation, the Japa-
nese military government introduced the Rice Delivery Movement 
(Gerakan Penyerahan Padi), whereby local aristocrats were obliged to col-
lect rice from the irrigated rice farms in the main villages as well as up-
land rice produced in the particulier and erfpacht lands. The Rice Delivery 
Movement imposed a collection quota of 5 percent of the rice produced 
in 1940, which was later increased to 7 per cent in 1943 and 9 per cent in 
1945. Apart from this, it was mandatory for households to sell 15 per-
cent of their surplus rice production to the Japanese military government 
at fixed prices. The rice collected this way was needed to feed the Japa-
nese troops, the forced labourers (rodi) and the new Japanese para-
military social organisation, the Barisan Rakyat to support the war, re-
flected in the slogan ‘New Java Construction’ (Shigeru, 1994:122).5 
Famine and malnutrition occurred in Priangan Residency due to the 
Rice Delivery Movement, as reported from April–August 1943. The Pri-
angan Residency had a deficit of 40,000 tonnes of rice and was only able 
to collect 10,105 tonnes of rice from other districts (Kurosawa 
1973:131). 
The Rice Delivery Movement gave rise to new emerging social clas-
ses. European landlords (represented by the particulier and erfpacht own-
ers) during the Japanese occupation were replaced by local aristocrats 
(pangreh praja),who were given more power and authority to collect and 
control the rice delivery movement. Other emerging classes were mer-
chants in the cities who bought agriculture commodities from the local 
elites and from the peasants who were formerly landless and near-
landless peasants who were given access to the particulier and erfpacht 
lands (Shigeru, 1997: 84).  
64 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
After the Japanese military left the country and Indonesia proclaimed 
its independence in 1945, the Barisan Rakyat in Garut was transformed 
into several local para-militia groups, one of which was called the Laskar 
Hiszbullah Fisabilillah, headed by Kartosuwiryo, and focused on resisting 
Dutch re-occupation. The January 1948 Renville Agreement between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands partially recognised the Republic of In-
donesia, which only included Central Java, Yogyakarta Province and Su-
matra Island. The realisation that West Java was not included within the 
Indonesian administration resulted in a faction separating from the Las-
kar Hiszbullah Fisabililah and their declaration of an Indonesian Islamic 
State (NII). This faction evolved into the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indo-
nesia (DI/TII), which was led by Kartosuwiryo and based in the southern 
part of Garut District.6 The DI/TII movement was suppressed by the 
Indonesian military and by the locally mobilised anti-DI/TII para-militia 
from 1949 until 1962. This conflict created a huge split between Garut 
communities, including between Islamic religious leaders (ulamas) and the 
wider society (pesantren). It has been estimated that 10,000 to 15,000 peo-
ple were killed during this conflict, which resulted in extensive displace-
ment of people from the area.One million people were reported to have 
moved to the nearest cities and to the capital city of Jakarta during this 
period (Husken & de Jonge, 2003:90). 
The conflict resulted in the dislocation of villages in the upland area 
of Garut, including Sagara village (where Ciniti is located). The inhabit-
ants changed the names of their villages and hamlets after the rebel 
movement and military ended operations in 1962, thus, making it diffi-
cult to trace who was from which village and who were the descendants 
of former peasants who lived in the hamlets. However, several village 
leaders and key informants in this in-depth study were identified as lead-
ers who fought the DI/TII from 1949 to 1962 and were supported by 
the Indonesian Army.7 
In 1957, all former Dutch and other European plantations were na-
tionalised under state plantation companies (PPN). All such estates in 
West Java (now sub-divided into West Java and Banten provinces) have 
been amalgamated under the umbrella state plantation company, PTPN. 
The erfpacht lands were consolidated by the PPN as assets of PTPN, 
while most of the particulier lands were supposedly redistributed to the 
peasants following Law no. 1/1958. The acquisition of the rubber plan-
tation in Miramareu estate (part of the PTPN block at Sagara village), 
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which had been occupied and cultivated by the local community since 
the Japanese occupation, was not easily accomplished, ultimately com-
pelling peasants to penetrate further into the‘forest’ land. Up until 2010, 
disputes were ongoing between 131 households and PTPN Miramareu 
regarding the 125 hectares of the local communities’ land incorporated 
within the 4,267 hectares of PTPN Miramareu’s concession rights 
(HGU) (Rachman, 2012:280). 
Also in 1957, twelve years after Indonesia’s independence, the Minis-
try of Agrarian Affairs collected data on land ownership from several 
villages in Java and in other islands in preparation for the land reform 
programme. The situation in West Java showed that 87.7 per cent of the 
population were peasants, of which 60 per cent of them were near land-
less, owning less than one hectare (Slamet, 1963:29).8 These figures show 
that land was unevenly distributed and that land concentration was cen-
tred in rural West Java in the hands of landlords and rich peasants 
(Slamet, 1963:25). 
Right after the DI/TII movement surrendered in 1962, the villages 
were occupied by those who claimed to be the owners of the land, in-
cluding members of former para-militias (laskar members, who were ei-
ther for or against DI/TII). The original owners started to reclaim and 
re-occupy their houses which were mostly located close to the rice fields 
and along the river banks. The formal local elites, who owned brick 
houses and irrigated rice farms, easily re-acquired their properties be-
cause their houses had withstood arson during the conflict with the 
DI/TII movement. Unfortunately, those who had semi-permanent 
wooden houses had to make an approximation of their land and rebuild 
their houses. New households also came in after the PTPN rubber plan-
tation (at Miramareu) was re-activated in 1962.  
In 1970, Maroko village was sub-divided into three administrative vil-
lages: Maroko, Karya Mukti and Sagara. This division was due to rapid 
population growth resulting from the reestablishment of peace and secu-
rity in the area. Sagara village, where Ciniti is located, also expanded sig-
nificantly when new houses were rebuilt along the Cibaluk River and the 
irrigated rice farms were resumed.  
The West Java Governor, General Solihin GP (who served as Gover-
nor 1970-1974), convinced the inhabitants to return to their villages or 
to their hamlets in the upland area of Garut district. The Governor did 
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this through the initiation of the Rakgantang movement, which was aimed 
at persuading peasants to plant teak trees in their productive farms to 
avoid landslides. At that time, this was not intended as an environmental 
programme per se, but rather as a way for the local government to access 
and control both the upland area of Garut and former DI/TII members. 
The Ciniti villagers, on the other hand, farmed their land using mixed 
farming methods (huma) that combined teak with food crops and upland 
rice. 
As a consequence of the enactment of Forestry Law no. 5/1967, 
which delegates authority to MoF to claim state forest areas, during the 
term of the next Governor (Aang Kunaefi, military general who served 
as governor 1975-1985) MoF claimed the area of teak plantation through 
the Rakgantang programme in 1978(Rachman, 2012). Local communities 
were neither consulted to discuss any form of compensation; nor were 
their consent sought by MoF to release their farmlands as state forest 
areas. MoF used force to claim the areas as Pasir Malang II (a forest 
block of 6000 hectares), and through forced evictionsthat denied local 
communities the useof their farmlands. Most of the upland cultivated 
lands were claimed as forest areas while some parts of the settlements 
and rice fields, located at the river banks, were left as non-state areas. 
MoF granted the forest block of Pasir Malang II to the state-owned tim-
ber company, Perum Perhutani unit III (PP), which consequently classify 
theland as state forest land. 
The legitimacy claims over Pasir Malang II block in West Java, which 
were based on the colonial regulation besluit van de regering Oost Indie no. 
28/1927, issued on July 7, 1928, were deliberately ignored during the 
Japanese occupation. The local communities were pushed by the Japa-
nese military government to delegitimize the regulation in return for 
supporting the rice delivery movement. Reminiscent of the Dutch colo-
nial foresters, the Orde Baru’s technical foresters under the new regime of 
General Soeharto (1966), with the backing of the PP para-militia, exer-
cised their power to control the forest (land) through the rationale of 
preventive measures and through force. As a consequence, this excluded 
upland peasants from acquiring formal land ownership through the land 
agency Badan Pertanahan Nasional (BPN), and further excluded them from 
farming the land. This situation resulted in conflict with the foresters, 
who were hated both by local communities and by the local government. 
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Violent conflicts occurred right after the PP started working in the ar-
ea in 1978 and built a post around the allocated forest block, prohibiting 
local communities from cultivating the land in Ciniti hamlet. The PP 
used its force and legitimacy to evict local communities from the ‘state 
forest’ land. Most of the villagers left their upland farms, moving to 
nearby hamlets within Sagara village and working as sharecroppers to the 
PP under the tumpang sari scheme, as a result of which they became paid 
labourers or sharecroppers for the wet rice farm owners, or worked as 
paid labourers for the PTPN.  
 
3.2 Conflict and Collaboration: Reaction to MoF’s Claims 
This exclusion through eviction, however, did not happen to all of the 
peasants residing in Ciniti hamlet. In order to gain access to and cultivate 
the land, some peasants had to pay two kinds of payments in 1978: (1) a 
payment of around Rp. 2,500 (around US$ 6 equivalent to 20 kilo-
grammes of rice) to acquire access to a forest plot under the tumpang sari 
scheme; and (2) unofficial tax paid to the PP staff in the farming areas 
(per hut, usually consisting of one family) or the so-called pajak ko-
long9payment of around Rp. 1,000 (around US$ 2.40, which was equiva-
lent to 8 kilogrammes of rice) after every harvesting season for approxi-
mately 0.5 ha. Although the peasants paid the PP staff, there was no 
guarantee that they could use the land for certain periods of time. This 
unofficial tax or bribery of the PP staff has been in practice since 1978 
when the PP unit III was established and claimed the land as part of the 
Pasir Salam II Forest Block.10 
This unofficial tax or bribe was continued as a common practice by 
the officials and local communities at the same values until 1982. The 
result was that poor peasants were excluded from accessing the land, and 
so many either became paid labourers or sharecroppers in the neigh-
bouring hamlet, or worked as paid labourers at the nearby state rubber 
plantation. By contrast, an opportunity was opened up for the middle-
class peasants, through this unofficial tax, to access land for upland 
farming. 
The situation gradually changed after the Mount Galunggung volcanic 
eruption in May 1982, which affected a lot of villages in Garut and in the 
neighbouring districts of Tasikmalaya and Ciamis. The volcanic activity 
lasted until January 1983, causing crop failure followed by a long 
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drought.11 This resulted in severe food shortages in the hamlet and in the 
village. It also resulted in more landless peasants from neighbouring 
hamlets, who refused to pay the unofficial tax, moving to Ciniti to culti-
vate upland rice in this land without obtaining any permit from the PP. 
Bandung NGOs, notably Yayasan Sketsa Pojok (SKEPPO)andthe Le-
gal Aid Foundation (LBH), Bandung, offered support in 1990, as did 
organised student organisations from Garut Forum Pelajar Pemuda dan 
Mahasiswa Garut (FPPMG), as well as the bigger coalition, Komite Solidari-
tas Rakyat Sagara (KSRS) in 1992. As a result, the local community of 
Sagara was able to raise their voices at the district, provincial and nation-
al levels (Aji, 2005:13). 
With a variety of NGOs to support them, such as the Bandung-based 
SKEPO (working on labour issues),Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum In-
donesia (LBH) (public interest lawyers), and Forum Pelajar, Pemuda dan Ma-
hasiswa Garut (FPPMG) (a Garut-based youth movement originating 
from rural areas), communities felt empowered to organise their own 
peasant movement.12 A landless peasants’ movement, Organisasi Tani Lo-
kal Sagara (OTL-Sagara) was organised in Sagara against the state land-
lords represented by the PP and PTPN (Aji, 2006:52). This provided the 
seed of inspiration for a peasant union that was later established in the 
area in 2000, known as the Serikat Petani Pasundan (Pasundan Peasant Un-
ion) and led by Bapak Gunadi, a national pro-democratic activist from 
Garut with a legal advocacy background. While the members were land-
less peasants from the legal point of view (absence of formal land own-
ership), they came from different socio-economic class strata within 
peasant society.  
With their new consciousness as having rights over land, and their 
strengthened solidarity, these peasants refused to pay the unofficial tax 
(bribe) to the PP staff. This resulted in the increased frequency of PP 
forest operations and evictions from the area backed by the police and 
the military. The PP confiscated agricultural tools from local community 
members and later asked for money to return tools that they had confis-
cated from the rightful owners.  
Under instruction from the PP, the police, with the support of the 
military, destroyed huts and some permanent wooden houses, and 
forced the communities to leave their land. The nexus of the PP, police 
and military stigmatised the communities as being communist peasants 
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who had organised unilateral actions (aksi sepihak) by taking over the 
landlords lands similar to what happened in the 1960s. They also stigma-
tized the peasants as Muslim rebels as belonging to the DI/TII, who had 
been active in the area in the 1950s. 
These forms of intimidation and aggression continued against the 
peasants, with three peasant leaders being arrested and accused of forest 
looting and illegal logging. Court processes took place in Garut and were 
published in the local and national newspapers. The case attracted the 
attention of the general public, academics, NGOs and the student 
movement, as well as NGO advocates who later represented the com-
munities at court in Garut city. The case, as reported in the media, pre-
sented the MoF and PP as the enemy who claimed the land and evicted 
the peasants, whereas the land agency, the Garut government and the 
local communities were claiming land that was not state forest land, and 
in which the community had planted teak trees during the 1962 Rakgan-
tang programme (Lukmanuddin 2002). 
However, in 1996, two years before the May 1998 political reform 
took place, the police and the military changed their position. Instead of 
backing the PP and the state forest policy, they supported the peasants in 
reclaiming their land, and encouraged them to cut down the remaining 
teak trees and sell these trees to them. This business was organised by 
the military and police officials and ran smoothly until all the teak forest 
was depleted between 1996 and 1998. The communities then cut down 
the trees on their farms, transporting them to the main road, where they 
were paid per cubic meter. The police through the Bhayangkari (a spouse 
organisation to the police)13 measured the wood in the hamlet, while the 
military took the lead in supervising the process of cutting the wood, 
transporting it and dropping it off at the Cibalong police station. As dis-
cussed earlier, poor and disenfranchised peasant groups were excluded 
from the benefits of this teak wood business. Strong young men came 
into the area to access the teak forests. More men came from nearby 
hamlets and villages to fell the teak timber and even more people came 
to seek land in Ciniti.  
Several months before the 1998 reform, the court case was decided. 
The Garut court handed down a guilty verdict for the three local actors 
regarding the first accusation of trespassing and clearing land which was 
proven not to be owned by them. However, the second accusation of 
illegal logging could not be proven since no PP staff dared to speak up 
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as witnesses against the military and the police officials who were en-
gaged in illegal logging activities.14 Surprisingly, however, the third ver-
dict stated that the land could not be proved to be state forest land, par-
ticularly as the Pasir Salam II Forest Block had never been delineated 
and was, therefore, considered as state land.15 The three accused individ-
uals from the local Ciniti community, along with others from neighbour-
ing hamlets within the Pasir Salam II ‘Forest Block’, discussed the case 
with lawyers after the 1998 reform. They agreed not to bring the case to 
the Court of Appeals in Bandung and used the loophole in the verdict to 
apply for redistribution of the disputed state land.  
The legal consequence of the court decision was that the land could 
no longer be claimed as a state forest area, which ended the role of the 
PP and MoF in these areas. As a result, jurisdiction over the land shifted 
from MoF and PP (forestry) to the land agency, BPN, which acquired 
legitimacy through the court verdict to administer the state land. This 
opened up a path for redistributing land to landless peasants under indi-
vidual land ownership. 
 
3.3 The Agrarian Structure and Agrarian Relations in 
Ciniti and Surrounding Areas prior to Land 
Redistribution 
As discussed in the previous section, Ciniti is located in an area influ-
enced by the large-scale state-owned rubber plantation, PTPN, 
Miramareu, and the state-owned forest estate, PP, with its historical 
claim to the area. Even before the court case was decided, in 1996, PP 
relinquished control over the area, which subsequently came under the 
control of the police and the military, as well as local peasants. The mili-
tary and the police, however, departed from the area towards the middle 
of 1999 after all the mature teak trees were cut down and transported 
out of the area. Ciniti Hamlet was re-established as a formal hamlet be-
longing to Sagara village. The peasants who were residents of Ciniti 
Hamlet were from the Sundanese ethnic group, the dominant ethnic 
group in West Java, and spoke the Sundanese language. The existing so-
cial cohesion amongst the hamlet’s residents was based on their hamlet 
of origin. Those who came from Lengkong Hamlet (northwest of Ciniti) 
maintained their settlements and cultivation in the surrounding north-
western areas. Plantation labourers and workers from Rancaherang culti-
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vated and settled in the middle of the hamlet. Those from the hamlets of 
Karees, Cioa, Ciuda and Mancagahar cultivated and settled in the eastern 
part of Ciniti Hamlet (see Figure 3.1).  
Apart from identification forged through hamlets of origin, the social 
cohesion of residents is also reflected in their labour relations. A system 
of reciprocal shared labour exists among neighbours who originate from 
the same hamlet. This reciprocal shared labour is evident when upland 
rice farms are opened up, as well as during the harvesting of upland rice, 
and when semi-permanent houses are being constructed. Social cohesion 
stemming from origins was also reflected in offersof paid labour which 
prioritised labour from the same hamlet of origin. Examples of this work 
included carpentry, felling and cutting of trees and transporting wood to 
the main road. However, paid labour related to harvesting teak trees 
ended towards mid-1999. Mobilisation of labour and allocationof plots 
for each household is organized by several patrons or informal leader 
within each hamlet. These patrons are socio-economically better off 
compared with peasants in their own villages or hamlets. Furthermore, 
they also have leadership capacities, based on which they can be divided 
into four sub-groups, as described below. 
Before being introduced to the teak tree business, peasant households 
planted traditional Sundanese mixed agroforests (talun). This process 
starts with the plantation of upland rice (huma) through a slash and burn 
process. Together with upland rice, farmers plant corn, cassava, parkia, 
jackfruit and other fruit and timber trees. This ensures sufficient produc-
tion for their household consumption as well as for saleat the nearest 
market located at the Miramareu plantation (rice, corn cassava, parkia, 
jack fruit and other fruits as well as the timber). However, after peasants 
began to plant teak trees in their own farms, they could no longer prac-
tise slash and burn shifting cultivation. Instead, they cultivated upland 
rice, together with corn and cassava, in the spaces between trees under 
the canopy for local consumption. They were rarely able to produce 
more than what they required for a year. When the canopy closed (ap-
proximately three years after teak planting) the households had to find 
other plots in which they could cultivate the land in the spaces between 
trees. Cutting down teak trees, or their branches, was a common house-
hold strategy for continuing to access land for cultivation. 
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3.3.1 Lengkong Hamlet Group 
Lengkong Hamlet is located at the edge of the semi-permanent road, 
along a 30-minute walk northwest, passing through Ciniti. It is located 
on a flat plain of the upper watershed of the Cimerak River. In contrast 
to Ciniti Hamlet, which is located along the ridge between the two rivers, 
Cimerak and Cibaluk, the settlements are at a distance from the rivers. 
Lengkong Hamlet is located in a small valley that has a lot of irrigated 
rice fields and ponds emanating from the Cimerak River. These old set-
tlements were established during Dutch Colonial period, and were con-
tinuously inhabited during the Japanese occupation. The residents of this 
hamlet were evacuated during the DI/TII insurgence between 1949 and 
1962 when this area becamea battle ground between the DI/TII and the 
Indonesian military (TNI) supported by laskars. By the time the villagers 
returned to the village in 1962, local leaders from Lengkong such as 
Bapak Mahmud and his parents needed to renovate their houses, irrigate 
their farms and fix their ponds. Bapak Mahmud’s family was among the 
first families to return to Lengkong Hamlet. The hamlets in the area 
were redeveloped and grew quite fast in terms of rice productivity, fish-
ponds, houses, number of households and the area of cultivated land. 
The agrarian structure at that time was constituted by the following 
groups: (a) those who owned rice fields and ponds such as Bapak 
Mahmud family; (b) those who had no access to irrigated rice farms but 
who did have access to the upland area; and (c) those who had access to 
neither type of land and became paid labourers to the rich peasants. In 
1978, the upland areas beyond the valley were claimed by MoF as state 
forests, and management rights were given to Perum Perhutani (PP), the 
state-owned timber estate. There were a lot of landless and near-landless 
peasants in the hamlet who could not acquire access to land in Lengkong 
Hamlet, and who were, therefore, occupying the land in the lowland are-
as in Ciniti Hamlet claimed by MoF as state forests. 
There were three patrons from Lengkong Hamlet, who led the land-
less and near-landless peasants of this hamlet to occupy land in Ciniti. 
These patrons were: (1) Bapak Mahmud, a rich peasant/ who was 54 
years old during the land redistribution implementation (1999) and  65 
years old in 2010 when the household survey was conducted; (2) Kakek 
Oyok, an ex-militiaman who was 68 years old during the land redistribu-
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tion implementation process and was 79 years old in 2010; and (3) Bapak 
Oding, who started as a vendor of basins and other plastic utensils, and 
later married a rich woman from Lengkong hamlet. He was 50 years old 
when land redistribution was implemented and 61 years old in 2010. 
Bapak Mahmud was the leader (Kepala Dusun) of Lengkong Ham-
let.He owned approximately 1,000 bata (equivalent to 1.5 hectares) of 
irrigated rice fields as well as a rice mill.16As the owner of 1.5 hectares of 
irrigated rice fields in the hamlet, he is considered the richest peasant. He 
cultivates 0.5 hectares of rice fields with his own family labour, together 
with one additional labourer who helps him as a utility person and is paid 
a share of crops taken from the rice mill earnings and rent. He rented 
out a rice field of one hectare to three landless households based on the 
shared cropping system (50 per cent for the land owner and 50 per cent 
for the worker). Through these earnings, he was able to buy and operate 
the first and only rice mill in the hamlet, charging a 1/11 share for each 
hullingt hat is, 10 parts for the paddy owner and 1 part for the mill own-
er. Owning and operating a rice mill is one of the most profitable and 
popular methods of extracting surplus in rural rice farming communities. 
One part of rice is given for the costs of the hulling run by a multi-
purpose machine, which is a fixed cost that can last for a long time, and, 
if needed, can be used to generate electricity for several houses. Later, he 
used the abundant water supply from the Cimerak River for his fishpond 
and to feed the fish with mixed leaves from the surrounding farms, sup-
plemented with rice husks from the mill. He consumed a small portion 
of the rice and fish and sold most of it to the PTPN rubber plantation 
staff at Miramareu during market day. Asthe ownerof 1.5 hectares of ir-
rigated rice fields, fishponds and an operational rice mill, he was able to 
go on a pilgrimage to Mecca and became the only Haji in the area who 
was able to send two of his sons to study in Garut city.  
During the drought from 1982 to 1983, rice yields, not just in Bapak 
Mahmud's rice fields, but also in neighbouring farms were low. His earn-
ings dropped, as he did not receive much surplus from the rice mill. 
While he relied on income from the fishpond, this too dropped slightly 
due to the effect of ash from the Mount Galunggung eruption. At the 
same time, he needed to send money to his two sons who were studying 
in Garut. His produce from his rice fields was consumed by the house-
hold, and on certain occasions, it was loaned to their hungry landless 
neighbours, however, these loans were not repaid. The three sharecrop-
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ping households that had rented the one-hectare rice field were unable to 
pay their share. This situation led Bapak Mahmud to convince near land-
less and landless peasants to reclaim and improve their access to the land 
for theirown benefit and that of the younger generation. The motivation 
for reclaiming the land was to enable landless and near-landless house-
holds to acquire access to upland farms that would solve the problem of 
hunger that had hit the area. Apart from this motivation, there are also 
other positive implications. For example, the semi-permanent road pass-
ing through Lengkong village to join the main road would be main-
tained, electrical connectivity would be developed, rice production would 
increase, and Bapak Mahmud’s earnings would also increase through his 
mill and fishpond business.17 
Kakek Oyok was 68 years old when the land redistribution process 
occurred, and 79 years old in 2010. He and his family are not rich and 
are classified as near landless peasants. Kakek Oyok is one of Bapak 
Mahmud's youngest uncles. He was a former member of the militia dur-
ing the insurgency of the DI/TII in 1955 and was known for his ‘magi-
cal powers’ to win battles in the area. He lives with his wife in Gunung 
Peer Hamlet, which is a 20-minute walk from Lengkong Hamlet. He is 
still, however, regarded as a resident of Lengkong Hamlet resident be-
cause his relatives live here, and this is where he spent his childhood. 
While he does not own any land in Lengkong village, he does, however, 
own two plots of upland rice and mixed farming in Gunung Peer and his 
family cultivates the land on their own. Kakek Oyok has a small and 
simple family with no children of his own. He owns a small house in 
Gunung Peer and the family consumes all of their produce with minimal 
earnings of rice every season. As a veteran of the revolutionary war, Ka-
kek Oyok receives government subsidies every six months, which he us-
es to purchase basic items that the family does not produce. The subsi-
dies are collected from the post office at the town of Pameungpeuk, 
which gives him an opportunity to interact with his former colleagues 
from the militia and government. 
This commuting also enabled him to become acquainted with Bapak 
Sarjono from the National Land Agency (BPN) office, who showed him 
an old Dutch document that he could comprehend, with the land status 
of Sagara Village (where the hamlets of Ciniti, Lengkong and Gunung 
Peer are located). Although he is not economically wealthy and does not 
own vast lands, he is considered to be socially and politically influential. 
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He is from an elite class within society, and is well respected not only in 
his hamlet in Gunung Peer, but also in the whole of the Cibalong sub-
district. 
There was also one vendor trader, Bapak Oding, originating from 
Cisompet. He was 50 at the time of land redistribution and is 61 years 
old during the household survey in 2010. He married a rich woman, Ibu 
Oding, who was 45 years old at that time and is 56 years old (in 2010) 
and resides in Lengkong. Ibu Oding owns an irrigated rice farm of 0.5 
hectares, which she inherited from her parents, and which they cultivate 
with their own family labour. Bapak Oding used to be a vendor selling 
basins and other plastic utensils, and occasionally sold cloth during Ram-
adhan. He then decided to live in Lengkong and subsequently joined the 
land reclamation movement in order to acquire his own piece of land. 
With his own financial capital accumulated as a trader, and that of his 
wife, they were the first to open a kiosk (small shop) in Ciniti, selling all 
kinds of daily products such as batteries, soap, cigarettes, cooking oil etc. 
These three community leaders, described above, organised 28 for-
merly landless and near landless households from Lengkong Hamlet to 
join the land reclaiming movement. These households were very de-
pendent on their formal leader, Bapak Mahmud, for several reasons. 
These included their need to rent his rice mill during the harvesting sea-
son, to buy or borrow rice during the dry season, or to work as share-
croppers on his land. They were also dependent on Bapak Oding for 
selling their agricultural products and borrowing money. The peasants 
also depended on the informal leader, Kakek Oyok, for his leadership 
and bravery in dealing with police and military intimidation during the 
process of reclaiming land. After reclaiming land in 1983, these 28 land-
less and near landless households (or 31, including the three leaders) ac-
quired access to the Ciniti uplands based on their family size and the area 
of land that they cultivated.  
 
3.3.2 Rancaherang Hamlet Group 
Rancaherang is made up of barracks (bedeng) housing the PTPN rubber 
plantation workers.The hamlet consists of 40 households totalling 
around 100 people. These are workers related to the plantation; monthly 
PTPN workers, such as superintendents and clerks; rubber tappers; and 
daily paid labourers, notably young men, women and children working as 
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weeders and crop sprayers. The workers are not just from Sagara village, 
but also from several areas surrounding the Miramareu plantation. 
Rancaherang has a primary school and a football field developed by 
the PTPN. The demolition of the barracks and replanting in Ranca-
herang occurred in 1999. These barracks weredemolished after the su-
perintendents, clerks and most of the monthly workers re-
tired.Demolition is a common practice of the PTPN and is designed to 
prevent these workers from claiming the barracks and the land, which 
was replanted as a new rubber plantation block. At the beginning of the 
land claiming movement in the Ciniti uplands, a lot of landless rubber 
tappers and labourers (mostly men) filed claims. However, because of 
intimidation by PTPN officials from the Miramareu office, 30 house-
holds abandoned their claims and never got their parcel of land during 
land redistribution; only 12 continued the reclaiming process until the 
land was redistributed.18 
There were two patrons from Racaherang: Bapak Nano, the Superin-
tendent who was 52 years old at the time of land redistribution in 1999 
and is 63 during the household survey in 2010, and Bapak Momon, a 
clerk from the PTPN plantation,who was 55 years old then and currently 
66 (2010). Both were approaching their retirement age at PTPN,19and 
were financially better off compared to the other 10 rubber-tapping 
households in the hamlet. These 10 rubber tappers, who were under the 
direct supervision of Bapak Nano, were landless and decided to leave 
their work as rubber tappers to gain access to new land in the Ciniti up-
lands.20 
As a superintendent, Bapak Nano was experienced in dividing and al-
locating land amongst households in Ciniti. In the PTPN, this task of 
land allocation was the superintendent's. However, Bapak Nano did not 
leave his permanent job at PTPN until his retirement was extended to 62 
years in 2010. He went through a difficult time when he was suspected 
by the PTPN of supporting and leading the land claimants. On the other 
hand, as a respected and influential local leader in Cibalong and 
Pameungpeuk sub-district, the PTPN management counted on him to 
maintain peace and order at the PTPN VII Miramareu plantation area. 
Bapak Nano had a reputation for maintaining peace in his block and was 
respected for his influence in handling labour unrest in the Miramareu 
plantation. As a superintendent, Bapak Nano received his monthly salary 
and had access to non-irrigated wet rice fields(tanah serang) in the PTPN 
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 77 
 
area. Bapak Nano share-cropped one hectare of tanah serang with four 
households. Due to his work with the PTPN, he decided not to move 
with the land claimants to the Ciniti uplands (which had not been classi-
fied as a hamlet in 1999) when the Rancaherang hamlet was demolished 
in 1999. Instead, he moved to Leuwipari Hamlet in Sagara village, which 
was closer to the Miramareu PTPN office complex. 
Bapak Momon used to be a clerk at PTPN. He and his wife, Ibu 
Momon, decided to pursue a new life after he retired from PTPN and 
left the bedeng in Rancaherang. He also left 500 bata (0.7 hectares) of tanah 
serang, to which he had access and from which he shared the rice produce 
with two sharecropping households. The rice produce that he thus ac-
quired could feed the household for the entire season. His household, 
which consisted of his wife, two daughters and one son, decided to join 
the land reclaiming movement to pursue a better life in Ciniti Hamlet in 
1996. Leaving aside all of the PTPN privileges that he and his family had 
enjoyed during his service was difficult for him, but there was no other 
option for him and his family. With his retirement fund of 10 million 
rupiah (equivalent to US$ 1,000) which he received as a severance fund 
with some loans deducted from this amount, he cleared the reclaimed 
land and cultivated it with upland rice, cassava, corn and banana. Ibu 
Momon, the wife of Bapak Momon who is 5 years younger than him, 
was able to earn some money as a traditional midwife (paraji), ready to be 
fetched to help during deliveries in the hamlets and in surrounding vil-
lages. The payment she received was not always in cash; sometimes her 
services were paid for with chickens, rice or bananas. Bapak Momon is 
not a peasant. He is a clerk who has never previously cultivated land. 
Therefore, with his clerical skills, he kept records of the land that was 
reclaimed, while Ibu Momon and the children cultivated the one-hectare 
upland plots. 
Bapak Polo, who was 40 at that time of land redistribution (51 years 
old when the household survey was conducted) is a former rubber tap-
per from Rancaherang. He left his job before reaching the retirement 
age. He is considered to be a good rubber tapper, and was classified as 
‘A’ grade. Rubber tappers with this grade received higher monthly sala-
ries than those with other grades. They were responsible for tapping new 
plantations and also for training the daily paid labourers on how to main-
tain rubber trees and properly carry out rubber tapping. He decided to 
leave the bedeng and tanah serang in Rancaherang and start a new life in 
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Ciniti, 10 years before his retirement. With five members, this household 
cultivated land in Ciniti and received 5 plots of land (2.5 hectares). They 
cultivated rice, cassava, corn and banana on this land. 
Bapak Toto (39 at that time of land redistribution, 50 years old when 
the household survey was conducted), together with his daughter and his 
wife also joined the land reclaiming movement in 1996, 11 years before 
his retirement. His family used to live in Rancaherang,and prior to his 
retirement, he also thought of owning plots of land for his family's fu-
ture. He was also an ‘A’ grade rubber tapper and was able to claim two 
plots. The family cultivated rice, cassava, corn and banana on this land, 
and at the same time, they collected fire wood from their farmland and 
sold it at the nearest market.  
 
3.3.3 The Karees Hamlet Group 
Karees Hamlet is at the centre of Sagara village, where the village offices 
are located. This hamlet is located on the left side of the Cibaluk River, 
together with several other hamlets such as Cioa, Ciuda and Mancagahar. 
All of these hamlets have paved roads through which they are connected 
to each other along the river and up to the main road. The hamlets situ-
ated along the road have access to electricity and are considered as non-
forest areas. Those situated along the river valley, consisting of rice fields 
and settlements, are also considered as non-forest areas. However, the 
area further up from the valley towards the ridge is considered as state 
forest area. The upland land cultivated by the Karees peasants, located 
along the ridge, was considered a state forest area. 
The main patron from Karees, Bapak Imdad, (who was 45 years old 
at the time of land redistribution, and 56 years old in 2010) was elected 
as the village head of Sagara. However, due to accusations against him of 
criminal activities while he was leading the land reclaiming process, he 
was never officially designated as the head of Sagara by the sub-district 
head. However, he was socially, economically and politically better off 
compared with other peasants from Karees. He owned an irrigated rice 
farm of one hectare in his hamlet of origin in Lengkong, and had a per-
manent house at Karees. This rice field was shared with three sharecrop-
ping households in Lengkong and the produce was more than enough 
for his family's consumption. He was also better off compared to peas-
ants from Cioa, Ciuda and Mancagahar,who were mostly landless or 
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near-landless. As an elected hamlet leader, he convinced landless and 
near-landless peasants, not only from the Karees, Cioa, Ciuda and Man-
cagahar hamlets, but also from other hamlets in Sagara such as Cimerak, 
to join in reclaiming land up to the Karees valley ridge, entering the Cini-
ti uplands. There were 17 near-landless and landless households that 
joined the land reclaiming movement from Karees. 15 from Cioa, 7 from 
Ciuda, 3 from Mancagahar and 2 from Cimerak were able to gain access 
to land.  
Bapak Suaep (55 at the time of land redistribution, 66 years old in 
2010) is a landless peasant from Karees who joined the land reclamation 
process in 1996. He was a sharecropper in Karees hamlet and so reclaim-
ing land was the only way for him to own a plot. Bapak Suaep has 4 
members in his family and he acquired access to, and later formal owner-
ship of, more than 5 plots of land in Ciniti. He cultivated rice, cassava 
and banana in this land, which helped to improve his family's livelihood. 
Bapak Suaep has been the right hand of Bapak Imdad in the process of 
coordinating the land claims of beneficiaries from Karees, Cioa, Ciuda 
and Mancagahar.  
 
3.3.4 The Bendungan Hamlet Group 
Bendungan Hamlet is located on the right side of Cibaluk River in 
Sancang village, which has huge irrigated rice farms and fishponds. This 
hamlet is considered the richest hamlet in Cibalong sub-district. Howev-
er, while the hamlet has plenty of rice fields, there are also plenty of 
landless and near-landless peasants in this hamlet who are selling their 
labour as paid labourers and sharecroppers. 
Bapak Surade (45 at the time of land redistribution, 56 years old in 
2010) is a trader from Bendungan who invited landless and near-landless 
peasants to work with him to cut teak wood from the Ciniti area and en-
couraged them to cultivate the lands in 1996–1997. By doing so, he was 
able to buy cheap teak wood, make doors and sell them at the nearest 
town, Pameungpeuk. Although he never resided in Ciniti, his influence 
attracted quite a number of landless peasants to Ciniti, including one 
household from Cibalong and one from Pameungpeuk (both landless). 
Two young men from these households sometimes came to the village 
to sell their labour for his teak business as well as during harvest time. 
They later decided to join the land reclamation movement and brought 
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their families with them. Bapak Surade himself was not interested in 
joining the movement, but was interested in obtaining teak wood as raw 
material for making furniture. Due to this, a criminal case was brought 
against him and he was accused of illegal logging in 1997–1999.  
 
3.3.5 The Citoe Hamlet Group 
Citoe is located outside Sagara village but is still considered to be part of 
Cibalong sub-district. Distance-wise, its location is quite far compared 
with the other hamlets. Two brothers, who originally came from landless 
peasant households in Citoe, joined the land reclaiming movement be-
cause of the insurgency in Aceh.  
Bapak Daryo  (35 years old at the time of land redistribution, 46 years 
old in 2010) and his elder brother, Bapak Daryi (40 years old at that time, 
51 years old in 2010) went to Aceh to join the transmigration program. 
However, they were expelled by the para-militia during the civil conflict 
in 1996. These two landless brothers were well trained in rubber cultiva-
tion at the transmigration areas and were eager to own land for rubber 
cultivation. In Aceh, they had seen how transmigration could improve 
the livelihoods of their families through harvesting rubber latex, before 
they were expelled. Despite not having any money or assets, these broth-
ers were able to reclaim land on which they cultivated rice, bananas and 
corn, and slowly introduced rubber seeds, which they received from 
Bapak Nano.  
 
This hamlet was established based on differences in the social, eco-
nomic and political situations of its residents, who nevertheless interact-
ed with each other. Most of the elites of each hamlet, who were involved 
in the land redistribution process, did not reside in their hamlet,with the 
exception of those from Rancaherang (due to the demolition of the 
hamlet).  
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Table 3.1 
Origins and class positions of households in Ciniti hamlet before the land 
redistribution 
No Origin 
Number 
of HHs 
Class Ethnicity 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sagara Village  
  Lengkong 32 1 rich peasant, 1middle class 
peasant and trader, 30 land-
less peasants 
Sundanese 
Karees 17 1 rich peasant, 16 landless 
peasants 
Sundanese 
Rancaherang 12 Plantation workers: 1 superin-
tendent and middle class 
peasant, 1 former clerk and 
10 plantation wage labourers 
11 Sundanese, 1 
Javanese 
Cioa 15 15 landless peasants Sundanese 
Ciuda 7 7 landless peasants Sundanese 
Mancagahar 3 3 landless peasants Sundanese 
Cimerak  2 2 landless peasants Sundanese 
2 
  
Neighbouring villages in 
Cibalong sub-district 
    
Bendungan  14 1 trader and middle class 
peasant, 11 landless peasants 
Sundanese 
Citoe 2 2 landless peasants Sundanese 
3 
  
From the sub-district city 
Cibalong  
    
Cibalong 1  1 landless peasant  Sundanese 
 Total Number  105   
Source; interviews with 10 key informants from different hamlets in between 10-20 July 2008 
The residents of Ciniti Hamlet came from different hamlets and vil-
lages in the vicinity, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The households came 
from several hamlets inside Sagara village (dominated by Lengkong, Ka-
rees and Rancaherang), as well as from neighbouring villages (dominated 
by Bendungan village), and one person came from Cibalong sub-district.  
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Figure 3.1 
Map of the origins of Ciniti Households 
Sagara Village
PTPN State Owned 
Rubber Plantation
Ciniti hamlet & number of 
households
Neighboring hamlets & 
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village
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neighboring village in the 
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Cikondang village
Maroko villageKaryamukti 
village
Indian Ocean
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Source: Bakosurtanal 1999 & household survey 201021 
The social structure of the local community of 105 households that 
accessed land in Ciniti prior to land redistribution in 1999can be su-
marised as comprising the following four social economic classes: 
1. One rich peasant, Bapak Mahmud, who lived in Lengkong but 
hadestablished a farm in Ciniti. 
2. Three middle class households that farmed but did not reside in 
the hamlet. These were headed by Bapak Nano, who was still an 
active superintendent at PTPN; Bapak Imdad, a resident and the 
elected head of Sagara village, based in Karees; and Bapak 
Surade, a trader residing in Bendungan. 
3. One trader, Bapak Oding, and one former PTPN clerk, Bapak 
Momon, who also farmed land and resided in Ciniti. 
4. Two landless peasants skilled in rubber cultivation, who 
cultivated land but resided in Citoe; and 98 landless households 
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who resided in Ciniti.This group could be further sub-divided as 
follows: 
a. 12 households, skilled in rubber cultivation, who were 
originally from Rancaherang but resided in Ciniti  
b. 87 households from, Bendungan, Cimerak, Mancagahar, 
Ciuda, Cioa Rancaherang, Karees and Lengkong hamlets   
 
3.4 Patterns of Surplus Transfer prior to Land 
Redistribution 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, a pattern of transfer of surplus 
from peasant households to extra rural actors was identified in Ciniti be-
fore land was redistributed under individual land ownership. This en-
tailed the eight forms described by Deere and de Janvry (1979:607). The 
eight forms, involving private appropriation, were: rent (in labour, cash 
and kind); the labour market (wages in cash and kind); market produce 
(terms of trade); money lending (usury) and through the state (tax). 
 
3.4.1 Rent in labour  
Several patterns of rent in labour prevailed in Ciniti. This main mode of 
transferring surplus occurred between extra rural actors and peasants in 
Ciniti, during the period of PP's existence (1982–1996). Peasants planted 
banana, maize and corn, intercropped with the primary product, teak 
trees. Every peasant was required to maintain the teak trees in order for 
PP to be able to acquire access to the area claimed as state forest land. 
Maintaining teak trees included planting, weeding and taking care of the 
new saplings. Surplus transfer through rent in labour was carried out of-
ficially by PP through an intercropping scheme (tumpang-sari), as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. In this scheme, intercropping could only be prac-
tised for four years, after which time the canopy became too dense to 
cultivate food crops. After this period peasants had to gain access to an-
other plot for another rotation of intercropping.22 The trees that were 
previously planted under the rakgantang programme become the primary 
trees for PP, and one of the main sources of surplus extraction, in the 
form of rent in labour transacted with PP, from the peasant households 
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that farmed in Ciniti. This mode of transferring surplus from peasants to 
PP that entailed extra time invested in labour to maintain teak trees, free 
of charge for the company, could be classified as surplus extraction.  
 
3.4.2 Rent in Cash 
To get access to the nearest plot for tumpang-sari cultivation, and to build 
a hut on the farm, peasant farmers in Ciniti each paid PP officials (the 
superintendent or mandor) an amount of Rp. 2,500 (equivalent to approx-
imately 20 kg of rice) to acquire access to the land. They paid a further 
Rp. 1,000 per year for each hut (approximately equivalent to 8 kg of rice, 
for uang kolong). This practice of providing rent in cash has been in effect 
since 1982, and the total sum was collected by the hamlet coordinator. 
For some of the households that did not have the required cash, rent in 
kind in the form of  rice was extracted at a value of 20 kg of rice per plot 
annually, and 8 kg of rice per hut, annually. Besides rent in labour 
through the tumpang-sari schemefor surplus extraction, peasants were also 
subjected to rent-in-cash or rent-in-kind modes of surplus extraction. 
This practice was curtailed when local communities refused to con-
tinue complying with the tumpang-sari scheme and stopped bribery prac-
tices (uang kolong and uang plot tumbang-sari) with regard to PP officials. 
This occurred after they were reported by the PP as forest encroachers 
in 1996. In the same year, with the support of FPPMG, and LBH Ban-
dung, the peasants acquired new evidence regarding the legal status of 
their claims to the land, as well as an understanding of the official role of 
PP and the practices of misconduct (bribery and corruption) of its offi-
cials as a form of state exploitation of citizens.In Ciniti and other areas 
where land was being reclaimed in forest areas, peasant communities re-
fused to pay rent in labour, cash or kind to any extra rural actors.    
 
3.4.3 Rent in Kind 
During the heat of the reformasi movement between 1996 and1998, 
the police and military encouraged local communities to engage in illegal 
logging. The wood from the trees that were planted by peasants under 
the rakgantang programme were taken by the military and police officials, 
who, in return, gave the peasants security to cultivate the land with food 
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and perennial crops. The practice of surplus extraction from peasants in 
Ciniti (tumpang-sari or rent in labour) and by PP officers (rent in cash or 
kind) provided an avenue for peasants to acquire full control over the 
forest land, which they called re-claiming  
Extra rural actors (the military and police) availed of this opportunity 
to extract surplus from peasants in Ciniti through rent in kind by using 
their power to provide peasants with secure access to the land for farm-
ing. The teak timber they cultivated became the share of the police and 
military, while the land was for the peasants. Further, each household 
member was obliged to practise terresing23and felling teak trees within 
their own plot. The military and police would hire tree cutters to chop 
the timber in bulk and transportit to the police post at Cibalong. The 
terresing was done as surplus extraction in the form of rent in labour by 
women or children in the household without receiving payment. Two or 
three months after this had been done, the trees would dry up and were 
then ready for felling by the men without payment (additional surplus 
extraction in the form of rent in labour). 
An internal practice of rent in kind also occurred among owners of 
wet rice fields in Lengkong and Bendungan and landless peasants in 
Ciniti through sharecropping of paddy according to pre-determined 
equal shares of 50 percent to the land owner (bagi hasil) and 50 percent to 
the sharecropper. Bapak Mahmud, a rich peasant in Lengkong and the 
owner of the rice field, assumed part of the responsibility for the farm’s 
failure during the 1982–1983 droughts, together with the sharecropper. 
The produce barely met the basic consumption of the landless share-
cropper. This situation was a great loss for Bapak Mahmud,who assumed 
the main responsibility by foregoing his expected share and allowing the 
sharecropper to consume the rice. Since 1984, the sharecropping system 
between Bapak Mahmud and the three landless peasant households has 
been resumed. Bapak Ibnu (52 years old in 2010) from Ciniti refused to 
join the tumpang-sari scheme, and for 10 years (1986-1996) was a share-
cropper, applying rent as a form of surplus extraction (see Box 3.1).  
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 Box 3.1: Ten years of sharecropping; the experiences of  Bapak Ibnu’s household 
 
Bapak Ibnu, who is originally from Lengkong, has a house in Ciniti and used to cultivate  land in 
Ciniti. He was forced to join the tumpang-sari scheme in 1982 and participated in only one 
four-year cycle. He paid  PP officials to allow him to maintain his house, but was asked to pay 
more to obtain access to the new tumpang-sari plot. He refused to do so and chose to work as 
a sharecropper for Bapak Mahmud, rather than continuing as a sharecropper with PP and 
making an extra payment to the PP official to get access to the next tumpang-sari plot.  
 
He and his family  of four worked as sharecroppers from 1986 to 1996 and received 50 percent 
of the rice product. He said: “Working as sharecroppers to the rice farm owner,  utilizing 355 
bata (equal to 0.5 hectare)  rather than working as tumpang-sari beneficiaries, was our 
decision. After we shared the harvest with the owner, we had enough rice for our food and sold 
the rest to Bapak Mahmud. We  also received a guarantee that we could  continue  
sharecropping during the next harvesting season with relatively predictable yields. During the 
1982–1983 famine, Bapak Mahmud did not ask for his share that we could not fulfil due to the 
failure of the harvest. In the tumpang-sari scheme, our yield fluctuated, and we needed to pay 
extra to the PP official to get access to a good plot for the next cycle .If this official left Ciniti, 
how would  we pay to the new official? I would rather serve people whom I trust, rather than 
someone from Lengkong hamlet”.   
 
Box 3.1: Ten years of sharecropping; the experiences of Bapak Ibnu’s household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another mode of rent in kind was practised in Ciniti after the teak 
tree business folded up in 1999. It was not easy to start upland cultiva-
tion in the land while waiting for the planting season. The peasants, 
therefore, utilised the root bark of the teak trees underneath the ground 
in their own plots to produce charcoal. Charcoal making requires some 
expertise that is not acquired overnight. This kind of work was also done 
on a product sharing basis involving a team of two to three young men, 
assisted by one elder with experience in charcoal production. The prod-
uct-sharing ratio was one part of charcoal for the land ‘owner’ and two 
parts for the workers. The charcoal was bought by traders who would go 
to Ciniti in a pick-up car, and purchase charcoal by the sack (karung). The 
practice of charcoal production stopped after the teak wood was re-
moved from the farms.  
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3.4.4 Wages in cash  
Cash was paid for wage labour at PTPN VIII and this practice pre-
vailed among peasants in Ciniti from the 1960s up to 2010, as they 
sought cash for their domestic needs, such as paying school fees, buying 
clothes and utensils, cooking oil, cigarettes, and other requirements.To 
obtain cash, Ciniti residents sold their labour to the neighbouring PTPN 
rubber plantation as daily paid labourers who carried out spraying (young 
men and women), weeding (young men and women) and rubber tapping 
(a few men). This kind of wage labour became the easiest household 
strategy, especially for young men and women, while waiting for yields of 
their farm produce. Youth and women received less than the standard 
payment (Rp. 25,000 for half a day’s work in 2010, equivalent to 3 kg of 
rice).24 Men from Ciniti faced difficulties in competing for this wage la-
bour because of the higher rates paid to men who worked as daily paid 
workers at PTPN VIII  (Rp. 30,000 for half a day in 2010, equivalent to 
3.5 kg rice). Moreover, most of the work classified as men’s work (rub-
ber tapping) was being done by PTPN’s monthly paid workers, who 
were trained and graded (A–C) as rubber tappers. Only occasionally were 
men accepted to work at the PTPN plantation. 
The terresing and felling of the teak trees that occurred between 
1996and 1999 provided an opportunity for men in the village to form a 
group to fell timber trees in blocks with personal chain saws and to 
transport the timber manually to the village main road. This was ar-
ranged by the police and military officials through paid labour,  paid on 
the basis of the total wood in cubic metres received at the main road(Rp. 
200,000/m3or US$ 16.6) for the transporter and Rp. 500,000/m3or US$ 
41 for the cutter). This was not the price of the teak paid by military and 
police officials, but only the price of labour for cutting and transporting 
the trees to the main road. The price of teak at the local market was Rp. 
5,000,000 (US$ 416 in 1998) per cubic metre and demand was increasing 
for the furniture industry (Widyaningrum et al, 2003: 21).Thus the sur-
plus extracted by the military and police from the peasants was very 
high.   
Because of this profit margin, Bapak Surade, a local trader from Ben-
dungan, looked at this as an opportunity and hired Bapak Agus a peasant 
from Bendungan with carpentry skills to process the timber into teak 
doors. These teak doors were sold in Cibalong for Rp. 200,000 each, 
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while Bapak Surade paid Bapak Agus Rp. 100,000 per door. Buying teak 
directly from the peasants would have threatened the monopoly in tim-
ber of the military and police.  
To operate his business smoothly, Bapak Surade bribed the police or 
military officials by making them wooden teak doors. This was not a 
form of wage labour, but rather a transfer  of rent in kind between 
Bapak Surade and the military and police officials. Bapak Surade regular-
ly sent teak doors to the agreed place and according to the agreed num-
ber negotiated with the military and police commanders. The total num-
ber of doors far exceeded the number for a single house (approximately 
four doors are required for a permanent house in the sub-district) at a 
total of 15 teak doors. This indicated that the doors were not used for 
local consumption by the military or police officials, but were instead 
sold in the market. To produce almost 100 doors, Bapak Surade hired 4 
local carpenters, and he gave away 20 doors as rent in kind: 15 to the 
police and 5 to the sub-district head, to guarantee being able to buy 
wood directly from the peasants and secure the transportation of his 
products to the town.25 
Wage labour opportunities paid in cash were also available in the 
hamlet for those who had particular skills, such as carpenters like Bapak 
Agus. As a carpenter, Bapak Agus not only made doors for Bapak Su-
rade; he also made furniture as well as houses for people in the hamlet. 
He was usually helped by a junior carpenter or assistant to construct a 
house. His skills were valued at the same standard amount that daily 
male workers at PTPN VIII received. This PTPN VIII standard became 
the benchmark for the labour market in the surrounding village, which 
was hard for peasants in Ciniti to follow. A carpenter was paid Rp. 
35,000 a day working from 07.00 to 14.00and with food (a breakfast of 
coffee and steamed banana or cassava and lunch provided by the house 
owner).  
 
3.4.5 Wages in Kind 
In the irrigated rice farms surrounding Ciniti, it was common for the 
land owner to pay the labourer wages in products through the gacong sys-
temduring the harvesting time. The gacong labour harvested the riceas a 
group in one to three days, and as their wages received 1 part of the rice 
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harvest, while the land owner received 11 parts for the land owners 
(11:1) (wages in kind). The prescribed share changed frequently based on 
the availability of gacong workers. Before land was reclaimed in 1996, 
landless and near landless peasant households relied on this system in-
volving rich and middle class peasants who owned rice farms for their 
basic requirements of rice. However, during the rush to move to the 
Ciniti uplands between 1996 and1999, the gacong share changed in favour 
of labour, from 11:1 to 9:1 because of the difficulty in obtaining labour. 
Subsequently in 2000, labour from nearby villages was also utilised by 
irrigated rice farm owners in Lengkong and Bendungan and the owner’s 
share returned to 11:1.  
There were also other skilled labourers who received wages in kind, 
for example, Ibu Momon, a traditional mid-wife. She was well known 
and served not only in Ciniti Hamlet, but also in the surrounding areas 
of Sagara village. Her expertise was appreciated in kind rather than in 
cash. She received payment in kind equivalent to two live chickens for 
facilitating normal deliveries. She never charged a specified price, but the 
standard payment (wage in kind) was two live chickens.      
 
3.4.6 Extraction via Terms of Trade 
Extraction via terms of trade was practiced in Ciniti by Bapak Oding, 
the trader, in exchange for industrial products required by local commu-
nities, such as cigarettes, soap, cooking oil and cloth and agriculture 
products produced by the peasants, such as rice, corn, and bananas.At 
the beginning of the reclaiming process, there was only one trader, 
Bapak Oding, in the village, who opened a small kiosk in Ciniti where he 
purchased agricultural products, such as charcoal, rice and bananas. 
Transfers of surplus also occurred with pick-up traders, who came regu-
larly to the village with a pick-up truck, usually during Ramadhan, to sell 
cloth.  
Besides selling agricultural products such as rice, coffee, fruits and 
vegetables, women and children from Ciniti and from neighbouring 
hamlets also collected branches from the terressing teak wood for fire-
wood and sold this to the kiosks in the villages/hamlets between 1996 
and 1998. Firewood from timber teak is a good quality wood to use for 
small-scale fish drying operations and palm sugar processing in the 
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coastal areas. Walking inside the plots to collecting fallen branches of 
teak wood was quite dangerous work as old branches could  fall from the 
trees at any time. This practice was stopped altogether with the dimin-
ished supply of teak timber trees. Till the present, fire wood was being 
collected by each household from its own farm for local consumption.  
 
3.4.7 Usury 
Usury happens when peasants need some cash but do not have the 
agricultural produce to sell to traders (kiosk owners such as Bapak 
Oding). They, therefore, borrow moneysubject to a guarantee that they 
will subsequently sell their products to the traders at a certain price. This 
practice is known as ‘uang tancep’ (money for deal). A deal is made regard-
ing the price of an agricultural product, which is lower compared with 
the price it would fetch if it were to be sold in cash. There is no record 
of any outside money lenders coming to the area besides Bapak Oding 
and his kiosk. 
 
3.4.8 Taxes 
There are two kinds of internal community taxes: taxes in cash pay-
ment and in kind. Since the land is considered as state land, local com-
munities supposedly do not pay any land tax to the state.However, land 
tax is still charged to all peasants who hold identity cards and are regis-
tered as households in their villages. Previously, land tax was not based 
on the land that they cultivated, but was divided among all households, 
assuming that each household had a house on a particular land plot for 
farming.The tax was paid annually in cash (Rp. 1,000 equivalentin 1982 
to 2 Kg of rice in 1982 and increased to Rp. 10,000 (1999 equivalent to 
1.5 kg of rice in 1999). The tax was collected by the village head and of-
ficially submitted to the district government. 
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Figure 3.2 
Summary of the eight forms of surplus transfer in Ciniti  
before land redistribution 
 
 
Source: Interviews 2008 & 2010  
 
All of the peasant households were engaged in the practices of rent in 
labour, rent in kind and rent in cash, to gain access to forest land. To be 
able to meet rent in labour payments, peasant households used their in-
ternal labour to plant and produce rice. To be able to fulfil rent in cash 
payments, peasant household members also needed to sell their labour at 
the nearest state rubber plantation.    
 
3.5 The Land Redistribution Process 
The process of converting land from state forests to non-state forests 
entailed a lengthy struggle between the local communities, the local gov-
ernment, BPN and MoF. In the case of Ciniti Hamlet, the peasants' land 
No Form of 
Surplus 
Extraction  
HHs from the 
Hamlet
Intra Hamlet To Village Actors To Extra Rural 
Actors
Notes
1 Rent in Labour
Peasant HHs PP officials IPP intercropping scheme     
(Tumpang-sari:  1982-1995)
Women and 
Children 
Military and Police Teressing teak trees (1996-1998)
2 Rent in Cash Peasant HHs PP personnel Rp. 2,500 + Rp. 1,000
3 Rent in Kind Peasant HHs PP personnel 20 +8  kg rice
Peasant HHs Military and Police Teak Trees (1996-1998)
Peasant HHs Landlords Irrigated  rice sharecropping 
(maro)
Peasant HHss Traders (Bp. Surade) Military, Police and 
Sub-District Officials
Bribes with teak doors
Peasant HHs Charcoal-making
4* Wages in Cash
Peasant HHs and 
Carpenters
Traders (Bp. Surade) Produced teak doors
Peasant HHs PTPN Daily paid labour (buruh harian)
5* Wages in Kind
Peasant HHs Landlords (Bp. 
Mahmud)
Seasonal paid labour (gacong)
Peasant HHs to 
Skilled Peasants
Carpenters, mid-wife etc.
6 Terms of Trade
Peasant HHs Traders (Bp. Oding) Exchange of agricultural and 
industrial products
7 Usury
Peasant HHs Traders (Bp. Oding) Borrowing cash and returning 
agricultural product (uang tancep)
8 Tax
Peasant HHs State Village development tax 
(Ipeda/Ireda)
Surplus transfer from landless/near landless HHs to medium and rich peasant HHs
Surplus transfer from peasant HHs to village traders and  landlords
Surplus transfer from peasant HHs to extra rural actors
Surplus transfer from village  traders to extra rural actors
s*  Extraction of surplus value in capitalist 
production relations; labour power sold for wages 
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reclaiming action required a legal basis to acquire clear land tenure secu-
rity. As explained earlier, this process began with a court case initiated in 
the district court in Garut, which resulted in the imprisonment of three 
peasants: Bapak Mahmud, the hamlet leader from Lengkong; Bapak Su-
rade, a trader from Bendungan; and Bapak Imdad, the elected village 
head from Karees. They were reported by the PP for forest looting, and 
subsequently arrested by the police. 
The case was brought to court with the accusation against the three 
peasants that they had encroached on state forest areas. It was proven 
that the peasants represented by these three leaders had occupied and 
cleared land in  an area that they did not own.   
The judge's verdict stated clearly that the peasants (represented by 
these three leaders) had occupied and cleared (encroached) land that was 
not theirs. However, the second verdict stated that the land was not 
proven to be state forest areas, but was rather free state land.26 The legal 
consequence of the first verdict was that the three individuals were sen-
tenced to serve four months at Garut prison.27 The second verdict, how-
ever, transferred jurisdiction over the land from MoF and the PP to 
BPN and the local government. This situation changed the constellation 
of power relations, which were previously seen as being bipolar entailing 
MoF and PP against the local community who were viewed as participat-
ingas a single entity in the land reclamation movement,28 towards a more 
tri-polar contestation with BPN on one side, the local government on 
another and the local community on the third side. 
After the court case was settled, the peasants,with support of FPPMG 
and LBH Bandung, organised an application for land redistribution by 
presenting data on the tillers’names, origins and the size of each plot in 
Ciniti and other neighbouring hamlets and villages to BPN.29 Following 
the MoF decree, the demands of the tillers, as well as the highly publi-
cised case in the media, BPN Garut supported the peasants’ proposal 
and forwarded this to the BPN provincial office in Bandung. As a result, 
the provincial office of BPN in Bandung allocated a small area of eight 
hectares for land redistribution (redistributed to 20 beneficiaries in 
1997),which was later followed by the allocation of 211.5 ha (55.5 ha in 
Gunung Peer and 160 ha in Ciniti) among 551 beneficiaries.30 
To enable redistribution of the land, the BPN central office in Jakarta 
declared certain areas as subject to land redistribution through a gradual 
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process, and also regulated how and to whom the land would be redis-
tributed. First, BPN declared the area located in two Hamlets in Sagara 
(including 160 hectares at Ciniti and Karya Mukti), and encompassing a 
total of approximately 600 hectares and 1,455 individual land tillers31 as 
being subject to land redistribution.32The 600 hectares of land allocated 
for land redistribution was only 42 percent of the entirearea of 1,400 
hectares of land cultivated by the local communities in the two villages 
(Karya Mukti and Sagara). At the same time, MoF took back the area 
that had not been declared by BPN as a target of the land redistribution 
programme through the re-designation of West Java’s forest areas in 
1999 (MoF Decree no. 419/1999, issued on June 15, 1999). 
The new forest designation was followed by delineation on the 
ground, but this operation was not successful completed due to rejection 
by the local communities of the omission of the rest of the area to be-
come state forests. Tillers who were not included in the BPN’s declara-
tion of land redistribution maps and name lists, and who in fact com-
prised more than half of the tillers, could not join the land redistribution 
programme. This meant that although they could still access the land, 
they were excluded from acquiring formal land ownership and were left 
with no security of land tenure in areas classified as state forest areas. 
This kind of procedural regulation within a rigid spatial location led to 
the exclusion of a significant proportion of tillers from the programme. 
At this stage, BPN did not acquiesce to the demand of the peasants to 
accommodate the whole of the former Pasir Salam II forest block, which 
had been opened up and tilled by the peasants. BPN staff assured them 
that theyfirst needed to save the 600 hectares for redistribution to land-
less peasants, and would subsequently declare the rest of Pasir Salam II 
forest block and redistribute this land to landless peasants. However, 
until March 2011, there were no plans to continue the land redistribution 
programme in the rest of the area claimed at Pasir Salam II Forest Block.  
At the village level, the government was represented by the BPN staf-
fand sub-district administration staff, backed up by military and police 
personnel for security reasons. The sub-district devolved the task to the 
village head, and due to the solid and strong peasant demands in Ciniti, 
the village head of Sagara devolved the process of land redistribution to 
the hamlet leader of Ciniti following the land redistribution regulation 
discussed in Chapter 2. At the same time, Bapak Momon, the hamlet 
leader (a retired clerk from PTPN VIII Miramareu), who was also the 
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secretary of the OTL Sagara (Organisasi Tani Lokal Sagara), the new peas-
ant organisation based in Ciniti Hamlet, became involved in the process 
of land reclamation.33 Bapak Momon became the central support person, 
preparing all the data and information for the entire process of land re-
distribution and cadastral mapping undertaken by the BPN in 1997 and 
1999. Bapak Momon, with the support of FPPMG and LBH Bandung, 
also succeeded in lobbying the BPN to cover the costs for the registra-
tion, cadastral mapping and issuing the certificates of land ownership. 
The first phase of the land redistribution began with the successful 
redistribution of 7.9 hectares (20 land plots) in December 1997, and fol-
lowed with 151.7 hectares (436 land plots) in 1999. These lands were 
registered and cadastrally mapped and presented as recapitulation data 
and in a map presented in Figure 3.3. This first batch of land distributed 
in 1997 of 20 plots belonging to 12 households. This first batch of plots 
was located in the middle of the hamlet in the most accessible area. This 
happened five months before the May 1998 political reform. A special 
ceremony for handing over the certificates of ownership to the 20 tillers 
was organised at the Ciniti hamlet by BPN, together with the local gov-
ernment of Garut, and was covered by national and local media during a 
time when peasants, students and NGOs were rallying against the 
Soeharto dictatorship in Jakarta. This action and the media profiling was 
meant to de-radicalise the peasant movement, which had significantly 
expanded at that time, and was linked to the national peasant movement, 
as well as to the pro-democratic movement to compel the Soeharto dic-
tatorship to step down.34 At that time, Bapak Gunadi, the main advocacy 
leader who brought FPPMG and LBH Bandung into Sagara, was arrest-
ed and sentenced to eight years of jail due to a riot case in Tasikmalaya 
that occurred on December 26, 1996 in which he was not involved.35 
This first batch of land redistribution was unable to de-radicalise the 
peasant movement, and instead came to signify the winning spirit of the 
peasant movement.The second stage of land redistribution occurred in 
February 1999. As a result, land-totalling 161.76 ha was redistributed to 
458 tillers (individual names). See Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 
Recapitulation data of the land registration and a cadastral map of the re-
distributed land in Ciniti (1997 and 1999) 
 
Source: BPN Cadastral Map (1997 and 1999) 
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3.5.1 Results of the Land Redistribution 
The BPN recapitulation data of the land registration and cadastral map  
presented the individual names of the tillers and the sizes and locations 
of the plots. However, they do not reveal from which households the 
tillers came, and whether they were landless, middle class, peasants, rich 
peasants or landlords, or extra rural actors. Nor do they reveal which 
households received the biggest plots, and which households received 
the smallest plots. 
Interviews with key informants who were involved in the process of 
land redistribution (conducted in 2008) and through household surveys 
targeting those who were in the hamlet (in 2010) facilitated the analysis 
of the cadastral data and maps.They also revealed several issues that 
emerged as a result of the land redistribution as follows: 
1. The household origins of beneficiaries; 
2. The area of the land and plots received by each household; 
3. The social economic social class based on the size of the land per 
household; and 
4. The   number of household members and their age. 
The land redistribution programme was aimed at redistributing the 
land equally to all of the landless (tuna kisma). However, instead of using 
the term  ‘landless’ that was rarely used within local communities, the 
hamlet committee and the BPN staff used the term penggarap or tillers 
(individual persons or households that occupied and cultivated the land). 
This term was commonly used within the local communities, with the 
assumption that those who tilled the land did not own land in other are-
as. This term helped to ensure that all peasant households that accessed 
the land became the beneficiaries of the land redistribution, with the re-
sult that no landless peasant households existed after the land redistribu-
tion but did not help to differentiate those who were near landless and 
those who owned land in other areas, even though the local peasant 
leader knew who owned what land in Ciniti and the surrounding ham-
lets. Admittedly, it was difficult for him to exclude the local elite (such as 
Bapak Mahmud, Bapak Oding and Bapak Imdad) who owned land in 
their own hamlets, tilled the land in Ciniti and were also patrons in the 
land reclaiming movement. A clear differentiation was made between 
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those who joined the movement and those who did not. Those who 
joined the movement were termed tillers, while outsiders were termed 
non-tillers. The data reported by OTL Sagara to BPN during the process 
of identifying tillers showed that the redistributed land was allocated 
among the tillersi n the names of 450 individual beneficiaries, who each 
got less than 0.5 hectares per individual, following the national regulation 
(OTL Sagara, 1999).  
However, when the BPN data and data from the household survey 
2010 (conducted in the research) were analysed, it showed that the land 
was distributed among 450 beneficiaries belonging to 115 households 
and consisting of 456 plots.36 These individual names were grouped and 
were assigned to households in Ciniti, except for four names that were 
not those of the tillers. The origins of the households that got the land 
included several areas: (a) Ciniti hamlet (36%); (b) outside Ciniti hamlet 
but inside the village of Sagara (55.14%); (c) the village of Sagara 
(4.68%); (d) outside the district but from the sub-district Cibalong (2.26 
%); (e) the nearest city Pameungpeuk (1.15%); and finally (f) the capital 
city of Bandung (0.77%).  
The largest area of land was distributed to the couple composed of 
Bapak Oding and Ibu Oding. They received a total of 2.3 hectares divid-
ed into eight plots under the names of their son and daughter who were 
residing in Bendungan (neighbouring Sagara village). On the other hand, 
the smallest area of land (1,135 metres or 0.11 ha) was given to Ibu Eu-
tin, an old widow from Cioa who resides in Ciniti. Besides the tillers who 
were landless, near landless, middle class, and rich peasants, there were 
also non-tillers who benefitted from their influence and thereby acquired 
land. There were four extra rural actors (one policeman from Cibalong, 
one military personnel from Pamuengpeuk and two BPN staff from 
Bandung) who acquired land ownership as gifts from the local commu-
nities. As a gift of gratitude in return for their support of the redistribu-
tion process, the four of them were allocated a total of 1.45 hectares. 
Even though these staff never asked for land, the hamlet elders dis-
cussed the matter and agreed that every tiller should shift a little bit in 
order to give a piece of land to these four individuals. The tillers agreed 
but with certain conditions: that the land would not be consolidated in 
one block, but should be scattered in four different places, and that the 
land would not be on the main road. Apparently, the land was located in 
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remote areas that were not easy to access. This created in absentia land 
ownership in the area and these land areas have never been cultivated 
further. They were among the first areas of land to be sold to extra rural 
actors (Bapak Nanang) from the nearest town, Pameungpeuk. 
The land was distributed to households within the range of a maxi-
mum area of 2.3 hectares and a minimum area of 0.11 hectares per 
household, resulting in the pattern of land distribution shown in Figure 
3.4 below. 
Figure 3.4 
Landredistribution among all beneficiaries’ household & class differentia-
tions, 1999 
 
Source: BPN Cadastral data (1997-1999) & retrospective data from the household survey (2010)37 
 
Combining the BPN’s cadastral map with data collected from the 
household survey conducted in 2010 and interviews with key informants 
held between 2008 and 2011, and taking into account the four extra rural 
actors, enabled a classification of peasant households into seven classes 
based on their land ownership in Ciniti and their status as extra rural ac-
tors. There were no landless households as all of the tillers received land. 
Six households (5.2 per cent) received less than 0.2 hectares, and were 
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classified as near landless peasants. Almost half of the households in 
Ciniti (58 households constituting 50.4 per cent of the total) received 
larger than 0.2 to 0.75 hectares,and were classified as middle peasant 
(category II) households. A total of 30.4 per cent of households (35 in 
total) belonging to the middle peasant  (category I) received between  
0.75 and 1.5 hectares of land, and 13.6 per cent of the households, classi-
fied as rich peasant households, received between 1.5 and 3 hectares. No 
household (in the landlord class) received more than three hectares. 
However, 3.5 per cent of the beneficiaries that received land were classi-
fied as absentee land owners. There is, however, another way of inter-
preting the data, namely that 40.5 per cent of the land was distributed to 
middle peasants I (30.4 percent of the households); 32.6 per cent of the 
land was distributed to 14 per cent of the households; 25.9 per cent of 
the land was distributed to 50.4 per cent of the households; 1 per cent of 
the land was distributed to six near landless peasants (5.4 per cent of the 
household), and 1.5 per cent of the land was distributed to four extra 
rural actors (see Table 3.2.). 
Table 3.2 
Household classes based on land ownership, directly after the land redistri-
bution in 1999 
Household Class Class range of land ownership in hectares HH 
Percentage of 
total land 
Landless 0 0 0 
Near Landless 0.01 up to 0.2 6 1 
Middle Peasant II 0-21 up to 0.75 58 25.9 
Middle Peasant I 0-76 up to 1.5 35 40.5 
Rich Peasant 1.51 up to 3  16 32.6 
Landlords More than 3.01  0 0 
Total number of HH 115 100 
Source: Household survey 2010 
 
The criterion for land distribution to the peasants was that the land 
should have been tilled and cultivated by individual peasants belonging 
to certain households. This led to a situation in which households with 
larger numbers of adult household members got larger total areas of   
household land. Conversely, households with smaller numbers of adult 
household members got smaller areas of land.  Figure 3.5 presents the 
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situation with a majority of households in Ciniti having  two adult mem-
bers.38 The definition of adults in Ciniti used as the lower age range  
teenagers above 13 years old who had a junior high school ID card as a 
land administration requirement, proving that they were ‘adult’ tillers. 
Households that had six adult members received a larger share of the 
land (2.5 hectares) compared with other households with smaller or larg-
er numbers of household members. The rush to reclaim land by peasant 
households, including junior high school children, after the withdrawal 
of PP between 1996 and 1999 resulted in this structure. Chayanov’s (Van 
der Ploeg 2013) dynamic relationship between household demographic 
growth and land cultivated was evident in the Ciniti context both during 
and after land reclamation. More hands (adult household labour) were 
needed to work on the farm, which consistently increased the total area 
of the household’s land (Van der Ploeg, 2013:87). After the PP with-
drawal, land in Sagara was considered as unlimited for tillers to access. 
The OTL Sagara leaders convinced SMP students, originally from Ciniti, 
to join the land reclamation movement even though they were not living 
with their parents in Ciniti due to the distance they had to walk to school 
(approximately 1.5 hours back and forth).39 The new classification of 
adult household members as those who needed land, and occupied and 
cultivated land, implied that households with larger numbers of adult 
members received larger parcels of land, while households with smaller 
numbers of adult members received smaller parcels. These were accom-
modated by the land redistribution committee and reflected in the results 
of the 2010 household survey. 
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Figure 3.5 
Distribution of households by land area and number of adult members in 
Ciniti 
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Source: household survey 2010 
An analysis of the results of the household survey, comparing the age 
group of the household heads and the average land area that they re-
ceived in 1997-1999, revealed the following. A total of 37 percent of the 
households in the 35–40 years age group acquired land ownership. A 
further 35 percent of households were below 35 years old, and 30 per-
cent of them were between 40 and 55 years (see Figure 3.6). Peasant 
households have endured a long struggle of 16 to 17 years from 1982, 
when the land was taken from them, up to 1997 and 1999 when they 
finally obtained ownership of the land. During this long period of strug-
gle, they lost the opportunity to cultivate the land and make a better life 
for their households.  
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Figure 3.6 
Percentage ofhouseholds by age group category of household heads Ciniti 
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Source: household survey 2010 
A consequence of this was the domination of the middle age group 
(35–40 years and 40–45 years), with a medium number (3–4) of adult 
household members having got the opportunity to acquire wider lands. 
Looking more closely at the actors involved in Ciniti, and at the house-
hold level data reveals that the 35–40 year age group was dominated by 
12 households that were formerly part of the PTPN labour force from 
Rancaherang. They were led by Bapak Momon and Bapak Nano, who 
were anxious about entering into their retirement without possessing any 
land for constructing a house or for cultivation. This group constituted 
the new land owning class (owning between 0.75–3 hectares), the middle 
class (category I), and rich peasants (see Figure 3.4). This situation re-
flected the conflict that occurred in 1996–1997 between the PP and the 
local community, especially the phase when the PP became weaker, and 
the tillers more dominant. Groups with stronger capabilities to lead, and 
mobilise their household members received a larger share.  
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In contrast to the peasants from Rancaherang, who were ensured a 
certain level of intra-group equality  based on the criteria  of household 
size in the land distribution process, land among the 29 landless  house-
holds from Lengkong was unevenly distributed. Three households, in-
cluding that of Ibu Eutin, who got the smallest plot (0.11 hectares), were 
considered as near landless households (owning between 0.01 and  0.2 
hectares); 16 households were entering the middle peasant category II 
(owning between  0.21–0.75 hectares); 10 households were entering the 
middle peasant category I (owning between 0.76–1.5 hectares); and two 
households headed by Bapak Mahmud, the Lengkong hamlet leader and 
Bapak Oding, the trader,  became rich peasants (owning between 1.51 to 
3 hectares), see Table 3.2. 
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive official data base of land 
ownership available that could be used to trace land owned by an indi-
vidual outside a hamlet or village, as mentioned in the Basic Agrarian 
Law (BAL) to avoid land concentration by absentee land owners or ac-
cumulated to several persons. The local land redistribution committees 
lacked such data to exclude rich peasants from getting a share in the land 
redistribution programme. There was also no available database for iden-
tifying the landless and near landless households that needed to be prior-
itized for land redistribution. The committees from each participating 
hamlet were well aware of who were the landless and near landless peas-
ants in their hamlet, but never spoke up in this regard. Feelings of in-
debtedness to the local elite from Lengkong hamlet during the famine in 
1982, and of gratitude for being recipients of land through land redistri-
bution in 1998/1999, led them to avoid raising the question of how land 
redistribution was formalising the (unequal) agrarian structure. At the 
same time, there was no available mechanism to prevent non-tillers (ex-
tra rural actors) from acquiring access to land. This was adversely experi-
enced mostly by small landless and near landless  households that only 
received  a small number of plots when competing with  large middle 
class peasant households had to share a part of their  land collectively 
with the other households to be given to the extra rural actors as gifts 
(four extra rural actors).  
Having analized the distributions of land plots and titles in this case 
and the in equalities involved in the process, the question could be raised 
whether this could be considered a case of a land redistribution rather 
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than simply a case of land titling, which prepetuates the pre-existing pat-
tern of acces to land. Technically it is correct that not much redistribu-
tion happened on the ground, but I have continued to use the term ‘re-
distribution’, because this term has been used by both the government 
and the peasants.  
 
3.6 Farming Practices and Processes of Differentiation 
under Individual Land Ownership (1999–2010) 
After the land was redistributed and cadastrally mapped by BPN, 
peasants felt that their land tenure was secure from appropriation by 
MoF, even though they had not yet received their individual certificates 
of ownership over the land. The local peasant union was strongly moti-
vated to prove that they could manage the land more sustainably than 
PP and MoF (leuwih hejo in the Sundanese language, means more green), 
and more productively than the neighbouring PTPN (leuwih ngejo, means 
more rice), and guarantee sufficient rice for peasant households from 
upland cultivation (patuangan pinuh kukejo, means stomach full of rice). 
They aimed to prove that land tenure security through the provision of 
individual land titles to households would be much better (more produc-
tive, sustainable and promoting food security) than giving them access to 
large-scale forests or estate plantations which would contribute to pov-
erty and famine for peasant households. Cultivating the land and intensi-
fying its productivity started with local initiatives to plant the land with a 
combination of food and cash crops in upland rice farms (huma), includ-
ing banana, corn, cassava, and later after the rice harvest, planting a vari-
ety of fruit trees in the form of a multilayer canopy known as talun (in 
Sundanese language). This constituted an agroforestry system (the scien-
tific term).  
In this mixed garden system (talun), rice and banana were the main 
products. Rice was produced in five months for local consumption, and 
the rest was sold in the market. Besides rice, each household produced 
corn, cassava and vegetables for local consumption. Cash earnings were 
obtained from the bananas that were harvested from the sixth month 
onwards at fortnightly intervals. Bananas were sold to the small shops in 
the village, and collected by the middlemen or outside traders who came 
with their trucks every two weeks to the village. However, bananas need-
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ed inputs such as fertilisers for good growth, and this was an extra cost 
for the peasants. The talun system was combined with fruit trees, mostly 
parkia (petai), the fruits of which were harvested throughout the year and 
consumed as well as well as sold in the market. The local Garut govern-
ment introduced mango trees within monoculture farms that could po-
tentially increase incomes within the local community, be less labour-
intensive and protect the land from landslides. However, while the trees 
grew well, and also produced fruit, these did not fetch a  good market 
price and were only harvested once a year. Rubber monoculture became 
the preferred farming system, replacing talun rice farming. The tech-
niques involved in rubber tree farming were familiar to the peasants in  
Ciniti, who  lived in proximity to  the PTPN.    
After the rice was planted, and in anticipation of a good harvest, Cini-
ti residents built a primary school (SD) in their hamlet, which they ran as 
a private school. Establishing this school enabled households with 
school-going children to reside permanently in Ciniti and reduced their 
school transportation costs. Previously, most of these children had to 
walk for an hour to reach the school at Karees. Alternatively, they were 
taken by ‘motor cycle taxis’ (ojeg) to and from the school. The school also 
reduced the household costs of having to maintain two houses, one at 
the hamlet with the school (Karees, Lengkong and Bendungan) and one 
at the hamlet where they owned land (Ciniti) as happened before the 
school established. Post-1999, there were still several households that 
maintained two houses because of the problem of the school’s distance 
and owing to their transition from being  landless sharecroppers to  
households that cultivated their own farms at Ciniti. 
 
3.6.1 Processes of Class Differentiation among Peasant House-
holds 
In this section, examples are provided of contrasting post-land redis-
tribution trajectories of individual households. 
Bapak Suaep, with his wife Ibu Suaep and their two daughters, repre-
sent a successful peasant household that acquired two plots of land dur-
ing the land redistribution process. Their house in Karees has been con-
structed on land belonging to someone else, and they do not have land 
for cultivation in  Karees. Prior to land redistribution, this household 
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was able to survive and make a living through a sharecropping arrange-
ment with Bapak Imdad (the village head) involving 250 bata of irrigated 
rice cultivation.  Due to the increase in land prices outside forest areas, 
and the population growth in Karees, landless peasants like Bapak Suaep 
were hardly able to make a living in Karees. The owner of the land on 
which Bapak Suaep had built his house asked him to vacate the land or 
else pay rent for the land he occupied. Through the land redistribution 
programme, he received two plots; one plot in his name and the other 
plot in his wife’s name. To be able to cultivate the two plots, he needed 
to simultaneously maintain two houses: a semi-permanent house in Ka-
rees and a small hut in Ciniti. He worked by himself at the farm in Ciniti 
and his wife continued their sharecropping arrangement with Bapak Im-
dad, helped by their two children after school. It was hard work for them 
to maintain two houses and cultivate lands in two different places.   
This household followed the traditional talun system of upland rice 
cultivation, combined with cultivation of bananas and fruit and rubber 
trees. After land redistribution, rubber trees were the most preferred 
species planted by the peasants in the area since the local government 
provided support in the form of free rubber seedlings and some fertilis-
ers for intensification of farming within local communities. Combining 
huma (intercropping of rice, corn and banana) with intensive rubber 
farming similar to the neighbouring PTPN, was a trend followed by a lot 
of households in Ciniti, to achieve the main goal of patuangan kejo, lembur 
ngejo and leuweung ngejo.  
Bapak Suaep’s household found that during the three or four years 
following closure of the canopy of rubber trees, the yield of the banana 
trees declined and ended, before the sixth year, which was when the 
rubber latex was ready for the first harvest. These two to three years 
(years 5 and 6) were thus a critical time for households, especially for 
those who only had one plot of land. Bapak Suaep’s plots were used for 
huma and intercropped with rubber trees. The household transitioned 
very effectively from being partial share croppers to becoming land 
owners who cultivate their own land and were be able to stay together as 
a family in Ciniti. When they saw that there was a continual banana crop 
to harvest every two weeks, and that the rubber trees were growing well, 
in 2002, after receiving their last 50 per cent share of the rice farm pro-
duce from Bapak Suaep, Ibu Suaep and the two daughters (aged 13 and 
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14 years old) moved to Karees. They dismantled the house in Karees and 
recycled materials that could be used again to build a semi-permanent 
house in Ciniti. With the savings they had accumulated as labourers, they 
planted rubber in the second plot. This household survived the difficult 
transition period to become managers of their own land. They cultivated 
the land, and in 2006 were among the first households to harvest rubber 
latex from their first plot, followed in 2008 by a rubber latex harvest in 
their second plot. In 2007, both of the children left the village, following 
their father to Sumatera, where they assisted him as street peddlers in 
Lampung.     
Only a few households were able to develop their own farms and in-
tensify the productivity of their land through banana and rubber farms, 
using their own earnings and savings within the agrarian economy with-
out support from the non-agrarian economy. This can be seen in the 
case of Bapak Suaep’s household, who were able to intensify the produc-
tivity of their land without paid labour, helped by their own household 
members during the eight years of transition (1999–2007). Since 2006, 
Bapak Suaep and Ibu Suaep have relied for their livelihoods on the rub-
ber latex they harvest every day through a rotational system. The product 
increased from time to time, especially in 2008 when the second plot be-
gan to produce rubber latex. Rubber latex sapping is not a difficult job 
for Bapak Suaep and Ibu Suaep, who are in their sixties. They commence 
rubber latex sapping early in the early morning from 06.00 am until 10.00 
am. After that, Bapak Suaep collects branches for firewood from the 
rubber farm for preparing their brunch (combined breakfast and lunch). 
He prepares the rubber latex, mixing it with acid, and rolls it into sheets. 
At noon, they have already returned home and can enjoy their own time 
there or doing something else. They sell rubber sheets every week to the 
nearest small shop, and every three weeks Kang Ija (son of Bapak Nano, 
the superintendent from Rancaherang) organises trucks to collect the 
rubber sheets sold in Lampung.     
In 2008, this household received money (remittance) from their chil-
dren, and Bapak Suaep used this, together with their accumulated sav-
ings, to invest in buying two more plots from the Karees peasants who 
sold their land, Ibu Aam (2007) and Kakek Maulana (2008). He gradually 
developed his third and fourth plots, combining huma and rubber farm-
ing, and working as a gacong labourer during harvesting time in Bapak 
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Imdad’s rice field. This household could afford to buy rice from the 
nearest shop, but working as gacong labour in the nearby hamlets is a 
means of acquiring rice through labour relationships that could reduce 
their production costs.  
Bapak Suaep was known as a diligent farmer who worked on his farm 
together with his wife, without the help of paid labour. The household 
succeeded in making the transition from being landless and working as 
sharecroppers to becoming a middle class category  II peasant household 
during land redistribution, and eventually rising to the middle class cate-
gory I in 2010. This household owned and cultivated the land produc-
tively, and moved away from feudal agrarian relations with the state (rent 
in labour) and with landlords (rent in cash) that prevailed in the past. At 
a certain point, in light of his age, and supported by his earnings and re-
mittances from his two daughters who worked in Sumatera, he was able 
to accumulate more land, which he cultivated with export-oriented 
plants (rubber), which is less labour intensive compared with huma culti-
vation. 
However, if necessary when rice is in short supply, they can work as 
gacong workers (wages in kind) for the rice field owner in the neighbour-
ing hamlet. This household’s welfare will be affected by the dynamics of 
rubber prices, and will also change and require the formulation of a tran-
sition strategy for coping with the second cycle of the first rubber farm 
plot in 2025. This has not been taken into consideration by Bapak Suaep 
and Ibu Suaep. 
There are also households, such as that of Bapak Suraji, which have 
been able to maintain and intensify their farms into monoculture rubber 
farms by using their savings, selling their property in other areas and 
consolidating their land in Ciniti. Bapak Suraji (aged 57 years old) and his 
wife Ibu Suraji (aged 53 years old) are originally from Central Java. He 
worked as carpenter as well as a rubber tapper for PTPN and lived in 
Rancaherang. The family joined in the Ciniti land reclaimed movement 
in 1989, and subsequently acquired two parcels of land (one hectare) 
during the land redistribution process. This household used its own la-
bour of two members to develop a farm. After introducing rubber mon-
oculture in both plots, they sold their inherited wet rice fields in Central 
Java and invested their earnings in six plots of land in Ciniti purchased 
from residents of Cioa and Lengkong (Bapak Engkus, Bapak Dadang, 
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Bapak Uju, Bapak Sudin, Bapak Didin and Bapak Bana), resulting in a 
total of eight plots (three hectares), which placed them in the category of 
rich peasants. Using their family labour (two persons), and two daily paid 
labourers (Bapak Dadang and Bapak Uju), this household established a 
rubber monoculture farm on a stepwise basis. In 2010, four out of the 
eight plots had been planted with rubber, and the remaining four plots 
had not yet been cultivated. This household is considering selling these 
four plots due to their constraints in further developing it. The children, 
who live in the city, are not interested in cultivating the land.  
Other households, such as Bapak Daryo’s family, did not participate 
in the local government's mango fruit programme. Instead, Bapak Daryo 
intensified rubber farming in his land and that of his brother (Bapak 
Daryi) six years after land redistribution. A special ceremony took place 
in July 2007 to celebrate the successful impacts of the land redistribution 
programme in Ciniti. In 2007, the programme was renamed as the Na-
tional Programme on Agrarian Reform (PPAN; see Chapter 2). Ciniti 
Hamlet is profiled as a PPAN success story, especially in terms of out-
comes such as making the hamlet greener and increasing rubber latex, 
banana and rice production.  Bapak Daryo and Mr. Joyo Winoto, the 
Head of BPN from 2009–2012, symbolically tapped the rubber latex 
during the ceremony. This celebration motivated more peasants, as well 
as extra rural actors, to invest in land with rubber trees which rapidly 
changed the Ciniti landscape from one of traditional agroforests to one 
of rubber farms.  Bapak Daryo, together with his brother, invested in a 
rubber monoculture farm of four hectares. However, Bapak Daryo did 
not have any earnings during the process of developing the farm. His 
second wife, Ibu Yoyoh, whom he married in 2004, is a trader from 
Cibalong, and provided the capital to develop the rubber farms. Once 
the latex production started to appear promising in 2007, and he had met 
his obligation to pay back his debt to Ibu Yoyoh, from whom he sepa-
rated in 2007, he decided to sell the whole farm. In 2008, he sold his en-
tire farm at a good price to Bapak Nanang, a trader from Pameungpeuk. 
His relationship with Ibu Yoyoh, can be appropriately categorized as one 
of usury, given that Ibu Yoyoh provided a loan to Bapak Daryo for de-
veloping the four hectare rubber monoculture farm.  Bapak Daryo re-
paid the loan to Ibu Yoyoh with one fourth of the money that came 
from the land sale. Of the remaining amount, he gave one fourth to his 
brother, Bapak Daryi, and half to Ibu Daryo (his first wife). 
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Bapak Daryo started a new life in the sub-district town of Cibalong 
with his first wife (Ibu Daryo) and his two sons. He left his occupation 
as a farmer, hoping to become a worker with a monthly salary. With the 
rest of his earnings from selling the rubber farm, he built a permanent 
stone house in Cibalong, bought two motorcycles and cellular-phones 
for all members of the household, that is, his wife and two sons who 
were studying at the Senior High School. He used his well-known exper-
tise to work as an agriculture extension worker. So far, he has been hired 
by the district government and occasionally renders services to peasants 
outside Cibalong sub-district, training them on how to develop a rubber 
monoculture farm. The rest of his time, he works as a motorcycle taxi 
driver (ojek) ferrying customers around the district. However, the combi-
nation of these two jobs is still not sufficient for him and his family to 
enjoy a decent life in Cibalong town.  
The relative success of Bapak Suaep and Bapak Suraji contrasts with 
the fluctuating trajectory of Bapak Daryo, who was first able to develop 
his farm by borrowing money outside the village, but suddenly ‘dropped 
off’ due to his miscalculation regarding the required capital for develop-
ing a monoculture farm, especially at the crucial stage between the fourth 
and sixth years. But Bapak Daryo found a new opportunity to sell his 
skills to create a decent life. The trajectories of these two households 
(Bapak Suaep and Bapak Suraji) can be explained by referring to the 
point made by Bernstein (2010:104), as discussed in Chapter 1. That is, 
households are able to accumulate productive assets and reproduce 
themselves as capital on a larger scale, engaging in expanded reproduc-
tion and stepping up from their poor or middle class peasant status 
(Cliffe et al. 2011). 
Bapak Daryo lost his land (becoming a landless peasant), but found a 
new career as a part-time extension worker within the local community, 
as well as to the local government. Bapak Daryo is still acknowledged as 
the teacher (guru) by local communities that he taught how to cultivate 
rubber as monoculture and more efficiently compared with the PTPN 
method. Bapak Daryois not representative of what Lenin (1899) and 
Kautsky (1899) describe as a complete proletarian household. Rather, he 
is representative of the Chayanovian peasant, whofound new job oppor-
tunities related to farming activities taken up by peasant households or 
other off farming activities (van der Ploeg, 2013). 
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But there are also households that did not succeed in passing the dif-
ficult transition period from near landless to middle class peasants, or in 
maintaining their land assets. 
Those who do not have capital (in cash) and family labour, cannot 
follow the success story of households that have been able to accumulate 
capital using their agrarian and non-agrarian savings. One example is   
Ibu Aam (42 years old in 2010), a widow from Karees with three chil-
dren. Ibu Aam's household acquired three plots of land during land re-
distribution, and managed these as upland rice fields. Her husband, who 
used to be a local Quran teacher (guru ngaji) at the Ciniti mosque, passed 
away in 2001. He used to earn enough rice locally from his students to 
whom he taught the Quran, and sometimes received help from the stu-
dents on the farm. After Ibu Aam's husband passed away, she needed a 
strategy to ensure that her household had enough food and cash to raise 
their three children. She sold her time as a paid labourer to their neigh-
bour, PTPN, doing spraying work as a daily labourer (Rp. 25,000 or 
roughly US$ 2.5/half day). While working as a paid labourer, she also 
cultivated her own farm.  
In 2004, Ibu Aam decided to sell one of her plots to Bapak Nanang, 
who paid for it in cash (Rp. 3 million, which was equivalent to US$600). 
Ibu Aam used the money to mortgage a wet rice field in Karees village 
(Rp. 3 million equivalents to US$300). By mortgaging a wet rice field and 
sharecropping it with a landless household at Karees, she earned enough 
rice for the whole year. In 2006, she decided to send her eldest son to 
SPP boarding school in Garut, where she only needed to provide him 
with 5 kg of rice per month from the village. However, she needed extra 
money for his transportation and preparations for admission to the 
school. She sold another plot for Rp. 3.5 million to Bapak Suaep and 
bought three goats for Rp. 2.5 million (equivalent to US$ 250). While her 
children took care of the goats, she invested part of her time in cultivat-
ing her sole remaining plot with rubber trees. Unfortunately, her son had 
an accident in 2009 and later passed away after being hospitalized in 
Garut. She en-cashed the mortgage money and sold the three goats 
(which had already given birth to two more kids) to pay the hospital cost. 
In 2009, she sent her two surviving sons to an Islamic boarding school 
in Purwakarta, which is quite far away but free of cost. She now lives 
alone in Ciniti and in order to maintain her remaining plot, she continues 
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to work as a paid labourer and has taken over her husband’s role in 
teaching the Quran. She was hoping that the rubber trees could be 
tapped in 2012, and to survive by doing this kind of work for the next 
three-year period when no produce would come from her rubber farm. 
If there was any urgent need of cash, she would sell her two goats, which 
could enable her to survive until the latex could be tapped. Once latex 
began to be produced, she would get a reasonably stable income until 
2030 (for 25 years) that might improve her socio-economic condition in 
her old age. But it is hard for her to regain her land due to the rapidly 
increasing land prices. 
There are also families such as those of Kakek Maulana and Bapak 
Toto that have not been able to accumulate capital and lost all their 
farmlands only five years after land redistribution.  
Kakek Maulana (60 years old) has a wife and two daughters. He was 
active during the land struggle in the 1990s, and controlled quite a large 
amount of land. However, he felt that the struggle would never end and, 
therefore, decided to work illegally at a plantation in Malaysia. He was 
deported back to Indonesia in 1996 and lost his earnings paying off his 
debts and paying bribes to the Malaysian police and immigration. He re-
turned to Ciniti in 1997 and acquired 1.5 hectares of land as a result of 
the land redistribution programme. He planted cassava, maize and bana-
nas on the land and was also able to devote one plot (0.5 hectares) to 
rubber. Unfortunately, he could not make a living from the rubber farm 
after the third year, when the rubber could no longer be intercropped 
with banana and maize because the canopy had already closed. He sold 
his plots, one by one, to Bapak Nanang. Now, he and his family (wife, 
two daughters and two grandchildren) only have 400 square metres of 
land for their house and he makes a living working as a paid labourer on 
the rubber plantation. His wife and daughters are farming the rest of the 
400 m2 plot of land, and sometimes work as paid labourers at the PTPN 
rubber plantation.   
Then, there is the story of Bapak Toto, a 52-year old rubber tapper 
from Rancaherang. After a long struggle, together with his wife and his 
daughter Ibu Momon, he acquired two plots of land as a result of land 
redistribution on which he cultivated upland rice and bananas. Bapak 
Toto borrowed quite a lot of money from the local kiosk owner (Bapak 
Polo) to start a banana trading business. However, this did not succeed 
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 113 
 
and he had to sell one plot to repay his debt. When his daughter got 
married in 2003, they sold the last piece of land to Bapak Nanang, hop-
ing that the money could be used by their daughter to open a small rice 
mill in Cikajang. He returned to being a monthly labourer at the state 
rubber plantation and stayed at the nearby village of Bedeng. After his 
second grandchild was born, his daughter (Ibu Momon) and her family 
returned to the village. The rice mill was sold, and they live together in 
the partly ruined house in Bedeng (the house on the rubber plantation 
was hit by the earthquake that occurred in November 2008 and will not 
be renovated by the plantation company until Bapak Toto retires in 
2013). Bapak Toto and five members of his household took out a loan 
with a monthly interest rate of 5 per cent from the PTPN in order to 
open a small kiosk in January 2008 and to fulfil their basic needs. Given 
this scenario, Bapak Toto’s life after retirement will be difficult. With no 
land, no house and no farm of his own, and with the deduction of his 
debt from his retirement funds, his life will be precarious within two 
years. 
Several households with only one plot of land have not been able to 
follow the trend of intensifying their farming through rubber monocul-
ture so far. They include those of Bapak Engkus, Bapak Dadang, Bapak 
Uju, Bapak Sudin, Bapak Didin, Bapak Bana, Bapak Kusdi and Ibu Eu-
tin. They cultivated their farm through the huma system, and produced 
rice and corn during the first year and banana from the second year. 
They also adopted rubber monoculture farming, and obtained free seeds 
through a government programme, as well as technical support from 
their neighbour Bapak Daryo, and some peasants originally from Ranca-
herang, who are rubber cultivators. However, they were unaware of the 
trap that commenced in the fourth year when they could not obtain any 
product until the sixth year when the rubber trees could be tapped. 
Bapak Engkus, Bapak Dadang, Bapak Uju, Bapak Sudin, Bapak Didin 
and Bapak Bana sold their land and once again became landless. To 
make a living, Bapak Engkus and Bapak Dadang work as paid labour for 
Kang Rudi, and the rest of the landless peasants working as paid labour 
for Bapak Nanang, and occasionally for the PTPN. Ibu Eutin and Bapak 
Kusdi have cut down their rubber trees that are already three years old, 
one by one, and have returned to practicing the huma system involving 
intensive labour in the cultivation of upland rice. They survive, feeding 
114 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
their families without so far losing their land, but they are at risk of being 
in a near landless situation. 
A Leninist definition of poor peasants could be applied to Ibu Aam, 
Kakek Maulana, Bapak Toto, Bapak Engkus, Bapak Dadang, Bapak Uju, 
Bapak Sudin and Bapak Didin. Alternatively, Bernstein’s term of simple 
reproduction (2010: 104) applies, entailing their being squeezed in be-
tween 1999 and 2006. Ibu Eutin and Bapak Kusdi were able to transition 
from this reproduction squeeze by returning to the huma traditional agri-
culture system, and letting go of the dream of having monoculture rub-
ber farms. These two households are representative of Marx’s descrip-
tion of simple reproduction (Bernstein, 2010: 104) even though they lost 
some of their capital in the process of developing rubber monoculture 
farms.        
Some of the better off households who were already in a better con-
dition before land redistribution have savings and available lands in their 
hamlets of origin, and have also gained from the trend of rubber mono-
culture farming in Ciniti. The cases of Bapak Oding and Ibu Oding are 
illustrative of this. They are considered as rich peasants, who succeeded 
in converting all of their huma plots to tree-based farming.   
Bapak Oding, a trader from Singajaya, and his wife Ibu Oding, partic-
ipated in the land reclaiming process and acquired two plots of land 
through the programme. Initially, they cultivated upland rice, cassava, 
corn and banana on the land. Following the introduction of the govern-
ment's fruit tree programme, they converted their banana and mixed ag-
roforest farms to mango trees, which they thought might be better and 
easier to maintain. However, they only earned an income from this once 
a year following the season. The income from the mango trees could not 
compete with the income from bananas. They abandoned their mango 
orchards and step-by-step reconverted the land to upland rice and bana-
nas. They achieved this conversion by cutting down the mango trees and 
making charcoal from them. Bapak Oding lost some of his investment, 
but this was not a huge loss for someone like him who also had an in-
come from a small shop (kiosk) in the hamlet. His kiosk was the first to 
be established in the hamlet, and he has a lucrative banana and charcoal 
business with peasant producers in Ciniti.  
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Bapak Oding and Ibu Oding, who have three children working in 
other cities, were worried about the cost of labour for cultivating their 
banana farm, and were looking for other types of cultivation which 
would be less labour intensive and required fewer inputs. From the in-
come from the kiosk, Bapak Oding and Ibu Oding were able to buy land 
from their poor neighbours in Lengkong, Cioa and Karees, who sold 
their lands because they did not have sufficient savings to survive the 
fourth to the sixth year when they replace their indigenous agroforests 
with rubber monoculture farms. In 2010, they bought 15 plots and are 
hopeful that they have enough capital to invest in a rubber farm. Bapak 
Oding hired two persons, Bapak Doni and Bapak Oling (landless farm-
ers from Lengkong, who sold their sole plots of land to Bapak Oding), 
on a daily basis to work on his farm. Bapak Doni and Bapak Oling lost 
their land, due to their being heavily indebted to Bapak Oding. They sold 
the two plots to Bapak Oding to repay their debts. Bapak Oding relies 
on paid labour for his farm activities, which include land clearing, plant-
ing rubber and tapping rubber. He supervises his two workers in farming 
the land himself. By hiring paid labour, he has been able to plant half of 
his land with rubber trees. The trees have already produced latex and, 
over time, the total volume of the harvest will increase. He does the rub-
ber tapping himself with the help of one relative, Bapak Soleh, from 
Lengkong. Bapak Soleh acquired one plot during land redistribution. 
During the period between the fourth and sixth years in the develop-
ment of his rubber farm, he worked as a rubber tapper on a wages in 
kind basis. A quarter of the rubber latex tapped per day was paid to the 
rubber tappers. A wages in kind relationship with rubber tapping labour 
was an innovation in Ciniti, which was quite different from the wages in 
cash mode that was applied at PTPN. Similar to PTPN, which was very 
choosy in hiring rubber tappers (based on skill grades and hired as 
monthly permanent staff), the rubber tappers in Ciniti were only selected 
from among relatives, whom the land owners trusted. Rubber trees need 
to be carefully tapped to achieve a balance between the quantity of latex 
tapped daily, while ensuring that the trees will last a long time and pro-
duce latex.        
Other cases highlight the trajectories of rich peasants who were able 
to maintain and acquire more land to cultivate. These households, with 
the support of remittances from family members, were able to hire paid 
labour to do all the farm work. Kang Rudi (30 years old), and the son of 
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a rich peasant from Lengkong, Bapak Mahmud, obtained three plots of 
land in the names of his father, his brother and himself. He planted ba-
nana and rubber in his family's land in Ciniti and did not use it for up-
land rice cultivation. He was supported financially by his brother, a pho-
to model in Jakarta, who paid for all the costs, including labour. He also 
bought two plots of land from poorer households in Lengkong (Bapak 
Engkus andBapak Dadang), and hired them as paid labour in his farm. 
Currently, the family owns five parcels of land in Ciniti bought from 
peasants in Lengkong. 
There is also a second generation of peasants from the hamlet who 
do not have any land, and who were too young to receive land during 
the land redistribution programme in 1999. These include Radin (18 
years old in 2010) and his friends who wait around for any paid jobs in 
front of the kiosks in the middle of the hamlet. Early in the morning, 
they would be ready with their tools, waiting for someone to hire them 
to do some work. While waiting, they chat, buy coffee and cigarettes at 
the kiosk, and sometimes text their friends on their cellular phones. 
However, since 2009, Bapak Nanang and his assistant Bapak Dayat have 
been bringing in their own workers from the neighbouring sub-district, 
paying them a lower half a day rate (Rp. 20,000) than the rate in Ciniti 
(Rp. 25,000). This puts the new generation of peasants in a precarious 
position, faced with options that do not necessarily work in their favour. 
These young men cannot be hired to work at the state plantation be-
cause they are too young and inexperienced in rubber tapping, and might 
destroy the rubber trees. They may be accepted to work at the rubber 
plantation as daily labourers for high-risk jobs, such as spraying chemi-
cals, and get paid at the rate of Rp. 25,000. Another option, which they 
may not necessarily like, is working as paid labourers in their neighbour-
ing farms at a much lower rate than the standard rate (Rp. 15,000–
20,000), but lunch is included. Most of them have experienced working 
in the farms of their parents and relatives as unpaid household labour, 
and have made the sacrifice of self-exploitation, described by Chayanov, 
particularly regarding the intensity and duration of work required to re-
place huma with rubber monoculture farms (van der Ploeg, 2013:45). 
Working in neigbouring farms for a payment rate below the standard 
reminds them of this experience. They, therefore, prefer to be treated as 
professional paid labour at PTPN. If there is no demand for them as 
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paid labourers in the hamlet, they return home close to lunch time (mid-
day) with a debt for the coffee and cigarettes they consumed at the kiosk. 
Besides the new generation of landless peasants, there are also young 
couples newly arrived from Jakarta who decided to move to the village 
to start a simple life. These include Kang Atim (25 years old in 2010), a 
food vendor in Jakarta and Ibu Atim, a former domestic helper in Jakar-
ta, who have two sons. Using their earnings from Jakarta, they built a 
small house in Ciniti village in 2004. Ibu Atim borrowed money from a 
local sponsor to finance her migration to work in Malaysia. Besides tak-
ing care of their two sons aged four and six years, Kang Atim takes up 
any labour opportunity (paid in cash or in kind) in the hamlet. As a for-
mer food vendor, he has not yet acquired sufficient skills in farm work. 
However, he is skilled at preparing food for the ceremonial feasts (slame-
tan) in the hamlet, and is mostly hired as a cook. 
With a small house in the hamlet, the household believes that they 
can afford a simple way of life compared with life in Jakarta. With their 
combined incomes, they have been able to pay back their loan, raise their 
children to go to the primary school that had already became a state sub-
sidised school in 2006, and save some money to buy a piece of land 
where they have constructed a  house. They also hope to own a rubber 
farm in the future. However, the price of farm land has increased tenfold 
within a few years of land certification. Even after five years of Ibu 
Atim’s foreign employment, the household still cannot buy a plot of 
farm land, though they continue to hope that some day they will have 
built up enough savings to purchase cultivatable land. Such households 
are locally perceived as the poorest due to their landless status and ne-
cessity of sending a family member overseas as a contract worker to Ma-
laysia. In reality, this family is saving their capital to be able to farm from 
quite a young age, availing of an opportunity that the previous genera-
tion did not have. They predict that they can start their own farm at the 
age of 28 years, and if they can save enough, they might be able to har-
vest rubber by the age of 34, and then perhaps begin to accumulate capi-
tal at an early stage of their family life. 
Nevertheless, the local community views the families of Ibu Aam, Ibu 
Atim and Kang Atim, Ibu Eutin, Bapak Toto and Kakek Maulana as the 
poorest in the village in view of the fact that they do not have enough 
land for farming, and some do not even have land for a house. This local 
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perception does not take into account the potential of Ibu Atim and 
Kang Atim as newcomers to the village, nor the potential of utilising the 
young generation to work in their farms. They also do not take into ac-
count the potential of young people such as Radin, who did not acquire 
any land due to their age, but who have strong and productive years 
ahead of them as daily paid labourers. At this stage in the hamlet, there is 
no system or effort underway to distribute or allocate land to those who 
are young and of a productive age, beside reliance on land inherited from 
parents. 
 
3.6.2 Intensification of Land Productivity under Individual Own-
ership by Absentee Land Owners 
After the land redistribution process, there was a clear sign of emerging 
markets for land investments. Four plots of land were distributed to 
three absentee land owners (belonging to BPN staff, the military and the 
police), who acquired the land as gifts of appreciation for their support 
in the land redistribution process, and who eventually sold the land to 
Bapak Nanang (a hotel, shop and travel car owner residing in 
Pameungpeuk town), only few years after the land was redistributed. 
Bapak Nanang continuously bought land from those who succeeded in 
planting rubber, such as Bapak Daryo from those who sold their land 
due to indebtness, such as Bapak Toto; and from those who desperately 
needed money for emergencies, such as Ibu Aam. So far, Bapak Nanang 
has accumulated 10 hectares in Ciniti Hamlet. He used to work with a 
local assistant, Bapak Awan (37 years old), originally from Ciniti Hamlet, 
who works in the office of Cibalong sub-district in order to have access 
to the data on land certification. He did not pay the assistant on a 
monthly basis in cash, but instead shared the agricultural produce from 
the land that was converted from indigenous agroforests to a banana and 
rubber farm. The rice and banana, which are the products from the first 
to the fourth year, belong to the assistant, and the rubber produce from 
the sixth year belongs to Bapak Nanang. With this share cropping sys-
tem, Bapak Nanang only had to hire daily paid labour for land clearing, 
planting and harvesting of the bananas. The costs for the fertilisers and 
herbicides were also provided by Bapak Nanang. Bapak Awan arranged 
daily paid labour at the same payment terms as applied at PTPN, and 
young peasants such as Bapak Suraji and his friends use to work here 
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until 2009. This sharecropping system forced Bapak Awan to be a land 
broker for Bapak Nanang to find new land for sale. Otherwise the assis-
tant's share of the produce (banana) would end due to the closing of the 
rubber canopy within three to four years. This system enabled Bapak 
Nanang to own a total of 10 hectares of land in Ciniti in 2009. 
In 2009, Bapak Nanang replaced Bapak Awan with Bapak Dayat (41 
years old), who was a newcomer to the hamlet and is the superintendent 
at the state rubber plantation at Cikelet. Bapak Nanang hired Bapak 
Dayat in order to speed up the rubber planting process with lower paid 
labour. Bapak Awan is good at accessing data on the status of land certif-
icates, and knew all of the individual households that desperately needed 
money and would sell their land. However, Bapak Awan is not good at 
mobilising labour for planting, and only relies on labour from his hamlet. 
On the other hand, Bapak Dayat is not good at accessing data on land 
certificates and the situation of each household, but he is good at finding 
cheap labour from all around the district. Bapak Nanang’s strategy has 
changed after eight years of accumulating lands from individuals. Own-
ing sufficient land to invest in a rubber farm, he is focussing on land in-
tensification through rubber farming, so Bapak Nanang employs a super-
intendent to mobilize labour for land clearing, planting, weeding and 
spraying. 
Two other absentee land owners in Ciniti had adopted a similar mo-
dus operandi in 2010, but at a lower scale in terms of land ownership. 
One is Bapak Nanang, an entrepreneur from Pameungpeuk, and the 
other, Bapak Johan, is a car rental owner from Bandung. There is com-
petition among the peasants to be affiliated with these two absentee land 
owners, as their assistants or to acquire a product share, become a bro-
ker selling land, or as daily paid labour, such as Bapak Awan was in the 
past with Bapak Nanang. Since 2009, Bapak Awan has worked for Bapak 
Johan and is paid according to a similar system for cultivating four hec-
tares of land. However, Bapak Johan does not appear to be interested in 
expanding into more land, but is willing to intensify production through 
a monoculture rubber farm. 
Bapak Dayat became the common enemy of the hamlet when he 
brought in his own outside labour to work on Bapak Nanang's land. Lat-
er the local communities realized that extra rural land owners excluded 
the local community from accessing the land.  
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3.6.3 Emergence of New Non-Farming Activities in the Process 
of Differentiation and Accumulation  
There are also some households that rely on their earnings from non-
farming activities, such as opening a kiosk (small shop), which did not 
happen prior to land redistribution. These kiosks buy and sell agricultural 
products, such as rubber, banana, and rice, as well as factory products 
such as soap, kerosene, batteries, pesticides and herbicides. The number 
of kiosks has significantly increased from one kiosk at the beginning of 
the land redistribution process in 1998 to 13 kiosks in 2008–2010. 
One kiosk is located at the school in the middle of the hamlet. This is 
run by Bapak Momon and Radin. They do not buy or sell agricultural 
products, but instead specialise in catering to the needs of the school 
children. Almost all of the school students have some daily pocket mon-
ey of Rp. 500  (six days a week), and they spend their pocket money on 
candy at the school kiosk. The kiosk also serves coffee to those waiting 
around for casual daily paid labour jobs, enjoying the terms of trade 
from cash from the peasant household with industrial product. 
The eight kiosk owners buy agricultural products, such as bananas 
and rubber from the peasants, and simultaneously sell rice for local con-
sumption. With this system, the owner of the kiosk extracts the surplus 
of the peasants in two ways: 
1. Exchange of agricultural products with industrial products: 
agricultural products obtained from peasants are valued at a 
certain amount below the market price, while factory products 
are valued above the market price. These double terms of trade 
surplus extraction were enjoyed by the owner of the kiosk, who 
extracted the price from buying and selling deducted the 
transportation cost to carry industrial products. 
2. Exchange of agricultural products with agricultural products: 
agricultural products obtained from peasants (banana or rubber 
sheets) are valued at a certain amount below the market price. At 
the same time, agricultural products originating in the hamlet 
(such as rice) are sold at a value that is higher than the market 
price. The Kiosk owners buy the rice from the nearest hamlet 
from the local peasant households that own irrigated rice farm 
(such as from peasants at Bendungan and Lengkong), and sell it 
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with higher price. By buying banana or rubber latex and selling 
rice, the kiosk owners enjoy another type of double terms of 
trade advantage from buying and selling agricultural products, 
with only  paying the transportation costs to buy rice from the 
nearest hamlets. As a lot of households did not plant upland rice, 
but instead produced banana and rubber sheets, kiosk owners 
were able to enjoy surplus extraction based on these extra double 
terms of trade. 
Most of the peasants were tied to certain kiosks through interest-free 
loans (uang tancep) of various amounts. From the point of view of the ki-
osk owner, this debt was designed to make sure that the debtor’s agricul-
tural produce would be sold to that particular kiosk. At the same time, 
the income obtained from the sale of the agriculture produce would be 
used for debt repayment and for purchasing industrial and agricultural 
products.  
The kiosks operated by Bapak Pepen and Bapak Oding have the 
strongest financial capacity, and took advantage of the opportunity pro-
vided by installation costs for the state electricity programme imple-
mented in 2010, providing loans to their peasant customers (those who 
were given uang tancep). To obtain access to the state electricity pro-
gramme, each house was required to pay Rp. 1.2 million (equivalent to 
US$ 120) for the installation and Rp. 40,000 (US$ 4) as a monthly charge 
for using 450 Kwh. This kind of uang tancep was developed to gain the 
certainty of a product and the benefit from the trading terms for agricul-
ture products. Bapak Pepen gave loans to 10 households, while Bapak 
Oding gave loans to 12 households that produced bananas and rubber. 
The three other kiosks were short-lived because of liquidity problems. 
The uang tancep system in effect trapped some small kiosks into liquidity 
problems, especially if the borrowing household could not return the 
loan on time due to crop failures.  
After the land reform, a motorcycle repair shop, owned by Kang Ho-
lim from Karees, was established in the hamlet. Kang Holim bought a 
house and land in Ciniti. Apart from providing a motorcycle repair ser-
vice, he also sells spare parts for motorcycles, and gasoline. The motor-
cycle repair shop serves not only Ciniti Hamlet but  all of the villages 
located along the semi-permanent road from Lengkong to Ciniti. 
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After the land reform, especially with peasants producing good quan-
tities of banana, money lenders frequently came to the hamlet under the 
guise of cooperatives (known as KUSAPA). These cooperatives are reg-
istered in Tasikmalaya, a neighbouring district of Garut with Bandung 
city as its headquarters, and they operate at the hamlet level through col-
lectors. These money lenders are known as bank keliling, which means 
circulating bank. The interest rates they charge are quite high and they 
usually target households outside Ciniti Hamlet that operate small food 
stalls and paid their dues weekly. In Ciniti, money is loaned on certain 
occasions at a monthly interest of 20 per cent interest without collateral, 
and is used for non-productive purposes such as wedding and circumci-
sion ceremonies, and to send children to high school outside the hamlet. 
These are designed to be short-term loans for ceremonies such as wed-
dings and circumcision, in the anticipation that a portion of the money 
will be available from the ceremony to repay the loan and the rest will be 
paid weekly following banana and rubber collection from the kiosk. 
Most collectors know which households own rubber and banana farms, 
and have produce available every two weeks.  
 
3.7 Changes in the Agrarian Structure and Agrarian 
Relations after Land Redistribution 
The agrarian structure and agrarian relations in Ciniti changed signifi-
cantly and became more complex after land redistribution. Comparison 
of land ownership in 1999 and 2010, based on data obtained from the 
household survey, shows a significant change across all six classes of 
peasants based on their ownership of land in the hamlet (see Figures 3.4 
and 3.7 for a comparison). 
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Figure 3.7 
Land distribution and agrarian class status among all beneficiaries, 2010 (10 
years after land redistribution) 
 
 
Source: Household survey (2010) 
 
A further change has been population growth in the hamlet from 115 
households to 129 households living in Ciniti. 
 
3.7.1 The Agrarian Structure and Dynamics in Ciniti ca. 2008–
2010  
Within about 10 years after the completion of land redistribution, twelve 
landless households (9.3 per cent of all households) had emerged in the 
community, compared with no landless households existing in 1999. 
These landless households included not only beneficiaries of land redis-
tribution who had lost all of their land, but also newcomers to the ham-
let. The percentage of near landless peasant households also grew from 
5.2 percent to 13.1 per cent. Middle peasant households (owning 0.21–
1.5 hectares of land) declined from 80.8  per cent to 58.1  per cent, while 
rich farming households (owning 1.51–3.0 hectares) increased slightly 
from 14 per cent to 16.3 per cent, and a new class of landlord house-
holds emerged. Although the latter consisted of only four households, 
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they collectively controlled 30 per cent of all the land in Ciniti. Among 
these households were two extra rural landowners who accumulated 15 
per cent of the total land in Ciniti Hamlet. The process of class differen-
tiation based on household land area has been evident with an increase 
in landless and near landless peasant households being apparent in 2006. 
This group was dominated by those who were near landless because of 
limited land availability for them to make the shift from huma cultivation 
to export-oriented farming, which was the prevailing trend at the time. 
Some households were able to revert to the huma system to avoid enter-
ing into a simple reproduction squeeze. The number of landless and near 
landless peasants increased from 5.2 per cent in 1999 to 22.4 percent. 
The middle class (categories I and II) was reduced by 22.7 percent dur-
ing this 10-year period (from 80.8 per cent in 1999 to 58.1 per cent in 
2010), but still dominated the overall population.However, land owner-
ship by these classes dropped from 76.4 per cent to 43.6 per cent of the 
entire land area. Correspondingly, the land appears to have been appro-
priated by the rich and landlord classes,which increased from 14 percent 
to 19.5 percent.These two classes collectively owned 56.3 per cent of the 
land (an increase of 23.7 per cent compared from 1999 to 2010 when the 
household survey were taken), see Table 3.3 & Figure 3.7, 
Table 3.3 
Household classes based on land ownership, during the land redistribution in 
1999 and in 2010 
Household 
Class 
Class range of 
land ownership in 
hectares (1999) 
HH 
(1999) 
Percentage of 
total land 
(1999) 
HH 
(2010) 
Percentage 
of total land 
(2010) 
Landless 0 0 0 12 9.3 
Near Landless 0.01 up to 0.2 6 1 17 13.1 
Middle Peasant 
II 
0-21 up to 0.75 58 25.9 39 30.2 
Middle Peasant I 0-76 up to 1.5 35 40.5 36 27.9 
Rich Peasant 1.51 up to 3  16 32.6 21 16.3 
Landlords More than 3.01  0 0 4 3.2 
Total number of HH 115 100 129 100 
Source: Household survey 2010 
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One cause for concern is the emergence of absentee land owners who 
acquired access to land through the land market system. In 2010, 15 per-
cent of the land in Ciniti was owned by two absentee land owners, who 
bought the land from peasants and cultivated rubber monoculture farms. 
Only one of them employed members of the local community; the other 
absentee land owner hired a professional assistant and cheap labour 
from outside the district.    
Among the peasant households, there are also more paid labourers in 
the village, represented by the young generation (15–18 years old), who 
were not able to acquire land at an early stage of their productive age. 
The land of their parents is still in the process of becoming productive 
monoculture rubber farms, and does not, therefore, entail much work 
and earning. There is a need to provide land for this future peasant gen-
eration; otherwise they will leave the village in the footsteps of their elder 
siblings. Most of the household heads who received land were in the 35–
40 year age group when they acquired formal ownership of the land after 
struggling for more than 10 years. Some of their children are working 
outside the village and send money as remittances to their parents to cul-
tivate the land.   
There are also new non-farming occupations in the hamlet that have 
evolved over time. These include kiosks and selling and trading occupa-
tions, such as motorcycle and catering services. The key to success of 
peasants who have enough land, that is, more than two plots, is mono-
culture rubber farming. However, those who with less than two plots are 
squeezed by rubber monoculture cultivation, attracting other actors such 
as money lenders to the hamlet, as well as absentee land owners, who 
accumulate land in the hamlet that they use for monoculture rubber 
farming. 
To summarise this section, we can conclude that during a period of 
approximately ten years post-land redistribution, the agrarian structure 
has undergone rapid changes, influenced by extra rural actors, the arrival 
of new landless peasants from other areas, and the expansion of a new 
generation of land owning peasants. These changes in the agrarian struc-
ture have also been accelerated by the mobilisation of capital by local 
peasants through waged labour, as well as by the sale of their land or 
properties in other areas. The population is now constituted by the fol-
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lowing categories of households, each with a different position in the 
agrarian structure:  
1. Households that have accumulated and concentrated their 
landownership: 
a. Households that were not originally beneficiaries of land 
redistribution bought land from the beneficiaries. Some invested 
in rubber plantations (in Ciniti) Some reside in the village, while 
others like Bapak Nanang, who resides in the main town of 
Pameungpeuk, hire managers to run farming activities. There are 
also some households that have just invested their capital in land 
and left the land abandoned. 
b. Households that were considered rich before land redistribution 
gained more land as beneficiaries, and used their savings to buy 
land from other beneficiaries of land redistribution. This group 
consists of old as well as new households in the hamlet, as well 
as some from outside the hamlet. 
c. Households that acquired more land through trading bananas 
and rubber in the village. 
d. Households that acquired more land from selling land such as 
rice fields in other areas at higher prices and buying lower-priced 
land for planting rubber. 
e. Households that combine strategies a, b and c. 
This broad category is represented by a few households that control 
significant areas of land. However, not all of them have been able to 
invest in the land so as to obtain productive agricultural outputs because 
of high labour costs.  
 
2. Households that used their savings from selling their labour outside, 
and their surplus to invest in land and develop rubber farms. There 
are several instances of large households that were able to sell their 
labour in the village or outside the village, as well as to send 
household members to the Middle East or Malaysia as migrant 
workers. 
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There are also instances of households selling some of their plots to 
their neighbours to develop their remaining plots. Most of the house-
holds were facing this situation and had to sell their labour in the 
neigbouring hamlet, as well as provide paid labour in the hamlet.  
 
3. Households that do not have any agricultural land, but still have 
houses and sold their labour as a result of a variety of labour 
opportunities. 
a. This group consists of households that previously had agricultural 
land, but have now lost it. It is sub-divided into two types of 
households: (a) those, like Bapak Toto, who lost everything and 
moved from the village, returning as labourers to the company; 
and (b) those, like Bapak Daryo, who sold their land at a good 
price, moved to the cities, and are enjoying city life, looking for 
city jobs that offer monthly salaries. 
b. This group is composed of households that moved from the city, 
using their capital to buy houses to be able to reside in the hamlet 
in the hopes of having a lower-cost environment to raise their 
children, find some jobs and, in some cases, also own rubber 
farms. It also includes young families that send the wives to work 
in Saudi Arabia and hope that after three years (paying off their 
debts during the first year, and receiving net earnings within two 
years) they could save enough to buy land.       
4. The fourth group is composed of individuals who do not have any 
farm land or house, live in the hamlet and sell their skills. An 
example is Kang Holim’s motor service. 
 
3.7.2 Changes in Agrarian Relations Reflected in Changing Pat-
terns of Surplus Extraction 
As outlined above, the post-redistribution community in Ciniti now in-
cludes a spectrum of households from those who cannot compete and 
have lost their land, to those who are struggling to maintain and intensify 
their land with rubber agroforests and finally those who have gained 
more land (see Figure 3.8). Several post-land redistribution forms of sur-
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plus transfer were evident in Ciniti in 2010. However, this process of 
change of the agrarian structure did not happen overnight; it was gradual 
but consistent with changes in land tenure and labour relations. The pro-
cess has led to the decline of some forms of surplus transfer and the 
emergence or development of other relations and mechanisms of surplus 
extraction, which are summarised briefly below. 
Figure 3.8 
Form of surplus transfer in Ciniti after land redistribution (2010) 
 
Source : interview 2008, 2010 & 2011 
 
3.7.2.1 Rent in Labour 
After land redistribution, the rent-in-labour mode of surplus extraction 
at Ciniti hamlet also ended. This kind of relationship was terminated 
when there was clarity of land tenure status as non-state forest land that 
Surplus Transfer Mechanism at Ciniti After Land Redistribution
No. Surplus Extraction  
Mechanism
From Hamlet HHs To Village Actors To Extra Rural 
Actors
Notes
1 Rent in Labour Peasant HHs No longer exist 
2 Rent in Cash Peasant HHs No longer exist 
3 Rent in Kind Peasant HHs Landlord (Bp. Nanang) Banana intercropping /sharecropping 
Landless, near landless 
peasants
Landlord  (Bp. 
Mahmud) 
Wet rice sharecropping
4* Wages in Cash Peasant HHs PTPN Daily paid Labour (buruh harian) for rubber 
planting and weedingPeasant HHs Landlord (Bp. Nanang)
Landless and near landless Landlord (Bp. 
Mahmud)
Landless and near landless 
to rich and middle class 
peasant HHs
5* Wages in Kind
Peasant HHs Landlord (Bp. 
Mahmud)
Seasonal paid labour for rice harvesting 
(gacong)
Landless and near landless 
to rich and middle class 
peasant HHs
Rubber tapping, paid through  crop sharing
6 Terms of Trade
Peasant HHs to the 12 local 
traders 
Village traders (Kang 
Ija)
Traders Exchange of agricultural products (bananas
and rubber latex) with industrial products 
(soap, cooking oil) or other agricultural 
products (rice) at kiosks
Peasant HHs Traders Traders who come occasionally to the 
village exchange cash for industrial (cloth 
and utensils) or agricultural products 
(bananas and rubber) 
Peasant HHs to  middle 
class and rich peasants
Sale  their land, to the richer peasant and 
to the new commers
Peasant HHs Landlord (Bp. 
Mahmud)
Sale of land by peasants to  village landlord
Peasant HHs Landlord (Bp.Nanang) Sale of  land  by peasants to land lords
7 Usury
Peasant HHs to Traders (B4 
& B36)
Borrowing cash and returning agricultural 
products (uang tancep)
Peasant HHs Money lender Two money lenders under the name of 
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was converted into individually owned land. However, it persisted in the 
neighbouring state rubber plantation, PTPN VIII, where it occurred be-
tween the superintendent and the monthly rubber tapping labourers, en-
abling them to acquire access to wet rice fields (tanah serang) inside the 
rubber plantation estate, outside Ciniti hamlet. 
 
3.7.2.2 Rent in Cash 
The practice of rent in cash stopped in 1996, when the position of the 
PP weakened and they subsequently lost their legitimacy through the 
court decision that declared that the land was not forest land. The rent in 
cash pattern of surplus extraction was never resumed in Ciniti. 
 
3.7.2.3 Rent in kind 
In the past, when land rights were uncertain, every household wanted to 
have land in tenure secured areas, usually non-state forest areas where 
peasants could utilise the land without feeling insecure. When the Ciniti 
households received land from the state, they felt obliged to express 
gratitude to the field level individuals who facilitated the process of regis-
tering and mapped their land. They, therefore, put aside a total of 1.5 
hectares of their own land to be divided between four staff (two from 
BPN, one from the military and one from the police).The increase in 
land prices as a consequence of the change in land status from state for-
est areas to privately owned land also changed relationships between 
landowners and the sharecroppers, placing landowners (as non-
productive actors) in a better position in relation to the share-croppers. 
Share-cropping of irrigated ricefarms (which do not exist at Ciniti) oc-
curs in Lengkong and Karees hamlets, but involves Ciniti peasants. The-
se households are competing with share-croppers from other villages. 
This did not change the 50:50 sharing of crop quantities, but it did im-
pact on the quality of sharecroppers, since they now had to perform well 
that is, be diligent in cultivating the land. Payment in rice is very neces-
sary for peasants in Ciniti because of the deficit of rice resulting from the 
conversion from huma cultivation to rubber monoculture farms. 
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3.7.2.4 Wages in Cash 
Wages in cash are the easiest source of earning for peasant households, 
and a mechanism for transferring surplus.Whereas PTPN was the near-
est source of paid labour in the past, currently wages in cash are also ap-
plied by the new landlords in Ciniti (Bapak Nanang and Bapak Johan) to 
peasant households. Labour costs have also changed as most households 
wish to have their own rubber farms as soon as possible. In this situa-
tion, wage payments are differentiated according to: (a) the type of work 
(land clearing, planting, spraying, weeding etc.); (b) age; (c) gender; and 
(d) the employer-employee relationship  (for example, whether this in-
volves a company, local landlord, ordinary household farm, or family 
relatives of the household farm). Young men like R and women labour-
ers like Ibu Aam are in the weakest position in the new relationsof paid 
labour. They will receive the lowest wages and be allocated the most 
risky work, such as spraying the weeds with chemicals. Payments also 
vary depending on whether they are from PTPN, landlords, or ordinary 
household farms. PTPN and landlords pay higher rates than ordinary 
working households. However, besides getting daily payments (though at 
lower rates than those of the state plantation), labourers working on 
household farms are also provided with food (lunch), snacks, coffee and 
cigarettes which might add up to more than the rubber plantation rate 
for daily paid labour. 
 
3.7.2.5 Wages in Kind 
The gacong system, practised by households in Ciniti with landlords who 
own the irrigated rice farm surrounding Ciniti Hamlet continues, and has 
become the main source of rice for the peasants, besides share cropping 
(see.7.2.3, rent in kind). This system has been extended to the rubber 
tapping labourers, who received one-fourth of the latex, while the re-
maining three-fourths are retained by the rubber farm owner. But this 
system is not yet widely practised, and is only applied to those who are 
relatives or trusted by the rubber farm owner. It is predicted that this 
system will be further developed and become widely used, which could 
provide more opportunities to those who are landless to get a share.        
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3.7.2.6 Extraction via Terms of Trade 
Those who could control rice production through ownership of wet rice 
farms (for example, Bapak Mahmud from Lengkong) were in a better 
position, especially when upland agriculture in Ciniti underwent a rapid 
change from food crops to rubber. Surplus extraction in the form of 
terms of trade applied to peasants who sold their rubber valued at Rp. 
7,000/kg in 2010 (the rate for middlemen was Rp. 7,500–8,500/kg de-
pending on the season) and rice from the nearest hamlet sold by the ki-
osk at the rate of Rp. 7,500/kg at harvesting time and 8.000/kg at fam-
ine time (the market rate was Rp.7,000/kg), and for the industrial goods 
the kiosk owners take also some benefit allowed by the distributors. Sur-
plus extraction through terms of trade (double terms of trade for selling 
industrial goods and buying agriculture products, and extra double terms 
of trade for selling and  buying agriculture products) has been the domi-
nant mode of surplus extraction in Ciniti by the kiosk owners. This is 
also reflected by the fact that kiosk owners extract the most surplus from 
peasant households. There has also been a rapid increase in the number 
of kiosks form one in 1999 to twelve in 2010. This mode of surplus ex-
traction applies to several products produced by households, namely, 
rice, bananas and rubber, as well as  exchanges with industrial products 
for which standard prices are better known compared with agricultural 
products. 
Buying and selling land has also become a new way of transferring the 
surplus of peasant households. Figure 3.7 shows that 15 percent of the 
total land area has been bought by extra rural actors, and all the benefits 
of the previous owners have already been transferred permanently to the 
new owners. Land has become a commodity that is transferable, and its  
price has increased significantly since the change in status to individual 
land ownership. The price of this new commodity also depends on the 
increase together with the farming system that is practiced on it. Rubber 
monoculture is valued the highest, followed by banana farming,with hu-
ma traditional farming being valued the lowest.  
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3.7.2.7 Usury 
Money lending is commonly practiced in the hamlet, by kiosk traders, 
who normally charge interest indirectly rather than directly through the 
guarantee, provided by peasants that they will sell the product to the 
traders (uang tancep). Money lending by the kiosks according to the uang 
tancep method is only carried out with those who have  productive assets 
such banana or rubber farms that are continuously productive. This is 
practised by eight out of  twelve kiosk owners in Ciniti. Two of the 
kiosks have developed further money lending schemes for electricity 
instalments with several trusted households. The payments were made 
directly to the state electricity company (PLN). Beside this, there are also 
money lenders who come to Ciniti Hamlet from Tasikmalaya and 
Bandung, offering credit at high interest rates (up to 20 per cent per 
month) using credit cooperative associations as a legal body (Bank 
Keliling). Better rates for money lending can be accessed from Sagara 
village (2 per cent monthly interest), or at the nearest bank (BMT or 
BRI) in Pameungpeuk town at 8 per cent interest. However, for these 
loans,  a lengthy  procedure has to be followed to prove that the owner 
of the land certificate has paid all the land taxes since the land certificate 
is used as collateral. Bank Keliling has, therefore, become the easiest way 
for peasants to borrow money over short terms, for example,  wedding 
or circumcision ceremonies, when it is expected that a large proportion 
of the loan can be repaid after the ceremony through the cash gifts 
(sumbangan) provided by the guests. 
There were also some households in Ciniti that mortgage irrigated 
rice farms. Mortgaging irrigated rice farms is common in the lowland 
society as a means of borrowing money. Both parties will agreed on the 
terms of the mortgage and invite witnesses to their agreement. Rubber 
farms are  not yet being mortgaged, but mortgaging termsmay be 
established soon after the fourth year after the first harvest (usually ten 
years after planting), when the  rubber farm product becomes stable. 
 
3.7.2.8 Taxes 
As the land is now categorised under individual land ownership, the land 
tax (PBB) is much higher at approximately Rp. 10,000/plot 
(approximately 0.25 ha/plot) for agriculture activities. However, this 
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state land tax is considered low by people from the cities (compared to 
the tax in the cities for housing) who accumulate land in the rural areas. 
 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
Two basic research questions have been have been the focus of this 
chapter. The first relates to patterns of exclusion and inclusion that oc-
curred in the forest land redistribution process in Ciniti Hamlet, and the 
extent to which the programme reached landless peasants. The second 
question relates to how this process has contributed to the formation of 
a new agrarian structure and agrarian relations. But before addressing 
these questions further, there is a need to identify whether the land redis-
tribution process in Ciniti Hamletconstituted a redistributive or a non-
redistributive land reform, as discussed by Borras (2007). A redistributive 
land reform is characterised by redistributed power, land (including state 
land) and no compensation (Borras, 2007: 22). The historical context of 
this land redistribution case highlights the appropriation of state forest 
land from PP control by the state, which then redistributed this land to 
the beneficiaries (tillers and four absentee land owners). This was done 
without any compensation being paid by the state or by the beneficiaries 
to the PP. Thus, this may be characterised as a land ‘redistribution’ pro-
cess in one sense, but with the qualification that most of the beneficiaries 
already had informal access to the land, and the allocation of plots to 
beneficiaries partly replicated the existing inequalities in land control. 
This leads us to the next stage of addressing the two research questions.  
a. Exclusion and Inclusion   
Exclusion and inclusion based on policy regulation  
Patterns of exclusion and inclusion based on policies or regu-
lations, as discussed by Hill et al. (2010) were evident in Ciniti. 
The area defined and targeted for land redistribution by BPN 
(SK BPN no. 35/1997) and by MoF decree through the new des-
ignation of West Java forest area (MoF Decree no. 419/1999) 
was delineated by a boundary, within which land was to be ap-
propriated from PP and included in the areas to be redistributed 
to the tillers. Conversely, the land located outside of the BPN 
boundary that defined the target of land reform was excluded 
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from the land redistribution programme and continued to be un-
der the control of PP. Consequently, the tillers who cultivated 
the land targeted for land redistribution were included as benefi-
ciaries of land allocation. However, those tillers who cultivated 
the land located outside of the boundary were excluded as bene-
ficiaries of land redistribution.  
 
Tillers versus landless and near-landless peasants 
For the land redistribution process the term ‘tillers’ (penggarap) 
was used to define the beneficiaries based on the assumption that 
all the tillers were landless or near landless peasants. In the pro-
cess of land redistribution in Ciniti, it emerged that there were 
several patrons from Lengkong, Karees and Bendungan hamlets 
who were neither landless nor near landless, but were actually 
rich peasants or traders whohad led the land reclamation process. 
Besides the land that they tilled at Ciniti, they also owned land, 
including irrigated rice farms in their hamlets of origin. However, 
due to their categorisation as tillers under the prescribed defini-
tion, they were eligible beneficiaries of the land redistribution 
programme. While all landless and near-landless peasants did re-
ceive one or more plots of land, they were excluded from receiv-
ing bigger plots of land, due to accommodation of the rich peas-
ants. This process of land redistribution, therefore, formalised 
existing land inequality, which in turn had consequences for the 
emerging agrarian structure..    
 
Landless and near landless peasant versus absentee land owners 
There were four absentee land owners who each received 0.25 
hectares of land during the redistribution process. They included 
one police officer from Cibalong sub-district, one military official 
from Pameungpeuk and two BPN staff members from Bandung, 
who were involved in the land redistribution process, and collec-
tively controlled 1.5 per cent of the land in the hamlet through 
this allocation. Even though they received land with the consent 
of the tillers, they should have been precluded from receiving it. 
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Their receipt of land was a violation of the process and could be 
considered as a form of corruption. This again prevented land-
less and near landless peasantsfrom receiving bigger plots of land 
from the one hectare of land (1.5%) that was allocated to them. 
These absentee land owners were among the first land owners 
tosell their land to other absentee land owners, namely, traders 
from Pameungpeuk.      
 
Individual versus household property 
Prior to land redistribution in Ciniti Hamlet, the land was 
controlled, managed and cultivated by household units in the lo-
cal land use tenure system. During the redistribution process, 
land was distributed to adult individuals (in this case, above 13 
years old) under individual land ownership, as long as they pos-
sessed ID cards and had been tilling the land during the massive 
land reclaiming movement from 1996–1998. However the indi-
vidual names that have been registered  are mostly those of men, 
who were assumed to be the household heads. Women have 
been systematically excluded from land ownership and their 
names are rarely registered. The only women’s names that ap-
pearare those of widows and women belonging to the middle 
and rich classes, whose fathers cannot have land registeredin 
their own names due to the maximum ceiling of land ownership. 
The land that was received from land redistribution was not 
permitted to be sold without a permit from BPN. In reality, 
however, land was bought and sold without any permit from the 
BPN, and not always with the consent of the household mem-
bers. For some households this happened through an agreement 
reached between the individual buyer and seller whose names 
were recorded on the land certificate. This affected the local ten-
ure system, loosening the intra-household cohesion, and 
strengthening the individualism of household members.  
Due to the registration of individual ownership, more house-
holds with larger numbers of adult members were able to register 
their lands than households with smaller numbers of  members. 
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Those households with six adult members were the largest land 
owners.  
Tension between the old and young peasant generations over land 
The land struggle to gain legal access over forest land through 
the land redistribution process was sustained over a long period 
(17 years) until the tillers obtained ownership of the land be-
tween 1997–1999. One consequence of this process was that the 
tillers involved in the reclaiming process were already approach-
ing middle age when they finally received the land ownership (37 
per cent of the beneficiaries were between 35–40 years old in 
1997–1999). Only a few of these beneficiaries, for example, 
Bapak Mahmud and Bapak Nano, passed the land on to their 
sons and daughters (the second generation). Most retained their 
control and cultivated the land, or sold a portion of the plots, 
providing their children with money to pursue their studies or 
work outside of farming. This tension over the land was felt 
more strongly in relation to the third generation (grandsons and 
granddaughters) who were entering the productive age (18 years). 
The experience of R (18 years old) represents that of this third 
generation with no land given to them by their parents or grand-
parents, who are struggling to find work opportunities to make a 
living. Their grandparents either sold the land and gave the mon-
ey to their parents, or still retained the land and have plante 
monoculture rubber that is not yet ready to be tapped.  This gen-
eration feels excluded from the land redistribution programme 
due to the age barrier and their exclusion from work opportuni-
tiesin the hamlet.    
b. The second research question relates to how this process has 
contributed to the formation of a new agrarian structure and agrarian 
relations. 
 
Agrarian Structure 
There has been a change in the agrarian structure both before and af-
ter land redistribution in Ciniti Hamlet. As previously discussed, the land 
redistribution process could not prevent the rich peasants, traders and 
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middle peasant households from acquiring access to land. At the same 
time, all the landless households received plots of land, and there were 
consequently no landless peasant households left in the hamlet. As a re-
sult of the land redistribution process, there were five classes of house-
hold in the hamlet; near landless peasants (5.2 per cent), middle class 
(category II) peasants (50.4 per cent), middle class (category I) peasants 
(30.4 per cent), rich peasants (13.9 per cent) and extra rural actors (3.5%) 
see Table 3.3. During the subsequent 10 years, new classes emerged: 
landless, landlord and various skilled labour households. Landless peas-
ant households (9.3 per cent) remerged in 2010, not only because of the 
dropping out of the near landless and middle class peasant households 
(Scoones et al. 2012 and Cliffe et al. 2011), but also because of a third 
generation of new landless couples and migration of new landless peas-
ant households to the hamlet. This class of landless peasants worked as 
paid labour in neighbouring farms or used the various skills that they had 
acquired to sell products or services in the hamlet or outside. 
A new class of landlords also emerged gradually through a process of 
land accumulationin the area by four households (3.2 percent) that can 
be differentiated by how they accumulate their lands. One household 
accumulates land through surplus gained from the shops; one household 
accumulated land through a process of consolidating their property out-
side the hamlet and investing this in the hamlet; and the other two 
households are headed by extra rural traders who gradually bought land 
from the peasants using their capital. This dynamic process of change 
has also impacted on the near landless, middle class (categories I and II) 
and rich peasant households over a period of 10 years. Aside from that,  
two landlords(traders from the city) who control 15 per cent of the ham-
let’s land, changes in the class structure have mostly entailed an internal 
process of differentiation among peasant households in the hamlet. This 
internal process has occurred through the accumulation of capital by 
peasant households as a result of remittances sent by their children in the 
cities. This capital has played an important role in enabling them to in-
vest in more land in the hamlet.Other factors, such as sickness, crop fail-
ure, and entrapment in monoculture rubber plantations have also been 
major factors compelling peasant households to sell their land or step 
down in class. The changes of agrarian structure can be seen to be the 
result of changing agrarian relations.         
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Agrarian Relations 
 Agrarian relations also changed drastically after the redistribution of 
land and its conversion from public state land to individual land owner-
ship. There were eight forms of surplus transfer (rent in labour, rent in 
cash, rent in kind, wages in cash, wages in kind, terms of trade, usuryand 
taxes) before land redistribution. These have been changed to six forms 
of surplus extraction following the weakening positions of the state and 
PP in 1996. The surpluses of landless peasants were transferred in the 
form of cash to the PP officers, and in labour to the PP institution, in 
order to acquire temporary access to the land to cultivate spaces in be-
tween the rubber trees when the PP and MoF controlled the land.  Rent 
in kind was practised for a short period when the military and police 
controlled the land. This form of surplus transfer was practised by trad-
ers who wanted to acquire access to the teak wood and pay rent in kind 
to the military and police officers between 1996–1998. These forms of 
surplus transfer ended after land ownership was transformed from state 
land to individually held land in 1998. In the past, before land redistribu-
tion, the dominant patterns of surplus transfer were rent in labour, rent 
in cash and rent in kind for peasants to gain access to the land. 
Agrarian relations changed drastically from feudalistic relations to 
market transactional relations. The terms of trade form of surplus trans-
fer became the dominant mode of agrarian relations between peasant 
households producing agricultural products and shop owners selling in-
dustrial products and staple foods (rice) bought from lowland irrigated 
rice cultivators. Land became the new commodity with a value that in-
creased tenfold after it was classified as individual land.  
Surplus transfers through wages in cash and kind in the past depend-
ed on PTPN, the neighbouring rubber state plantation. Currently, these 
forms of surplus transfer occur within peasant households. Other market 
relations include money lending by shop owners, credit unions and 
banks to peasant households according to various terms and conditions 
(collateral, interest rate etc.) These kinds of agrarian relations position 
those with capital as the higher class that can buy more land, mobilise 
labour and invest their capital in money lending, small shops or agricul-
tural production. There are also other kinds of market relation-based 
forms of surplus transfer through selling skilled labour, such as motor 
cycle services and catering for ceremonies. One of the consequences of 
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this widening of opportunities for surplus transfer from peasants to sev-
eral actors in the hamlet has been to attract migration from other areas 
to the hamlet to partake in the transfer of surplus. 
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Notes 
1Interview Bapak Nano & Bapak Momon, 19 Juli 2008, at Ciniti Hamlet. 
2Particulier land (particuliere landerijen or ‘private lands’) was land leased by the state to private compa-
nies, allowing them to develop their own regulations and taxation systems for regulating local com-
munities in surrounding areas. To avoid exploitation, this system was abandoned in 1958 through 
Law no. 1/ 1958, 13 years after Indonesia attained independence. These particulier lands were later 
declared as state lands and were subjected to the 1960s land reform. 
3Erfpacht land was land leased by the state to private companies for a period of 90 years, whereby 
private companies followed all the Dutch Indie laws and regulations. This system was replaced by 
Hak Guna Usaha (HGU) through Law no. 5/1960, enacted 15 years after Indonesia’s independence, 
which declared that leased land were only to be given to the private sector from state lands (Gov-
ernment Regulation no. 40/1996). However, most of the land leased from local communities during 
the Dutch Indie administration was never returned to the local communities. 
4The Rukun Warga and the Rukun Tangga (RW and RT) were introduced by the Japanese as a 
neighbourhood block known as tonarigumi in Japan. The RT consisted of approximately 10 house-
holds, while the RW (previously RK) consisted of approximately 5 RTs. 
5During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), commodities (i.e. rice, cotton, jathropa, coffee, sugar 
and other agricultural products) were concentrated under the control of the central agency. This 
encouraged village leaders, Japanese military officials and merchants to engage in black markets. 
This corrupt practice created conflict in several areas of rice production in Java (Shigeru, 1997:72). 
6The DI/TII movement was widely followed in several parts of Indonesia such as Central Java 
(1949), South Kalimantan (1950), and in Aceh and South Sulawesi (1953), which was declared as 
part of the NII under Kartosuwiryo’s leadership (Crib, 2000:162). 
7Based on an interview conducted for this research, none of the peasants in the village of Sagara and 
in Ciniti hamlet identified themselves as DI/TII members. This issue is still sensitive, leading to 
difficulties in collecting information at the local level. 
8The first Indonesian national census in 1963 showed that 43.6per cent of  peasants in West Java 
owned less than 0.5 hectares of land, 44.7per cent owned 0.5-2 hectares, 9.2 per cent owned 2-5 
hectares and 2.5% owned more  than 5 hectares and the Gini ratio was 0.5 (Bachriadi and Wiradi, 
2011:37). 
9Pajak Kolong is a common practice among PP staff, which involves paying some money to acquire 
access to land in order to build a hut (pondok). Pajak literally means tax and kolong means space be-
low the house/hut. The payment is based on how much space is occupied under the hut, which is 
usually allocated as one per family, interview, Bapak Nano, 19 Ju1y 2008, Ciniti. 
10Personal communication with key informants: Bapak Momon at the hamlet, and Bapak Ahmad, 
one of the peasant union deputy leaders, on September 21, 2008. 
11The El Nino in 1982 was reported as the first and longest El Nino to hit Indonesia (BMKG, 
2013). It resulted in forest fires that impacted on 3.2 million hectares in Sumatera and Kalimantan 
(MenLH, 2003). 
12Responding to the increased agrarian conflicts, several solidarity coalitions to support peasant 
movements were formed by NGOs and the student movement before the 1998 political reform in 
Indonesia. These included KSKPKO (Komite Solidaritas Korban Pembangunan Kedung Ombo) in Central 
Java, KSMURB (provided solidarity support in the Badega case), KSKPLGC (provided support for 
the Cimacan case in West Java), KIRAB (provided solidarity in  the Blangguan case), KSMJ (sup-
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ported the Gresik case in East Java), KSMPK (supported the Klampok case), KSRB (supported the 
Sendang Pasir case), KSUMP in Bali, and JAKAD in West Nusa Tenggara. See also Borras (2005) 
on the Bachriadi case; and chapter four on Tim Krui and the Krui case in Lampung; Manalu (2009) 
on SRB and the TPL case in North Sumatera; and Elsam (1999) on Solidaritas Bentian and the 
Bentian case in East Kalimantan. 
13Bhayangkari is a police sister organisation founded in 1949. From 1964 until 1999 Bhayangkari was 
one of the members of the Dharma Pertiwi, the umbrella organisation for the wives of the police and 
military (armed forces). One of the outcomes of the 1998 Political Reform, enacted through Legisla-
tive Act no. VI/2000 was the separation of the police from the military structure. This meant that 
the command was no longer considered as armed forces. This was also followed by the separation 
of the Bayangkari from Dharma Pertiwi. 
14Court Verdict, Garut no. 20/Pid.S/1998. 
15The land could not be endorsed through the documentation of the verbal forest delineation pro-
cess (BATB) either by PP or by MoF. The Pasir Salam II Forest Block was only gazetted by the 
Governor General of the Dutch Indie 27/1927, but was never delineated in the field. On the other 
hand, BPN proved that this land was recorded in the Land Book as state land (Noer Fauzi Rachman 
in a personal interview with Soejarwo Soeromihardjo, Jakarta, November 9, 2007; see also Soedjar-
wo Soeromihardjo (2007:125). In 1997, the Land Agency classified the 578 hectares at  Sagara vil-
lage as a target for land redistribution (Adji, 2005:159). 
16Bata is a square unit used in West Java, especially to measure the area of rice field. This unit is 
known under different names in other areas such as Ru and Tumbak,and has been used since the 
Dutch colonial times. The size of one Bata is equivalent to 14.0625 square meters (3.75 × 3.75).  
Before the nineteenth century, a wide variety of different weights and measures were used by the 
various Dutch towns and provinces, as well as in the colonial empire, including South Africa, New 
Amsterdam and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). A Bata (or its other names) is equivalent to 
aRoede (or roe). The most common roede used in the Netherlands was the Rijnland rod (a Rijnlandse 
roede = 14.19 m2). 
17Interview, 20 July 2008, Lengkong Hamlet. 
18For peasants from Rancaherang Hamlet, who did not originate from Sagara village, the term land re-
claiming is not the correct term. They never owned the land and the land was never taken from 
them by the state. The correct term should, therefore, be land claiming. However, in this thesis, the 
terms are used interchangeably.     
19The retirement age at PTPN for a superintendent is 55 years, and for a clerk it is 60 years. 
The superintendent or Mandor is the direct supervisor of the monthly paid labourers. Monthly paid 
labourers were usually recruited on a daily basis to do a particular job under the supervision of the 
superintendent with a certain commission pertaining to the recruiting process. Superintendents are 
dependent on monthly paid labourers to  acquire access to daily paid labourers and ensure that the 
job target is  reached. At the same time, monthly paid labourers are dependent on the superinten-
dent's evaluation of individual targets. Superintendents also divide the rubber plantation block under 
the responsibility of certain labourers. They further allocate wet lands (tanah serang) for non-rubber 
plantations to the monthly labourers, while assigning the rice field to themselves. As a result of this 
practice, the superintendent will ask the labourer to work on his farm. This patron and client rela-
tionship is a common practice, which generates and regenerates over time, and creates a kind of 
self-exploitation as well as solidarity.  
20Based on the interviews in 2008 with 10 leaders that involved in the land reclaiming, there were 
105 households in Ciniti, but during the household survey in 2010, the number of households had 
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been grown to 111 not including the 4 households of absentee land owner that received the land 
from the 1999 land redistribution. 
21The spacing of the teak trees under the rakgantang programmes did not allow for utilisation of the 
land for intercropping after 4 years. The common tumpang-sari scheme prescribed 4 meter by 4 meter 
spaces between teak trees that could only be used for 2 years for intercropping. 
22Terresing is a common practice in teak plantation to ensure good quality teak for planks. It involves 
cutting the cambium of teak trees in a ring. After two months the teak trees will die and dry up, 
ready for felling. Between the second and the third months after the terresing, the branches fall down, 
and it became dangerous for workers to cultivate the farm. Several accidents have been reported 
during this period involving minor injuries. The women used to collect these branches for fire 
wood, both for local consumption and for sale at the small shop in Ciniti.    
23PTPN daily wage labourers work from 7.00 am to 13.00pm. Theyare home by 14.00, bringing 
some fire wood from the rubber branches. Each worker should bring his or her own tools, boots 
and lunch. Payment is disbursed every two weeks, on Saturdays, at the Miramare PTPN office.   
24Interview on 16 July 2008, Bendungan. 
25Free State Land (Tanah Negara Bebas) is a legal term for land that is controlled directly by the State 
and has never been allocated, leased or given to somebody else, either a person or any legal body. 
Other evidence revealed that the land had never been allocated by BPN as a state forest area, or to 
PP. 
26The court case started in 1996 and the sentence was given right after the 1998 reform. The Legal 
Aid Foundation, Bandung (Dindin Maulani SH) was one of the public interest law groups, which 
represented the case. There was also support from the student movement from Bandung and Garut 
(FPPMG) and from NGOs and POs (SPP) from surrounding villages who were similarly struggling 
for land ownership (from Sagara-Cibalong sub-district, Karyamukti-Pameungpeuk sub-district, and 
Badega Bayongbong sub-district). 
27The status and occupations of the three actors were described as petani penggarap (peasant tillers), 
used as representative labels for the whole community, viewed as homogeneous small peasants. 
However, this research shows that the three actors were elites in the village, as described on page 76. 
28Analysis of this data showed that there were more land tillers (555 individuals) and that the land 
was well distributed among peasant individuals, with a Gini Coefficient of land equality of only 0.14, 
as calculated by the researcher. 
29See BPN Provincial West Java Decree no. 4230.3-SK 21-KWBPN, 1999. 
30In this part, the term is used differently. In some cases, the term ‘tillers’ is used and in other cases 
peasants or landless peasants are used. Here the local communities in their movement used the 
terms interchangeably, so they assumed that there was an exact match between the ’tillers’ (penggarap) 
and the ’landless peasants’ (tunakisma). Through in-depth research in the area, it was discovered that 
the majority of tillers are landless and near landless peasants. There are some middle class and rich 
peasants who played a significant role in the reclaiming process and in land redistribution. The term 
‘tillers’ here is used to cover all those involved in reclaiming the land; the term ‘peasants’ is used to 
describe the whole aggregation of peasants who cultivate the land, and consists of landless, near 
landless and middle class peasants, excluding the rich peasants and non-farming household (i.e. 
traders) and extra rural actors. 
31See BPN Decree no. 35/1996 
32A Sagara local peasant organization (OTL Sagara) was formed in 1999 and joined the SPP declara-
tion in 2000. SPP, which was considered among the biggest local peasant unions after BTI in the 
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 143 
 
1960s, SPP was headed by Mr. A as the General Secretary and claimed to have 300,000 to 700,000 
peasant members (Aji, 2003:41; Rachman, 2012: 302). 
33Interview, Gatot Rianto SH, head of LBH Bandung on September 5, 2010. Rianto was involved 
in the advocacy of the case between 1995–1999, as well as in the national democratic movement. 
See also Chapter 4 on how  peasant demands in Krui Lampung were accommodated by  KDTI in 
1998. 
34See also Chapter 4 on how peasant demands in Krui Lampung were accommodated by KDTI in 
1998. 
35Bapak Gunadi was caught on January 8, 1997 and arrested. He was subsequently brought to court 
on August 20, 1997 in connection with the Tasikmalaya riot case in which he was never engaged. 
He was sentenced to 1.5 years and released in 1999 after President Soeharto stepped down (Aji, 
2003:15). 
36With the help of an enumerators, during the household survey in 2010 the researcher was able to 
capture data of 115 households  that were beneficiaries of land redistribution in and outside Ciniti 
Hamlet. 
37The household survey data were triangulated with a cadastral map, but this could not take into 
account the land possessed by tillers outside Ciniti Hamlet. Data on actual land possession by ab-
sentee land owners was gathered through in-depth interviews.   
38The household has only one member, consists of a single old and young family, those who have 
children below 13 years of age. 
39In 1996, Ciniti did not have a basic school (SD) and junior high school (SMP), so the children 
walked to Cibalong (an hour’s walk) back and forth to get to the school. A private SD was estab-
lished in 1999 and followed much later by a private SMP in 2008. 
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4 
Land Redistribution and Agrarian 
Change: The Experience of Simpang 
Duren Hamlet (Lampung) 
 
 
Similar to Chapter 3, this chapter describes the gradual change in the 
agrarian structure and agrarian relations in Simpang Duren hamlet 
(Lampung Province) from the 1990s to the period following land redis-
tribution in 2001. The second section of the chapter describes the back-
ground of the land conflict in Lampung province based on secondary 
data. A particular issue focused on is that of land claimed by adat com-
munities in Lampung, which is occupied and shared with migrants, while 
simultaneously being systematically co-opted by the state since the time 
of the Dutch occupation, and till recently, classified as state forest land. 
The third section of the chapter, based on secondary data, elaborates on 
conflict and collaboration over forest land that has occurred over a peri-
od of time in West Lampung district, where Simpang Duren hamlet lo-
cated. Based on primary data, the fourth section of the chapter presents 
a profile of the agrarian structure and agrarian relations prior to land re-
distribution in 2001, and the fifth section describes the pattern of surplus 
transfer during this period. Part six describes the process of land redis-
tribution under individual land ownership that occurred between 
2001and 2006. Part seven describes changes in farming practices and the 
process of differentiation under individual land ownership that occurred 
between 2001and 2010. Finally, the eighth section concludes the case 
study by summarising the changes in the agrarian structure and agrarian 
relations that occurred after the land redistribution process and up to 
2010.    
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4.1 History of the Settlements 
Simpang Duren Hamlet is currently administered under Sumber Rejo 
village (its jurisdiction between Sukamarga and Tajung Kemala villages 
was previously unclear). The hamlet and village are located in Bengkunat 
sub-district and Pesisir Barat District (which diverged from Lampung 
Barat District on October 25, 2012) in Lampung Province. Both Suka-
marga and Tanjung Kemala are long established villages of the Peminggir 
Lampung ethnic group, one of three ethnic groups (Peminggir, Abung and 
Pubian) of Lampung, located on its southwestern coast (Kusworo, 2014: 
29). It is believed that this ethnic group originated from the egalitarian 
Bengkulu upland communities (Belalau) that moved to the coast and 
gradually, over a long period of time, evolved into a stratified society un-
der the influence of the three kingdoms. These were the Sriwijaya and 
Pagaruyung kingdoms during the thirteenth century, the Majapahit king-
dom during the fourteenth century and the Banten kingdom during the 
fifteenth century (Hadikusuma, 1989: 2; Kingston, 1987; Bangsawan, 
2001).   
During the early colonial period in the eighteenth century,these villag-
es were part of  Kroe district, with Kroe being an important harbour of 
the former British colony during the Bengkoelen Regency.The Dutch 
exchanged Singapore Island for the whole of Bengkoelen Regency, ob-
tained from the British, during the early nineteenth century. In 1857, the 
Dutch colonial government in Lampung and Bengkoelen Regency re-
placed the military officials with civil servants, and disbanded the marga 
leaders as official components of government administration (Kingston, 
1987:28; Djalins, 2011:10). The social structure of the Lampungese was 
originally based on strong genealogical ties. The primary kinship-based 
community was known as an original clan (suku), whose territory was 
called a marga. Marga Bengkunat, a conglomeration of genealogically–
linked villages that has existed for 17 generations, is one such territory. It 
was created by Batin Pemoeka Pesirah Alam, originally from the Pa-
garuyung Kingdom, West Sumatera (Bangsawan, 2001). These villages 
(Sukamarga and Tanjung Kemala) were known as pekon, tiuh, anek, kam-
pong, talang and umbul. The marga leaders (kepala/saibatin) were responsible 
for maintaining and applying adat norms within their territories (Utomo, 
1975:51; Safitri, 2010: 142; Bangsawan, 2001). The marga administration 
was used by the colonial authorities to collect taxes from local communi-
ties, either through forest clearance activities or agricultural prod-
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ucts(such as coffee and pepper), collected from margaas well as non-
margamembers. The taxes were used to finance the marga elites and par-
tially for making payments to the colonial rulers (Elmhirst, 2001: 299)   
The authority of the local margas declined in 1874 as a result of the 
implementation of the Domain Declaration of Sumatera. Under this sys-
tem, the government only recognized land claims up to 6 km from vil-
lages (pekon) and 3 km from temporary settlements (umbul or talang). The 
land situated in between the marga claimed areas became state land 
(Kingston 1987: 29; Djalins, 2011; Safitri, 2010: 156). This opened up the 
way for the plantation era, during which several private plantation (erf-
pacht and particulier) licenses were given to European companies in Su-
matera, prominent among these being the Belimbing I to V concessions 
regarding marga Bengkunat land in 1912. These concessions pertained to 
an area totalling 16,996 hectares that extended across a 4–6 km width 
from Way Baroe in the north to Way Bambang in the south (Van 
Diessen & Ormeling, 2004: 196; Bangsawan, 2001). However, there is a 
lack of clarity regarding the recipients of the Belimbing I to V conces-
sions andthe commodities for which they were given. However, the ex-
pansion of plantations was reported to have caused considerable envi-
ronmental damage to the Lampung forests (Safitri, 2010:156). 
In 1916, the colonial forestry agency began to demarcate state forest 
areas and negotiated with each marga to classify a portion of the marga 
lands within this category. The state forest area became the Wilhemina 
Nature Reserve, the first nature reserve in Sumatera Island (currently 
known as Bukit Barisan Selatan National Park). Moreover, the colonial 
forestry agency implemented a reforestation programmein sloping hill 
areas (Boomgaard et al, eds, 1997: 22–23). At the same time, the enact-
ment of local forestry ordinance for Lampung included some portions of 
Bengkulen Regency. This provision prohibited timber felling and other 
forms of exploitation in forest areas. Delineation, official designation 
and registration of state forests were subsequently conducted (Safitri, 
2010: 157).  
During the uprising of the nationalist communist movement in the 
1920s, anti-marga movements were pioneered by the leftist Comite Tani 
Lampung (CTL). CTL held that the marga system would be regressive 
and place people under an autocratic and exploitative system that pri-
marily served the interests of the government and the elite at the expense 
of the people (Kingston, 1987: 29; Djalins, 2011: 11). A new system for 
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marga administration, known as the Pasirah system (pasirahstelsel) was insti-
tuted in 1928, as a result of which the marga was again recognised as a 
self-governing administration unit (Safitri, 2010:144). This system 
strengthened the margas in contrast to the CTL’s reformist anti-marga 
movement. CTL mostly consisted of young Lampungese, who did not 
intend to abolish the Pasirah system, but rather to withdraw the marga’s 
authority in collecting taxes. However, the pasirah system continued until 
the end of Dutch colonialisation  (Safitri, 2010: 145). 
The Kubu Nitjik forest area known as ‘Register 22 Bengkulen’ was es-
tablished and delineated in 1938, taking up almost half of the Bengkunat 
marga territory, as agreed by the Pesirah1 Kroe and the local communi-
ties. State forest boundaries were demarcated in the field with permanent 
poles (with registration numbers).The local communities recognised 
theboundary as a clear demarcation between the state forest area (for-
merly marga land given to the state as forest area) and their remaining 
marga lands. This boundary was known by the local communities as 
Boschwezen (BW), or forest areas. Sukamarga  and Tanjung Kemala villag-
es, as well as Simpang Duren Hamlet were located outside the Koeboe 
Nitjik forest areas, but inside the  Belimbing I plantation concession land 
(see Figure 1 for a map of the Bengkunat area in 1938).  
Due to the inactivity of the plantation, local communities were utilis-
ing the land located outside the forest area. It was reported that irrigated 
rice farms were developed in the five old villages (including Sukamarga 
and Tanjung Kemala) under the orders of Batin Pemoeka Pesirah Alam. 
It was also reported that irrigated rice fields were developed during this 
period. Almost all villages had established rice fields in the village centres 
by drawing on good river flow from the forest 17 generations ago, most 
probably 450 years ago during the sixteenth century (Bangsawan, 2001). 
Torquebiau, (1984) also notes the commencement of intensified tapping 
of shorea javanica latex, known as repong damar, from the forest. During the 
early twentieth century, this species was domesticated and brought closer 
to the villages. The marga landscape thus consisted of five old villages 
with settlements and irrigated rice farmswithin the village, surrounded by 
repong damar agroforests. This old landscape has endured up to the pre-
sent. Shifting cultivation lands are located outside of the villages, and 
secondary forests are in upland areas adjacent to the state forest in the 
Nature Reserve. 
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Figure 4.1 
Map of the Bengkunat area in 1938 
 
Source: Westenenk, L.C, 1938; Memory van Overgave Bengkoelen 1938, Register 22, Koeboe 
Nitjik  
 
During the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, Bengkunat, 
which is located approximately 200 km from the Residency’s capital city 
of Bengkulu, and about 200 km from the Residency’s city of Lampung, 
was under relative self-government. Few secondary reports mention the 
situation of Bengkunat during the Japanese occupation. Interviews con-
ducted for this study revealed that the local communities continued to 
occupy and cultivate land, and to extend their farms into what the Dutch 
administration defined as state forest areas (BW). 
After the declaration of Independence in 1945, political disorder re-
sulted in an unstable government (Safitri, 2010: 159). The situation was 
worsened by extreme drought and famine throughout Lampung. In 
1947, large numbers of people, both local and migrants, came to the area 
to clear forest (Utomo, 1975:23). Also in the same year, the Lampung 
Resident released Maklumat Resident no.15/1947, which legalised people’s 
access to state forests in Lampung. Moreover, in 1950, the Maklumat 
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Resident and the local government (kepala negeri), through the provision 
of what were known as ladang permits, allowed people to clear and culti-
vate land in forest areas. 
This practice continued until the 1960s when the Resident of Lam-
pung instructed civil servants to prohibit people from opening up the 
forest, and to guide applicants for ladang permits in seeking approval 
from the district head or forestry service. Due to the high pressure re-
sulting from demands by local communities to cultivate forest areas, in 
1964 the Lampung Forestry Service (through T.M.L. Tobing, the head of 
the Forestry office), issued instruction no. 4/1964 welcoming people to 
cultivate land in forest areas, and legalising previously established clear-
ings. These permits for cultivation (surat idzin usaha tani),could be used in 
forests and nature reserves for the practice of shifting cultivation associ-
ated with an agroforestry system (coffee, pepper etc.). The permit ena-
bled the status of the land to be upgraded from stewardship of state for-
est land to individual land ownership, as long as the agroforest was 
managed well. This situation reveals that a number of landless peasants 
from Java were seeking cultivation land. However, after the 1965 coup, 
all idzin usaha tani permits were cancelled and confiscated, and the peas-
ants, as well as T.M.L. Tobing, were all labelled as communists, accused 
of being PKI members, and some of them were sent to prison without 
trial. 
After the enactment of the 1967 Forestry Law during the early years 
of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime, MoF made exclusive claims to further 
forest areas, as reflected in the 1982 Forest Allocation Consensus 
(THGK), expanding its control from 60 million hectares in 1960 to 143 
million hectares in 1982.2 Significantly, MoF made its claim to more state 
forests by using the term ‘consensus’, even though in reality, consent was 
never reached amongst the concerned parties. In fact, MoF exercised 
this land claim by force, backed by the central government and against 
the will of the local government and communities. This process excluded 
any participation by local communities, especially those that had ac-
cessed and controlled the land from the time of their ancestors, as well 
as those who arrived later and tilled the lands. In Bengkunat and other 
parts of West Lampung district, however, this was not felt until 1996 
when the forest was once again delineated. This expansion of forest area 
disregarded the 1938 BW forest delineation, and included the former 
erfacht Belimbing I to V, which was considered as marga Bengkunat lands. 
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Further, this forest land which included village land, was coercively 
takenand allocated as a private logging concession to the company, PT. 
Bina Lestari, in 1970. This company did not succeed in getting access for 
cutting the dammar-cultivated agroforests from the local communities, 
and encroached outside of their concession area. The concession given 
to PT Bina Lestari was cancelled in 1992 and the land targeted for reha-
bilitation was transferred to the state-owned logging company, PT Inhu-
tani V (Int), until 2002.3 
Therefore, the new forest delineation plan entailed a significant 
change from the forest boundaries in 1938 during the Dutch colonial 
period, which had been previously been agreed to by the old villages.4 
Exclusion through regulation and force were carried out as part of the 
Orde Baruregime during General Soeharto’s dictatorship from 1965 to 
1998. Old Lampungese village settlements and their productive farms 
were incorporated into the forest areas without their consent.This led to 
the formation of movements by local communities against the MoF's 
claims over their lands as state forests. 
 
4.2 Conflict and Collaboration: Reactions to MoF’s 
Claims 
In 1995 a group called Team Krui, consisting of several organisations -  
Latin (a Bogor-based NGO), Watala (a Lampung-based NGO), several 
universities (including the Universities of Indonesia and Lampung), and 
two Bogor-based international research institutions (ICRAFand CIFOR) 
provided assistance to the local communities. Specifically, this team was 
involved in discussing and mapping their problems, as well as discussing 
several possible solutions and negotiating their agenda with the govern-
ment. Two local community organisations with different identities were 
formed in response to the problems that were occurring along the west-
ern coast of Lampung. 
1. Yayasan Penyimbang Adat 16 Marga Pesisir (YASPAP), an 
indigenous people’s group: YASPAP was composed of 16 
marga leaders located along the west coast of West Lampung. 
This marga was an old territory-based village with a stratified and 
hierarchical lineage. As previously discussed, the marga was 
recognised as a village administrative unit during the colonial 
period. In  Bengkunat sub-district, YASPAP had an ally. This 
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was the Persatuan Marga Adat Bengkunat, or Marga Bengkunat 
Union (PERMAGA), headed by the Bengkunat Marga Chief, one 
of the 16 marga chiefs in Bengkunat sub-district.5 PERMAGA 
and YASPAP together constituted the local resistance group 
representing the interests of the adat communities regarding the 
expansion of the forest areas (TGHK, 1982). 
2. Persatuan Masyarakat Petani Repong Damar (PMPRD) 
constituted by indigenous peasant agro-forester groups: 
The PMPRD represented peasants who traditionally owned and 
managed the repong damar agroforestry system, which was 
dominated by damar trees (shorea javanica).6 This agroforestry 
system was implemented through a shift in the cultivation 
system, whereby after 45 years, the produce would be ready to be 
tapped by the usersand the latex sold to  local merchants and 
then exported for use in the cosmetics industry.7 Peasants 
traditionally owned agroforestry plots either through directly 
cultivating the plots (atar) or through inheriting them from their 
ancestors (atar pusaka). The Peminggir, who evolved a more 
egalitarian, modern organisational structure, were the dominant 
ethnic group among the peasants,  spreading from northern Krui 
to  southern Krui (and practising agroforestry in the 16 marga 
territories). 
 
 YASPAP and PMPRD voiced their anger towards MoF during field 
operations when forest delimitation started in 1996. They also sent an 
objection letter to MoF in Jakarta, as well as to the state-owned logging 
concession company, Int, in the field, which obtained a permit to log  
the ‘forest’ in the 16th marga territories. Several violent field-based con-
flicts occurred due to the competition over land and trees. Int planned to 
log mature damar trees, while the local communities tried to stop this in 
order to protect their productive agroforests, and continue tapping the 
trees for resin. During the repressive Orde Baru regime, some house-
holds from the non-Peminggir ethnic group who had planted coffee agro-
forests, and had no mixed damar agroforest farms, had no other options 
and were, therefore, trapped into a ‘partnership’ scheme with Int, com-
pelled to work as labour to cut the productive damar trees in their 
neighbours’ farms, and to plant trees in their own coffee farms. But 
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PMPRD members who possessed damar agroforest farms refused to 
surrender their lands and fought back in the field, raising their grievances 
with the local government together with YASPAP and PERMAGA 
members. There were reports of some clashes between those who were 
collaborators and those who rejected Int in the Krui area.   
Most YASPAP members were adat chiefs who were appointed based 
on their genealogy. Most of them were not farmers, and lived in the cit-
ies, relying on paid labour to manage their mixed agroforest farms and 
rice fields. YASPAP members were better off in terms of their access to 
land that they had inherited from their ancestors, as well as in terms of 
their education, and access to the local bureaucrats and politicians, com-
pared with PERMAGA members, who were the local village elites, and  
PMPRD members who were peasants who traditionally owned and cul-
tivated the agroforests. Collaborations between non-Peminggir peasants, 
and members of PMPRD, PERMAGA and YASPAP occurred towards 
the end of 1996. Despite their different backgrounds and interests, they 
joined together to voice their concerns to the district, provincial and cen-
tral governments to prevent their damar agroforests from being logged 
by the state-owned logging company. Following a long process of col-
laboration with the academy, research institutions, NGOs and people’s 
organizations, in 1997, the Ministry of Environment gave its recognition 
to the repong damar agroforest by awarding the prestigious environmen-
tal award, Kalpataru, to the local community for their sustainable man-
agement of the damar agroforest (Campbell,2001:15).8 
 
Because of its extensive local and national media coverage, this award 
changed public opinion about the potential of locally managed indige-
nous agroforestry systems such as damar agroforests in contrast to log-
ging concessions. This momentum also resulted in instructions of the 
Minister of Forestry (Mr. Jamaluddin Suryohadikusumo), who was 
trained in forestry, to his staff and ICRAF researchers, at the end of his 
term in 1997, to develop a policy for the formal recognition of commu-
nity-based forest/agroforest management as a conflict resolution tool for 
dealing with similar issues occurring all over Indonesia.       
The tension between MoF, Int and the local communities subsided in 
1997 when MoF initiated a dialogue and later offered a solution to local 
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communities. This involved recognising indigenous agroforestry systems 
as a sustainable way of  managing forests and awarding management 
rights to local communities to manage the land and resources without 
being time-bound, as long as this was done in a sustainable way. This 
policy, known as Kawasan Dengan Tujuan Istimewa (KDTI), was a break-
through policy for local communities in managing community forests.9 
This solution was accepted and taken up by the local communities en-
gaged with YASPAP, PERMAGA and PMPRD, and their supporters in 
1998, and adopted as their position before the May 1998 political re-
form. During the advocacy process, the people’s organisations 
(YASPAP, PERMAGA and PMPRD) and NGOs dominated public 
opinion and the mass media, using the knowledge provided by academ-
ics and research institutions (Kustes et al. 2007; Djalins, 2011; Chambel, 
1998; Fay et al. 1999; Colchester et al. 2005).  
In a parallel way, in another part of West Lampung district, another 
peasant land reclaiming movement (aksi reklaiming) emerged, similar to 
that in Ciniti but using a different approach. The movement was formed 
by peasant groups under  the name of Dewan Tani Lampung, orLampung 
Peasant Board (DTL), which was similar to the name used by leftist 
peasants in the 1920s (the Lampung Peasant Committee (CTL), as noted 
above). This people’s organisation wassupported by Lembaga Bantuan 
Hukum, the Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) both nationally and in local 
LBH chapters. DTL took a different approach compared with 
YASPAP/PERMAGA and PMPRD, who were willing to negotiate with 
the government regarding their access to the land and natural resources. 
YASPAP and PMPRD also used scientific arguments, indigenous 
knowledge and indigenous claims to the territory. DTL, by contrast, 
used its force and claimed rights as peasants to own the land. The two 
approaches resulted in different outcomes. PMPRD and YASPAP 
agreed with the KDTI policy of stewardship rights over state forest land, 
as long as this was managed as damar agroforests. The DTL movement, 
by contrast, achieved recognition of privately owned land for the peas-
ants inside the village land which overlapped with forest areas after the 
1998 political reform (Kusworo, 2000:23).10 
By adopting the argument that damar farming was an indigenous ag-
roforestry practice, and basing this on adat territory and claims, the pro-
cess that evolved in Krui excluded the non-Pesisir ethnic groups who 
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were not members of either YASPAP/PERMAGA or the PMPRD as 
they were not practising repong damar in the area. The migrants mostly 
practised coffee agroforestry, which they claimed as being an early stage 
towards the establishment of damar agroforests.11 
After the political reform in 1998, the DTL’s progress in getting indi-
vidual land ownership inspired some YASPAP/PERMAGA and 
PMPRD activists to pursue individual land ownershiprather than stew-
ardship contracts with MoF. This issue was also raised by the wider civil 
society consortium, Forum Pembaharuan Kehutanan Lampung (FPKL), con-
sisting of people’s organisations (DTL, PMPRD), NGOs, academics and 
journalists in 1998.12 The Lampung provincial government took the initi-
ative in applying to the national government for forest conversion to re-
classify and disengage village lands, settlements, rice fields and other lo-
cally productive cultivated land from forest areas.  
Backed by the data on the villages and their farm lands, which indi-
cated the number of households and hectares of land cultivated in the 
forest areas, the provincial government negotiated with MoF for the re-
classification of 153,000 hectares of forest. MoF agreed to the excision 
of 145,125 hectares from the forest area.13  This area, which included five 
villages within 7,600 hectares in Bengkunat sub-district that had been 
allocated as forest area, was to be reconverted as freestate land, and fur-
ther classified as the object of landredistribution. This phase thus ended 
MoF’s monopoly over the 7,600 hectares of land in Bengkunat sub-
district, which included five long established villages of the concerned 
YASPAP/PERMAGA and PMPRD members, and the upland farming 
land of non-Peminggir peasants, including newcomers from Java, South 
Lampung and other parts of Lampung province.  
Unfortunately, the quality of data used by the provincial local gov-
ernment to negotiate with the MoF did not comprehensively reflect 
thereality at the sub-district level.Besides the five villages in Bengkunat 
sub-district, there were also semi-permanent settlements, talang/umbul at 
the hamlet level, and their upland farming areas, which had not been in-
cluded in the data presented to MoF. Lack of data at the hamlet level 
resulted to the exclusion of some local communities residing in these 
hamlets. These were accommodated in the forest reclassification as a 
result of the MoF decree no. 256/2000, and excluded from the land re-
distribution programme. 
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4.3 The Agrarian Structure and Agrarian Relations in 
Simpang Duren Hamlet prior to Land Distribution 
Prior to land redistribution, there were three major ethnic groups in the 
villages of Sukamarga and Tanjung Kemala, as well as in Simpang Duren 
Hamlet. The first group consisted of the masyarakat adat Peminggir from 
the marga Bengkunat clan. Thisgroup was settled inTanjung Kemala and 
Sukamarga. Most of its members (who were PMPRD members) owned 
irrigated rice farms as well as ancestrally inherited damar agroforests. 
However, most of the inhabitants of Tanjung Kemala and Sukamarga 
(YASPAP and PERMAGA members) were aristocrats who were 
thought to have originated from the Pagaruyung Kingdom (West Su-
matera) and migrated to the area in the sixteenth century, claiming 
Bengkunat as their ancestral lands.They were most actively involved in 
the village administration and adat social structure, and had good political 
representation at the district level. It was this group that invited and gave 
permits for non-Bengkunat citizens to settle in Simpang Duren, and who 
declared Simpang Duren as a semi-permanent settlement (Talang/Umbul) 
and later as a formal hamlet (Dusun).  
 
The official payment made by each non-Bengkunat household to the 
village head to acquire access to the land and an identity card (KTP and 
KK) within the village, and rights and obligations as village citizens, was 
around US$10 (Rp. 25,000 in the 1980s).This increased to Rp. 150,000 in 
1998, and Rp. 100,000 in 2004, which is still the current rate. However, 
because two different and adjacent villages, Sukamarga (headed by Bapak 
Barkah) and Tanjung Kemala (headed by Bapak Hamid) laid claim to 
Simpang Duren, some non-Bengkunat households made double pay-
ments to access the land. Later in 1998, this dispute was settled and Sim-
pang Duren was formally recognised as a hamlet of Sukamarga, though 
the money paid to Bapak Hamid was never returned.   
The migrants were encouraged to cultivate in the forefront areas of 
the hamlets to extend the village land and adat  land claims, and to fur-
ther develop agriculture products from these lands. 
A few key persons in the process of land redistribution are briefly in-
troduced below. 
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a. Bapak Syahrun (60 years old in 2010) was the kepala marga of 
Bengkunat. The marga consisted of five villages. He had a 
Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from Lampung University 
and worked as a civil servant in Bandar Lampung. His traditional 
house (lamban gedong) was located in Tanjung Kemala. He was 
one of the founders of YASPAP and PERMAGA, and was 
actively advocating for the excision of land from the old villages 
from the state forest area, especially in his village(Sukamarga) and 
his adat lands. He was also one of the campaigners responsible 
for elevating the status of Pesisir to a district.14 One of his sons 
worked at the planning department of the provincial government 
of Lampung Barat, and the other son worked with the land 
agency of Lampung Barat. He was influential in the district as 
well as the provincial government because of his aristocratic ties. 
He was also connected through family relations to a famous 
lawyer in Jakarta, who helped him in a court case regarding a 
forest land swap that brought him into debt.15 In 2004, he ran as 
a candidate for the district parliament, and later as Bupati, but was 
not successful. He passed away in 2009, leaving heavy debts as a 
result of his political ambitions.  
b. Bapak Barkah (65 in 2010), the uncle of Bapak Syahrun, was the 
village head of Sukamarga for 24 years; He was one of the 
founders of YASPAP and also one of the people who 
encouraged non-Bengkunat migrants to access land in Simpang 
Duren during the mid-1980s. He insisted that the border 
between Sukamarga village and the forest area must follow the 
1938 BW markers. He also believed that the shifting cultivation 
land in Simpang Duren should be actively cultivated; otherwise 
MoF would reclaim this land as forest area. He further believed 
that Simpang Duren was part of Sukamarga village, and not 
Tanjung Kemala. He was active in the Golkar political party as 
coordinator of the sub-district of Bengkunat, and was actively 
involved in promoting the creation of Lampung Barat District in 
1991, when he proposed that Krui should be the capital city of 
the district.16 One of his sons was  working as the highest 
rankinglocal staff at the nearest palm oil plantation (PT KCMU) 
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c. Bapak Hamid (40 in 2010) was the village head of Tanjung 
Kemala. He also encouraged migrants and young couples from 
Tanjung Kemala to actively cultivate land in Simpang Duren. 
However, he believed that Simpang Duren was part of Tanjung 
Kemala village. He also believed that the shifting cultivation land 
in Simpang Duren should be actively cultivated; otherwise MoF 
would reclaim this land as forest area.           
The second group was Lampungese and composed of non-Pesisir 
ethnic groups. It included one dominant household, which originated 
from Talang Padang in Tanggamus district; 
Bapak Sulaiman (62 in 2010) had a family of five. Two of his 
sons, Bapak Wandi (aged 42) and Bapak Warto (aged 40) were 
landless. They, therefore, acquired access to land in Simpang Du-
ren from Bapak Barkah in 1994 and opened up the area, naming 
it Talang Lampung (meaning settlement originating from Lam-
pung ethnic groups). Due to the land dispute between Tanjung 
Kemala and Sukamarga, this family made a double payment to 
both village heads to get access to the 10 hectares of land (US$ 
10 per household or Rp. 25,000). Bapak Sulaiman was later ap-
pointed as the coordinator of Simpang Duren (before it was clas-
sified as formal hamlet), to maintain peace and order in the area. 
Bapak Sulaimanwas not a member of the first group residing in 
Simpang Duren, but due to Lampungese solidarity, as well as his 
seniority and capability in facilitating the two villages in settling 
the dispute over Simpang Duren, he was appointed as Simpang 
Durenhamlet leader. Bapak Sulaiman passed away in 2000. His 
sons inherited the land in Simpang Duren and his other house in 
Pintau (on the main road) was inherited by his daughter. One of 
his sons, Bapak Wandi, was appointed to succeed his father as 
hamlet leader of Simpang Duren. Bapak Wandi later brought in 
more young couples (Bapak Udin, Bapak Ismadi and Bapak 
Yadi, aged 36, 38 and 42, respectively), from Tanjung Kemala to 
expand the hamlet. He did not charge them any costs, claiming 
that their ancestors had already opened up the area in the past, 
and left it as secondary forest.  
The third non-Lampungese ethnic group was composed of three 
groups: 
158 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
a. The first group consisted of families originally from South 
Sumatera, and of Semendo ethnicity, headed by Bapak Anto 
(aged 52), and his relatives belonging to 10 landless households. 
The Semendo ethnic group is well known for their ability to 
open up secondary forest for shifting cultivation and coffee 
farming, and for subsequently selling their land and pioneering 
new land soon after the coffee crop has flourished (Elmrist, 
2007). Bapak Anto and his family and relatives followed this 
stereotype. This group came to Simpang Duren through access 
granted by Bapak Barkah, the village head of Sukamarga in 
1980s.They paid $10 per household, and the group resided in an 
area known as Talang Ogan (originated from Ogan Komering in 
South Sumatera). As the number of households expanded, they 
appointed Bapak Anto as the coordinator of Talang Ogan until 
he passed away in 2010 and was replaced by his son Bapak 
Hendra (aged 35).  
 
b. The second group of families, led by Kakek Sukanta (aged 63 in 
2010) originated from Banten and was of Sundanese ethnicity. 
Even though they were from Banten, they left Lampung in 1980s 
after being evicted from several forest areas in Lampung. As a 
landless peasant, Kakek Sukanta brought his own family and two 
other families (headed by Bapak Soleh (aged35) and Bapak 
Sutarman (aged 37)), as well as a landless peasant from Ciherang, 
a Sundanese dominated transmigrant areain Tanggamus District 
adjacent to West Lampung District. He acquired land access 
from Bapak Hamid in 1998, paying back US$ 10 per household 
($ 10 was then equivalent to Rp. 150,000) within a couple of 
years and residing there. These landless peasants did not have 
any money to pay for access toland. They, therefore, worked as 
paid labour for Bapak Sulaiman, the hamlet leader, to be able to 
make this payment. 
c. The third group of families, led by Bapak Sumadi (aged 50), 
originated from East Java, and were of Javanese ethnicity. Bapak 
Sumadi acquired land access from Bapak Barkah in 1981, and 
later brought in more family members belonging to the same 
ethnic groups from the transmigrant areas of Wonosobo in 
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Tanggamus (the household heads were Bapak Sularso, Bapak 
Sukarto, Bapak Hartono, Bapak Suwondo etc.). This group was 
landless but lacked capital to pay for their land at the same rate 
of $10 per family. Moreover, they didn’t have money to start a 
coffee farm. Bapak Sumadi, as the sponsor of his Javanese 
followers, covered the costs and arranged their IDs, utilising 
them as labour after arranging a payment system.  
 
Considering the insecurity of land tenure in these areas, intimidation 
by the forestry patrol, due to the unclear forest borders, and the hard 
work entailed in living in Simpang Duren, some members of the 
Bengkunat clan household (Bapak Udin, Bapak Ismadi, Bapak Yadi) did 
not reside in Simpang Duren. Instead, they opted to live along the main 
Pintau road between Sukamarga and Tanjung Kemala. They only opened 
up the area for shifting cultivation, and returned to the field during the 
weeding and harvesting seasons. It took them an hour walking from the 
main village, or 45 minutes by motorcycle to get there. In day-to-day ac-
tivities, Simpang Duren was inhabited by Semendos, Lampungese (not 
belonging to the Bengkunat clan), Javanese and Sundanese who relied on 
the land for shifting cultivation and planted mixedcrops. Each of these 
ethnic groups has its own patron and brought in its own relatives to cul-
tivate the lands, later being given access to the land through land shares 
or products, and being encouraged to open the remaining secondary for-
est surrounding the hamlet. These new members of the hamlet were also 
used by their patrons to protect the hamlet land from eviction by the 
forestry patrol.  
Before the land redistribution plan was announced in 2001, there 
were 75 households having access to land in Simpang Duren. They con-
sisted of 18 households from Sukamarga, Tanjung Kemala& Pintau, 12 
households from South Sumatera, and 45 Javanese and Sundanese 
households (see Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 
Map showing the origins of Simpang Duren households 
Source: Bakosurtanal 2004 & household survey 2008-2009 
Among the villagers in Sukamarga, Bapak Sumadi was the richest 
peasant in terms of the amount of land and capital that he had accumu-
lated as a result of profits from his small shop in the main village and his 
coffee farm that was almost ready to be harvested in one or two years’ 
time, as well as other farms he owned. Bapak Sumadi, who was of Java-
nese ethnicity, opened up land in Simpang Duren by giving other                                    
Javanese peasants access to it through an agreement to share the land 
(maro tanah). He made a deal with Bapak Hartono to prepare a coffee 
farm, with all the costs except for seedlings and labour for the first year’s 
rice crop being the responsibility of the workers. Later after the coffee 
farm was ready (mostly after two years), they divided the farm on a 1:1 
basis.With this system in place, Bapak Sumadi only needed to prepare 
seedlings, and Bapak Hartono needed to maintain upland rice farming to 
be able to feed himself and sell the product to cover other costs. This is 
how Bapak Hartono got access to the land in Simpang Duren, which 
was already fully occupied in 1999. At the same time, Bapak Sumadi 
opened his small shop in the main village to sell factory products and 
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buy agricultural products. Bapak Sumadi also made the same arrange-
ment with Bapak Sularso, Bapak Sukarto and Bapak Suwondo for open-
ing other farms such as pepper and coffee, and an eight-hectare estate of 
palm oil trees. Maro tanah agreements are not common in Javanese, Sun-
danese and Marga Bengkunat communities. He brought in the expertise 
acquired from the South Sumatera community in the border areas of 
Lampung and South Sumatera, as practised by the Semendo ethnic 
groups, when he was working in this region as a coffee trader. This sys-
tem is known as bagero (bage loro, meaning divided into two).17 Not all the 
Javanese households brought in their children and wives. They left their 
families with their relatives at Wonosobo, and travelled almost every 
three months to meet with their families. Of course, this added another 
cost for these families to travel and consequently they needed to have 
another place and meet the costs for the family at Wonosobo. Bapak 
Sulaiman and his sons were the rich or middle class peasants in Simpang 
Duren Hamlet, where he got access to 10 hectares land and also had his 
own house on the main Pintau road (between Tanjung Kemala and 
Sukamarga villages). They also had motorcycles that they used for travel-
ling to the farms at Simpang Duren. Bapak Sulaiman, and later his sons 
Bapak Wandi and Bapak Warto, who already had access to 10 hectares 
of land, encouraged more members of the Bengkunat clan, but none of 
them stayed in the hamlet. He brought in more relatives (Bapak Fahmi, 
Bapak Nurohim, Bapak Sugiharto, Bapak Suwondo, Bapak Sugondo 
etc.) to acquire further access to land. With permits obtained from the 
Tanjung Kemala village head, he divided the land that he knew would be 
classified as non-state land among the newcomer peasants. 
Kakek Sukanta, a middle level peasant from the Sundanese ethnic 
group, brought in more members of his ethnic group, notably, landless 
peasants from Ciherang (West Java), to Simpang Duren (Bapak Yadi, 
Bapak Nurohim, Kang Anta and other young men). Besides developing 
his own colony belonging to the Sundanese ethnic group, he encouraged 
young people from Ciherang to expand their areas by opening up new 
secondary forest, even though this was classified as forest area. He relied 
on young single men such as Kang Sarip (aged 20) to work on his farm 
on product-sharing basis. These young Sundanese did not bring their 
families to Simpang Duren, leaving them behind in Ciherang. As a result,  
their children could go to school, but more costs were incurred for trav-
elling to Ciherang every three months. The single young men could stay 
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longer at the farm in Simpang Duren, but only got to go out from Sim-
pang Duren twice a year during the Lebaran feast and usually on Inde-
pendence Day (August 17). 
Bapak Anto and his Semendo ethnic group were classified as middle 
class peasants. They maintained the land that they acquired in Sukamarga 
village. They decided to share all of the tasks in the shifting cultivation 
cycle among the households and their members, as they had long prac-
tised gotong-royong in their villages in South Sumatera province. Differing 
from other ethnic groups, members of this group brought their entire 
families to Simpang Duren, including their children. The consequence of 
bringing their wives and children to Simpang Duren was that the chil-
dren had to walk two hours to and from school every day. They didn’t 
have relatives in the nearest village who could take care of the children, 
but at the same time, there was no need for them tospend more on send-
ing their children to their relatives’ houses. Moreover, there was no need 
to save some money for travelling as Sundanese and Javanese citizens 
living in Simpang Duren had to do.  
 
4.4 Patterns of Surplus Transfer prior to Land 
Redistribution 
All of the patterns of surplus transfer identified by Deere and de Janvry 
(1979:607, as discussed in Chapter 1) that is, rent in labour, rent in cash, 
rent in kind, wages in cash, wages in kind, terms of trade, usury and tax 
were found in Simpang Duren and are discussed below. They entail dif-
ferent degrees of transfer to key village actors (the village head, adat chief 
and landlords and traders) and to extra rural actors (the state, Int, PT 
KCMU, MoF and military and police personnel) from peasant house-
holds in Simpang Duren (see Figure 4.3). 
 
4.4.1 Rent in labour 
Several patterns of rent in labour prevailed in Simpang Duren after the 
Bina Lestari logging concession was cancelled in 1992 and the land trans-
ferred to Int for rehabilitation. Peasant households that had acquired 
land for coffee and pepper cultivation, and did not possess any damar 
agroforest mixed farms, (examples being Bapak Soleh, Bapak Sutarman, 
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 163 
 
Kakek Sukanta and the other landless peasant households), were forced 
to work for Int in a ‘partnership’ scheme. To obtain access to their cof-
fee and pepper farms, they had to plant rows of timber trees and main-
tain their coffee and pepper cultivation in the spaces in between. They 
also had to sacrifice their time felling damar trees for Int’s logging activi-
ties. However, Bapak Sulaiman and Bapak Anto, along with their fellow 
ethnic Sumatrans, refused to cut damar trees owned by the Bengkunat 
ethnic group. 
Of Simpang Duren’s residents, members of the Sundanese and Java-
nese ethnic groups were selected to work for Int to get access to their 
own farm land, either under coffee or pepper cultivation, as well as to 
cut down damar trees, an activity that was purposively designed to break-
up the solidarity of the hamlet. However, this was soon curtailed after 
the Int camp was burned down by the villagers in the Bengkunat and 
Pesisir Selatan sub-district during a riot that took place close to the be-
ginning of the 1998 political reform. 
 
4.4.2 Rent in Cash 
The practice of providing rent in cash was applied to the adat chiefs and 
village leaders from whom peasant households obtained land in Simpang 
Duren. The amount paid to obtain approximately two hectares of land 
was relatively low, and  also included administrative costs for procuring 
ID (KTP) as proof of being a resident of a particular village. A total of 
US$10 per household was required to be paid to the village heads. Due 
to the dispute between the two villages, some peasant households had to 
pay twice to the heads of both Sukamarga and Tanjung Kemala villages. 
As the hamlet leader of Simpang Duren, Bapak Sulaiman was responsi-
ble for finding suitable land for the newcomers, and maintaining peace 
and order in Simpang Duren. 
 
4.4.3 Rent in kind 
Rent in kind is a pattern whereby access to land is given to some house-
holds, who in return pay ‘rent’ consisting of some of their product. 
Bapak Anto and his Semendo peasant associates, as well as Bapak Warto 
and other members of non-Bengkunat Lampungese ethnic groups, re-
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fused to cut down the damar trees and consequently had to confront 
MoF, military and police personnel during forest operations. These 
households bribed them with coffee, paper and jabon wood products to 
be able to continue to access their farms, which were being claimed as 
state forest areas.  
During the heat of the reformasi in 1998,Int’s position weakened, and 
KDTI negotiated an agreement in March 1998. All of the ethnic groups 
in Simpang Duren were adamant in their refusal to transfer their surplus 
in the form of rent in labour to Int. They also refused to transfer their 
surplus as rent in kind to the MoF, military and police personnel to re-
gain access to their farm land. Int left the camp in May 1998, right after 
the political reform, and did not return up to the time that it was dis-
banded in 2002. 
The other type of rent in kind commonly practised was share crop-
ping, known as maro hasil. Even though the land was considered as state 
forest land, those who had traditional claim to the land (Bapak Udin, 
Bapak Ismadi and Bapak Mulyadi) managed the land through sharecrop-
ping relations. Kakek Sukanta and other ethnic Sundanese  households 
(Bapak Fahmi, Bapak Nono and Kang Anta) occupied and cultivated the  
land, with half of the product  being the share of the sharecroppers, and 
half of it given to those who claim the land. Maro hasil entailed shared 
responsibility between the landowner and the worker. The responsibili-
ties of landowners was to prepare the seedlings (rice, coffee or pepper), 
and rice for the cultivator during the first year. The responsibilities of the 
labour were to prepare the pepper or coffee farms for the landowner and 
to share the products (according to a ratio of 5:5) for a period of four 
years. The second year’s rice harvest, resulting from upland rice planta-
tion on the farm during the first year, was the responsibility of the culti-
vator. Both risks and successes were shared equally between the land-
owners and the cultivators. The rent is paid in agricultural products for 
the entire process of establishing the farm (maro hasil). This practice had 
happened in areas close to the main village, which has close control by 
the villagers even though it was still considered as state forest area by the 
MoF before the land redistribution. 
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4.4.4 Wages in Cash 
Wages in cash, as practised among peasant households in Simpang Du-
ren, involved the sale of labour to extra rural and village actors. Two pat-
terns of wages in cash were practised by peasant households: 
a. The first pattern involved selling labour to the nearest palm oil 
plantation (PT KCMU) for weeding and harvesting operations. 
Most of the peasants had done this labour to acquire cash. 
Even though the payment rate was low (Rp. 25,000 for half a 
day’s labour), this was the only option open to any peasant. 
They had to walk for two hours back and forth to the main 
road to reach the palm oil company truck that transported 
them to the plantation, and to prepare their own simple 
breakfast and lunch meals. 
b. The second pattern was daily paid work for government 
projects that  came to the village, for example,  helping with 
village data collection in Simpang Duren hamlet, or being hired 
by the village head or a sub-district project. Bapak Warto, the 
son of Bapak Sulaiman, who had a senior high school 
education, availed of such an opportunity to undertake daily 
paid work for the village administration, and also got involved 
in the nationaland village election committees. This type of 
daily paid work was well paid (Rp. 50.000/day), and included 
the provision of two meals. However, only two individuals in 
the hamlet were able to gain cash from such paid labour 
activities.  
 
4.4.5 Wages in Kind  
There were two kinds of wages in kind transacted between village land-
lords and peasant households. These were: wages paid in part of the land 
(maro tanah) and wages paid in rice products during the harvesting period 
of irrigated rice farms (gacong). 
a. As discussed earlier, maro tanah was transacted between Bapak 
Sumadi and other Javanese peasants (Bapak Hartono, Bapak 
Suwondo and Bapak Sularso), who came through him to 
Simpang Duren. Bapak Sumadi offered to share the land with 
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them as a wage for working in and preparing the coffee, pepper 
and palm oil farms. Bapak Hartono and Bapak Sularso worked 
with him and received part of the land as their wages. After two 
years of working in the coffee and pepper farms, Bapak Hartono 
and Bapak Sularso received half of the land parcel they had 
prepared and planted. However, only a few households were able 
to avail of the maro tanah system of wages in kind. Although 
Bapak Sumadi had limited land under his control, these cases 
resulted from the close relationships that he maintained with his 
Javanese labourers. All equipment and labour were the 
responsibility of the labourer, while the landowner was 
responsible for the planting materials and providing the labour 
with the first year’s rice harvest. Cultivation risks were mostly 
borne by the labourer, as experienced by Bapak Suwondo, who 
failed to deliver the pepper and coffee farm on time. As a result, 
he did not receive a share of the land from Bapak Sumadi, and 
after the land redistribution process was completed, the practice 
of maro tanah was stopped. Thereafter, Bapak Suwondo worked 
for Bapak Sumadi as paid labour. This kind of relation happened 
in areas located far from the main village considered as state 
forest area before the land redistribution and where the main 
villagers exercised less control, with a greater risk of being 
confiscated by the MoF. 
b. The gacong system prevailed between village landlords, who 
owned irrigated rice farms and peasant households in Simpang 
Duren. One tenth of the rice harvested was owned by the 
peasant household and the remaining nine parts were owned by 
the irrigated rice farm owners. This system only applied to 
irrigated rice farms and was enacted twice a year following the 
rice-harvesting season. Most members of peasant households, 
including children, sold their labour within the gacong system to 
enable them to have a sufficient store of rice for the whole year. 
The limited production of upland rice at the household level in 
Simpang Duren was compensated for through the gacong surplus 
transfer mechanism.    
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4.4.6 Extraction via Terms of Trade 
In Simpang Duren, Bapak Sumadi acted as a trader, buying agriculture 
products such as bananas, rice, coffee and pepper from peasant house-
holds, while selling industrial goods (cooking oil, batteries, soap and cig-
arettes) to the peasants. He extracted a double surplus from the terms of 
trade, obtaining a specified money value from trading agricultural prod-
ucts and converting this through another set of terms of trade into in-
dustrial goods. Moreover, Bapak Sumadi also owned shops situated near 
the hamlet where surplus was transferred by individual traders who came 
fortnightly to the village. 
 
4.4.7 Usury 
Besides being a small shop owner in the main village, Bapak Sumadi also 
practised money lending with the guarantee that the borrower would sell 
their products to the traders at a certain price. Several peasant house-
holds had experience of this. For example, Bapak Hartono borrowed 
money to buy seedlings and rice through his maro tanahtransaction with 
Bapak Sumadi. He was able to pay back the money on time. However, 
this was not the case with Bapak Suwondo, whose maro tanah cultivation 
did not succeed. The situation was even worse in the case of Bapak 
Fahmi, who was able to acquire land through maro tanah, but later had to 
sell part of his land to pay back his debt to Bapak Sumadi. Bapak Fahmi 
borrowed money to send his children to school in Wonosobo. Thus, 
Bapak Sumadi benefitted from this kind of surplus transfer, and while 
some of the peasants lost their land,  most of those who lost their  access 
to land in  the village opened up other forest areas. 
 
4.4.8 Taxes 
Taxes were paid to Tanjung Kemala village, supposedly based on the 
amount of land accessed by each household within the local community 
in Simpang Duren. The national tax, IPEDA/IREDA (later converted 
to PBB), was collected annually by the village heads. However the tax 
charge (Rp. 5,000 per household, or approximately US$ 2 in 1998) was 
the same for the all households, regardless of household land size, pur-
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pose and location. The tax was collected by village heads and paid to the 
sub-district administration. The village heads had to fulfil the PBB tax 
target set by the sub-district in relation to the national budget allocation 
for each village. The more tax that was collected, the greater the national 
budget allocation received by the village. 
Figure 4.3 
Surplus transfer mechanisms operating in Simpang Duren, prior to land redis-
tribution 
No
Vil
Surplus 
Extraction  
Form
From the Hamlet 
HHs
Intra Hamlet To Village Actors To Extra Rural 
Actors
Notes
1 Rent in Labor
Peasant HH Inhutani V Intercropping scheme (Shorea as 
main trees, intercropped with rice, 
corn, coffee, parkia, pepper & jabon)
2 Rent in Cash
Peasant HH Adat & village heads 
(Bp. Syahrun, Bp. 
Hamid & Bp. Hamid)
IDR 100.000 (US $ 10) /household  to
get access to the land & ID card
3 Rent in Kind
Peasant HH
Marga Bengkunat land 
owners 
MoF, Military &
Police personnel
Jabon and   Shorea wooden plank, 
during  forest operation & 
sharecropping (maro hasil) in area 
close to the main village
4 Wage in Cash
Peasant HH PT KCMU, palm 
oil plantation
Daily paid labour (buruh harian)
Peasant HH Village heads (Bp. 
Barkah, Bp. Hamid)
Daily paid Labor for village
government  project (off farm)
5 Wage in Kind
Peasant HH Land Lord (Bp. 
Sumadi)
Opening Palm Oil, Coffee and Pepper
farm, and received half of the land 
(maro tanah) in area far from the 
main village
Peasant HH Land Lord Irrigated rice field harvesting 
(gacong)
Peasant HH Medium
Peasant
Land Lord (Bp. 
Sumadi)
Share cropping some of agriculture
product  during certain season 
(gacong)
6 Term of Trade
Peasant HH Traders (Bp. Sumadi) Exchange agriculture with industrial 
product
7 Usury
Peasant HH Traders (Bp. Sumadi) Borrowing cash and returning 
agriculture product (uang tancep)
8 Tax
Peasant HH State Village development tax 
(Ipeda/Ireda) per household Rp
5.000 ($1 in 1996)
Surplus transfer from Landless near landless HH to Medium & Rich peasant HH  
Surplus transfer from peasant HH to village traders and  landlords
Surplus transfer from peasant HH to extra rural actors
Source: interview 2008, 2010 & 2011 
 
4.5 The Land Redistribution: 2001–2006 
The land distribution process could only be implemented after the local 
government declared that the land would be prioritized for those who 
tilled the land, and only given to residents of rural areas.18 Through a 
long administrative governmental procedure, a MoF decree was issued, 
and the local government of Lampung province followed the recom-
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mendations of research done by local university lawyers who sought a 
way to uphold the rights of the tillers. The University of Lampung, 
through its research, recommended that the land should not be redis-
tributed equally based on Government Regulation no. 244/ 1961. In-
stead, adjudication should be carried out to accommodate socio-
historical claims on the land. Interviews were conducted in the five old 
villages. However, they only captured the aspirations and claims of resi-
dents of the main villages (PMPRD, YASPAP/PRMAGA interests), 
which were dominated by the Bengkunat Marga ethnic groups. Those of 
communities, such as Simpang Duren, that were distantly located from 
the main villages were neglected. The recommendation made was in fa-
vour of the Marga Bengkunat ethnic group, namely, to formalize their 
indigenous land claim. However, it did not address the complexity that 
existed in areas such as Simpang Duren. Equal distribution of land 
through land redistribution and prioritising landless and near landless 
tillers were not accommodated in the study’s recommendations. Moreo-
ver, the study recommended that adjudication should be a self-funded 
process, which meant that each tiller should pay for their own costs in 
acquiring individual certificates of land ownership.  
This adjudication system was later endorsed by the local government 
as the mechanism to be deployed for land redistribution within a period 
of five years (2001–2005) with priority being given to the tillers. If after 
five years, land was still not registered, it would revert to the state to be 
allocated for other purposes.19 
In 2005, the process of land registration and cadastral mapping were 
delayed because of the dispute on new forest boundaries between BPN, 
MoF and the tillers at the periphery of the villages. In addition, the tillers 
did not have sufficient funds to pay for the adjudication process. As a 
result of this, a BPN staff offered to use his influence within his own 
private company to conduct virtual cadastral mapping and issue the for-
mal land certificates. In practice, this would mean that this individual’s 
company would just use the data and ID of the tillers to execute the 
mapping without necessarily going to the field, and without carrying out 
actual measurements plot by plot. The offer was intended to resolve the 
registration time limit and to charge a certain amount for the extra ser-
vice provided by the BPN staff.20 This practice meant that anyone could 
obtain ownership of a piece of land by simply presenting their data and 
ID pertaining to one of the five villages. This was reported to the head 
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of BPN and the concerned person was forced to close down the compa-
ny and stop this practice. Due to such maladministration, the private 
company of the BPN staff was closed down and this practice ceased in 
West Lampung district. 
In 2006, a workshop was held to discuss problems emerging out of 
the land redistribution process. This was the initiative of YASPAP, 
PERMAGA, PMPRD, village administrators, including hamlet leaders 
and those of the sub-district of Bengkunat, together with the local gov-
ernment of West Lampung District, and the BPN office of Lampung 
Barat. It also received the support of ICRAF and WATALA. During the 
workshop, the price of cadastral mapping, land distribution and obtain-
ing a land certificate was renegotiated and agreed at half of the previous 
price, and a special task force was endorsed to speed up the process 
(Bangsawan, 2006). A provincial decree was released to extend the land 
registration and redistribution for two years to complete these processes, 
particularly in the five villages within Lampung Barat district. 
There were several reasons behind the provincial government’s exten-
sion of registration for another two years (until March 2009). These in-
cluded: (1) the slow pace of land redistribution and cadastral mapping; 
(2) the delay in reaching an agreement between the MoF, BPNand local 
communities over the new forest boundaries; and (3) the high expenses 
of producing cadastral maps and land certificates.21 
A total of 75 households in Simpang Duren eventually occupied and 
cultivated the land and acquired land ownership. They included some 
peasant households from Tanjung Kemala village and its neighbour, 
Sukamarga, as well as migrants who had already registered as Tanjung 
Kemala or Sukamarga residents. The local ethnic group belonging to 
marga Bengkunat (Tanjung Kemala and Sukamarga villages), were not 
particularly interested in gaining access to and cultivating the disputed 
forest areas, with the exception of seven households. In the main villag-
es, most of the households had access to and control of the land located 
in the centre of the village (Pintau, Sukamarga or Tanjung Kemala), 
along with irrigated rice farms or agroforests. Only seven ethnic 
Bengkunat households claimed and managed agroforests in Simpang 
Duren that had belonged to their grandparents. A further 11 households 
from another Lampungese ethnic group also sought land for their future 
generations.22 Residents of Simpang Duren were mostly originally from 
Java and Sundanese ethnic groups (45 households), who came to Sim-
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pang Duren in 1997 and 1998, just before the political reform, after be-
ing evicted from forest areas surrounding Talang Padang sub-district in 
Pesawaran district within Lampung Province. They eventually reached 
Bengkunat sub-district, where they sought to avoid conflict with  MoF 
and look for available farming land (see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 
The origins and  class positions of  households in Simpang Duren 
No. Origin Number of HHs Class Ethnicity 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Areas surrounding Simpang Duren 
Hamlet      
Tanjung Kemala (main 
village) 
7 1 Rich peas-
ant/trader (Bpk 
Sumadi), 5 mid-
dle-level peasants 
and 1 near land-
less peasant 
1 Javanese, 5 
Marga Bengkunat, 
1 Lampungese 
(non-Bengkunat 
ethnic group) 
Pintau Hamlet 
(In 2010, Pintau Hamlet 
become the main village 
of Tanjung Rejo, which 
includes Simpang Duren 
Hamlet) 
9 1 Rich peasant 
(Bp. Sulaiman), 8 
middle-level 
peasants 
Marga 
Bengkunat and 
Lampungese (non-
Marga Bengkunat)  
Sukamarga (main village) 2 Middle-level peas-
ants 
Marga 
Bengkunat  
2 
 
South Sumatera Province     
Talang Ogan 12 Landless peasants  
(led by Bp. Anto) 
Semendo 
3 
 
Java Island     
Cilimus 27 Landless peasants 
(led by Kakek 
Sukanta) 
Sundanese 
 
Talang Padang 18 Landless peasants 
(led by Bp. Har-
tono) 
Javanese 
 Total Number  75   
Source: household survey (2010) 
Twelve resident households in Simpang Duren, belonging to Semen-
do ethnic groups, also came from the South Sumatera province, arriving 
earlier in the area in 1995 in search of land for coffee cultivation. The 
Semendo ethnic groups were famous for their skill in pioneering forests 
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for coffee and pepper cultivation. Besides the Bengkunat ethnic groups, 
all of the groups that came from South Sumatera, Java, and other dis-
tricts of Lampung were landless and looking for available land for culti-
vation. They opened up the area despite the risk that the land might be 
considered as a state forest area and that they might, therefore, be evict-
ed from this land.  
The cadastral maps of Simpang Duren Hamlet produced by BPN in 
2004 included the details of each individual plot, with land certificates 
being obtained for some of them in 2006. Even though the land certifi-
cates have been paid for, this process had not been completed in 2010 
when this field research was done.23 The recapitulation cadastral maps 
released by BPN, without the names of the owners, become the refer-
ence for each household in securing their lands, and the only written 
document available to provide proof that none of these plots were locat-
ed in forest areas. 
Figure 4.4 
Land redistribution among all beneficiaries & household class status, in Sim-
pang Duren 2002 
 
 
Source: BPN Cadastral data (2002) & retrospective data from the household survey (2010). 
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A total of 104 plots of land were redistributed to 75 households cov-
ering 120 hectares. The maximum land area redistributed per household 
was nine hectares and the minimum area was 0.4 hectares (see Figure 
4.4). 
 
 Based on a household survey carried out for this study in 2010, which 
reconstructed land ownership in Simpang Duren during the period of 
land redistribution in 2001–2003, five household categories could be de-
lineated. There were no landless households, which meant that all 
households in Simpang Duren received land for cultivation. Within the 
category of near landless farmers (between 0.01 and 0.5 hectares), there 
was only one household, Ibu Masyati, a widow from Talang Aceh with 
four children belonging to a Lampungese non-Bengkunat ethnic group. 
She came to the village following her husband, a Quran teacher, who 
passed away in 2006. A total of 26 households belonged to the middle 
peasant II category (owning plots of 0.51 up to 1 hectare). This group 
mostly consisted of new households in areas dominated by the Sun-
danese and Javanese ethnic groups. A further 31 households belonged to 
the middle peasant I category (owning plots of between 1.01 and 3 hec-
tares) and were mainly from  the Semendos and  Lampungese ethnic 
groups. Eleven households were categorised as rich peasants (owning 
plots of 3.01 up to 5 hectares). These belonged to the Bengkunat ethnic 
group, with six households categorised as landlords who owned more 
than 5.01 hectares. See Table 4.2     
Table 4.2 
Householdclasses based on land ownership, directly after the land redistri-
bution in 2002 
Household Class Class range of land ownership in hectares HH 
Percentage of 
total land 
Landless 0 0 0 
Near Landless 0.01 up to 0.5 1 0.17 
Middle Peasant II 0-51 up to 1 26 16.57 
Middle Peasant I 1.01 up to 3 31 37.87 
Rich Peasant 3.01 up to 5  11 24.27 
Landlords More than 5.01  6 21.11 
Total number of HH 75 100 
Source: Household survey 2010 
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Based on landownership at the household level, new classes were evi-
dent in Simpang Duren Hamlet. 
The large family of Bapak Sulaiman (consisting of three households) 
clearly dominated land ownership in Simpang Duren Hamlet. Classified 
as landlords, this family, although from a non-Bengkunat marga ethnic 
group, was from a Lampungese ethnic group. It was considered the first 
household to have got a permit to live in Bengkunat marga and maintain 
the land in Simpang Duren in the 1980s when the land in this area was 
still upland farming and fallow land. Bapak Sulaiman was later appointed 
as the hamlet leader, who resided among the Javanese and southern Su-
matran ethnic groups and was the right hand of the Bengkunat marga 
elites. He was assigned by the Tanjung Kemala village head to administer 
land in Simpang Duren Hamlet. He was also a tiller but regarded as a 
‘landlord peasant’ who owned a house in the village as well as in the 
hamlet. He had two sons: Bapak Wandi who lived in the hamlet and 
tilled the land and Bapak Warto, a former member of the adjudication 
team during the land redistribution process, who was elected as the vil-
lage secretary in Sukamarga village. Bapak Sumadi was considered to be a 
landlord. Though of Javanese ethnicity, he lived in Sukamarga and 
opened a small shop. He got access to land in Simpang Duren through 
his good relations with the village head of Sukamarga. He used his capi-
tal to mobilise labour by sharing the land with them.  
The other categories of land ownership were in fact based on ethnici-
ty, with landowning households from Bengkunat marga being rich peas-
ants and landlords who claimed their ancestors’ land in Simpang Duren. 
The Semendos belonged to the middle peasant I category, the Sundanese 
and Javanese ethnic groups to the middle peasant II category, while one 
widow solely constituted the near landless peasant category.   
This land ownership status (even though not documented on a certif-
icate papers) liberated these groups from the threat of eviction and mo-
tivated them to cultivate the land to be more productive. However, to 
own a plot of land (averaging two hectares) required a payment of Rp. 
450,000 (around US$ 50.00) per plot, which was costly for peasants in 
upland areas. A total of 56 per cent of the peasants each owned 2–3 
plots of land which meant that they needed to arrange a fair amount of 
money. In this situation, a lot of tillers sold one or two parcels of land to 
maintain one piece of land under individual land titling.  
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The adjudication system which was administered by the village and 
hamlet administrators did not acknowledge that there were landless and 
near landless peasants in the hamlet, and also excluded those who could 
not gain land access outside forest areas. This system only formalised 
ownership of land claimed by the local community through a historical 
process. At the same time, household property was registered in individ-
ual names, which were the names of the men who were assumed to be 
the family heads registered by the BPN. This included the property of 
Ibu Masyati, a widow, which was registered in her late husband’s name.  
 
4.6 Farming Practices and Processes of Differentiation 
under Individual Land Ownership (2001–2010) 
Right after the announcement of land slated for redistribution in 2001, 
there were significant changes in cultivation practices from mixed upland 
rice towards several export-oriented crops. In contrast to the Sagara case 
in Garut, where peasants rushed into monoculture rubber plantation, in 
Simpang Duren, there were no clear patterns for planting commodities. 
The landscape was developed with multiple products based on the expe-
riences and capacities of each peasant household.  
Bapak Sumadi, as an example of a rich peasant, used his earnings 
from his small shop in the village to develop a palm oil plantation on his 
two-hectare plot of land situated near the village. While this grew well, 
he faced difficulties in marketing his products because of the delay in the 
construction of the palm oil mill by the palm oil company (PT KCMU). 
As a result, none of the villagers were following his example of setting 
up a palm oil plantation. Some middle-level peasant households were, 
however, experimenting with several export-oriented crops, such as cof-
fee, pepper and vanilla.  
Bapak Sukarmin used his earnings from selling his property in Wono-
sobo (Lampung) to plant pepper and vanilla, whichdid quite well. He 
decided not to plant upland rice and instead hired labour to open up his 
farm and plant pepper, vanilla and coffee in all five of his plots. His fam-
ily, therefore, relied on purchases of their staple food, rice, from the vil-
lage or from Talang Ogan peasants.  
Bpk Hartono brought in his wife, Ibu Hartono, who used to be a 
domestic worker in Jakarta, and used their earnings to plant coffee, pep-
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per and vanilla. He also established a rice mill to process upland rice and 
opened up his first small shop (kiosk).  
Bapak Wandi brought in his wife, Ibu Wandi, and settled down in 
Simpang Duren, where he experimented with planting coffee and cocoa 
in a mixed agroforest. Every two weeks, he rode back on his motorcy-
cleto his house located at the main Pintau road to sell his products. 
The Semendo ethnic groups, led by Bapak Anto from Talang Ogan, 
intensified their farming with coffee agroforests on the redistributed 
land, and extended their upland rice cultivation in the remaining forest 
areas at higher elevations up to the National Park. Technically, coffee 
grows well at higher elevations, but because of the issue of tenure securi-
ty, they planted coffee at lower elevations on the redistributed land, to-
gether with pepper. 
There was competition between the use of land for planting export-
oriented crops such as coffee, cocoa, vanilla and pepper and for upland 
rice cultivation. This was due to the higher price of these export-oriented 
crops compared with the price of one kilogramme of rice. This led to a 
situation in which the rich and middle-level peasants stopped planting 
upland rice and instead bought it from the small upland rice cultivators 
or, alternatively, from the small local shop or from shops in the main 
village. This effected a change in the landscape in Simpang Duren and its 
surrounding areas. While agroforests of export crops were intensified in 
Simpang Duren Hamlet, the adjacent state forest areas outside of the 
land redistribution area became areas of shifting cultivation dominated 
by upland rice.   
Within two years of the announcement of the land redistribution, and 
during the cadastral mapping, 30 per cent of the land was bought by one 
extra rural actor, Bapak Handoko, from Lampung City, who was of Chi-
nese ethnicity. He was  the manager of the adjacent palm oil plantation, 
and paid a price  in cash of 2–3 million rupiahs (around US$ 200–300) 
per plot in 2003. The transaction payment was received by the local 
community in cash, which was rather novel for this community. Bapak 
Handoko purchased the land from poor Javanese and Sundanese peas-
ants (Kakek Sukanta, Bapak Sutarman, Bapak Mahmud), who needed 
cash to pay the land certificate administrative fee for the remainder of 
their plots. He also bought land from rich and middle-level peasants 
from the Lampungese and Bengkunat ethnic groups, who sold all their 
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plots of land as they did not appear to have an interest in cultivating 
theirland in Simpang Duren. This was the case with Bapak Warto, Bapak 
Udin and Bapak Yanto, coordinated by Bapak Warto, the adjudication 
committee and the village heads. Apparently these rich and middle class 
peasants (from Bangkunat ethnic groups) each owned a house on the 
main Pintau road as well as another farm closer to the village. The total 
amount of collective land bought by the extra rural actor, Bapak 
Handoko, through the village head of Sukamarga was 35 plots, which he 
paid for at the same time in cash. He did not maintain these plots, but 
allowed the former owners or newcomers to use them for cultivating 
upland rice.  
The Semendo ethnic groups, led by Bapak Anto and his successor, 
acquired access to land in a non-forest area, and decided not to sell their 
land. Instead they cultivated coffee and pepper in their redistribution 
lands. They stopped the practice of selling their land on which they cul-
tivated coffee and instead maintained the redistributed land. However, 
they still relied on rice yields from their shifting cultivation land in forest 
areas.  
As a consequence of these changes, the landscape of Simpang Duren 
was transformed into patches of mixed agroforests planted with a variety 
of export-oriented crops (coffee, cocoa, vanilla and pepper) within agro-
forestry systems owned and maintained by the peasants. Land that was 
fallow or cultivated with upland rice was owned by Bapak Handoko in 
the surrounding forest areas. 
 
4.6.1. Purchase, Sale and Tenancy of Land within Local Commu-
nities  
Besides cash payments, land purchases and sales to extra rural actors, 
there is also a new pattern of ‘buying and selling’ of land in the village. 
Buyers in the village do not pay outright cash to the seller; instead they 
divide the payment into several instalments based on the coffee and 
pepper-harvesting season. On the other hand, when land is sold to extra 
rural actors, outright cash payments are possible. Within this context, 
mostly poor peasants, who need money in cash, prefer to sell their land 
to extra rural actors and immediately receive the cash, compared with 
selling the land to peasant neighbours. Consequently, the land, which is 
sold to an extra rural actor, such as Bapak Handoko, who uses it for land 
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speculation, will be left abandoned and can only be used for upland rice 
cultivation by the local community. Thus, there are no opportunities for 
poor peasants to obtain cash incomes as paid labour with these extra ru-
ral actors at this stage, besides getting access to the land for shifting cul-
tivation.   
The price of land, without being productively cultivated, tripled in 
2010, and the price of land with coffee farms increased tenfold to about 
20–25 million rupiah per plot (one plot = approx. 1.0 ha).Although it 
was not permitted to sell the land obtained from the redistribution pro-
cess without obtaining the consent of the BPN office, in reality, there 
was a market for redistributed lands, and the transfer of land through a 
’buy and sell mechanism without obtaining consent from BPN did oc-
cur.  
In 2008, Bapak Sukarmin decided to leave Simpang Duren Hamlet 
and returnto his village in Wonosobo (Lampung). He sold all of his va-
nilla and pepper mixed farms totalling five hectares and collectively 
worth 100 million rupiah (US$ 9,000). He received 2 million rupiah as a 
down payment from his local buyer, Bapak Purwanto, who was from the 
neighbouring village. Bapak Purwanto assumed control over the land 
transferred from Bapak Sukarmin immediately after the harvesting sea-
son, and paid installations according to the agreed terms of payment 
based on the harvesting season (Rp. 10 million every quarter). The first 
term was successfully paid from the harvest of the farm. However, 
Bapak Purwanto was unable to maintain the farm, and could not fulfil 
the due payment of Rp. 10 million from his harvest earnings for the se-
cond quarter (eighth month). The land sale was, therefore, cancelled by 
both parties, and Bapak Sukarmin returned to Simpang Duren Hamlet, 
where he regained his plots. Bapak Purwanto kept the harvested prod-
ucts along with the down payment (Rp. 2 million). Bapak Sukarmin re-
tained the first payment (Rp. 10 million) that has been paid to him. 
There was some confusion involved in settling this issue, as selling lands 
with productive individual farms was a relatively new concept for the 
local community. This required assessing and adjusting the land price, 
which had increased tenfold as a result of the new practice of cultivating 
export-oriented crops, and the traditional terms of payment in selling 
land that prevailed in the local community. As a result of this ‘accident’, 
the practice of buying and selling land according to long-term payment 
terms based on crop harvesting periods ended. Both parties (Bapak Su-
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karmin and Bapak Purwanto) agreed that the unfinished transaction be-
tween them should be described as ‘lease land’ (sewa) and not ‘sale 
land’(jual beli). At the same time, this community invented a new surplus 
transfer mechanism of ‘land lease’ for export-oriented crops under indi-
vidual land ownership.  
However,the tenfold increase in the land price also stopped the prac-
tice of shared land, whereby land was split into two parts: one for the 
owner and one for the worker (known by the Javanese/Sundanese term, 
maro tanah, and the Semendo term, bagero). As described in section 4.5, 
through the practice of one of the varieties of wages in kind involving 
the maro tanah system, Bapak Hartono acquired access to land in 1998 
from Bapak Sumadi. He did so by working on Bapak Sumadi’s land, 
clearing it, planting coffee and maintaining the farm, over a total period 
of two years of labour, even though the land was formally classified as 
forest area. Bapak Sumadi prepared the seeds and provided rice for the 
first year to Bapak Hartono.  After two years, two hectares of land was 
planted with coffee, and the ownership was split into two, one part being 
for Bapak Sumadi and the other part for Bapak Hartono. However, after 
the land price rose as a consequence of individual land ownership, no 
landowners would share land ownership with their workers. The land 
price was too high to be shared with the labour. Thus, the practice of 
land sharing (maro tanah) was replaced by a sharecropping system.       
 
4.7 Changes in the Agrarian Structure and Relations 
after Land Redistribution in Simpang Duren Hamlet 
Based on a household survey and semi-structured interviews conducted 
in Simpang Duren in 2010, changes were observed in the agrarian struc-
ture and relations within this society after land was redistributed under 
private ownership. In 2010, there were 20 landless households composed 
of newcomers to the hamlet, after the land redistribution, who followed 
their Sundanese and Javanese relatives. Even though they were consid-
ered as landless peasants, based on land ownership, they worked as 
sharecroppersfor their relatives and, thereby, acquired access to land in 
the adjacent forest area.  
The total number of households in Simpang Duren remained the 
same in 2010, with some new households from outside Simpang Duren 
but also a reduced number of Simpang Duren original households, eight 
180 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
years after the redistribution process was completed. Two peasant 
households belonging to the middle class II category lost their land and 
became landless (‘dropping off’ in the terminology of Cliffe et al. 2011). 
Further, nine new landless households of Javanese and Sundanese eth-
nicity come to the hamlet and illegally accessed forest land. One of the 
near landless peasants has retained her illegal status. Fourteen house-
holds from Sukamarga, Pintau and Tanjung Kemala, belonging to the 
middle peasant I and II categories, sold their land immediately after land 
redistribution to Bapak Handoko, the absentee land owner. These 
households returned to their main village and continued to cultivate their 
lands in their own village. Based on interviews and the perceptions of the 
residents in their main villages, they could be classified as category II 
middle class peasants within their own villages. Two middle level peas-
ants (both of Javanese ethnicity) were able to raise their class status to 
became rich peasant landlords. Conversely, six rich peasant households 
were downgraded to middle class peasants, while five landlords sold their 
land and became rich peasants. Only one landlord, the trader, Bapak 
Sumadi, was able to maintain his landlord class status, along with the 
new landlords, Bapak Sukarmin and Bapak Handoko. 
Most of the peasants experienced a downgrade in their class status 
due to the high cost of land administration. Bapak Handoko, the absen-
tee landowner, took advantage of this situation and bought portions of 
the land belonging to peasant households so that they could pay the cost 
of land administration for their remaining land. As a result, as alrerady 
explained, Bapak Handoko acquired control over more than 30 per cent 
of the land in the hamlet. 
 
4.7.1 The Process of Class Differentiations in Peasant House-
holds 
This section provides examples of the contrasting post-redistribution 
trajectories of individual households. 
Bapak Suwondo, who used to belong to the middle peasant I catego-
ry, did not succeed in farming his land, and became landless after selling 
all of his land to Bapak Hartono. He then worked for Bapak Hartono as 
paid labour managing the rice mill. There are several cases of households 
that have lost their land and become landless because of the expense of 
the land administration fee that they had to pay. This household (Bapak 
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Suwondo) was able to maintain a house in the hamlet and to access for-
est area and practise shifting cultivation.  
Ibu Masyati (a widow with four children) was the only near landless 
peasant who could survive and continue to maintain and cultivate a 
mixed coffee farm within her 0.4 hectares plot of land. She was able to 
survive and even to intensify farming through a coffee agroforest, be-
cause of the support she received from villagers in Sukamarga, who 
helped her to clear the land and plant coffee. She did the weeding to-
gether with her four sons.  
A total of 21 households belonging to the middle peasant I category 
were identified in 2010, a decrease from 24 households in 2001. This ar-
ea was still dominated by Sundanese and Javanese ethnic groups from 
the same households, with the exception of Bapak Hartono, who was 
able to accumulate his family wealth, utilising the savings of his wife, a 
former domestic worker in Jakarta, and her labour on the farm. These 
savings were used to intensify their farming through coffee and pepper 
cultivation. At the same time, he opened a rice huller, located at the for-
est margin, and sold the rice to peasants in the hamlet at a good price. 
He employed Bapak Suwondo at his rice huller, and also opening his 
own small shop where he exchanged export-oriented agriculture prod-
ucts for rice and factory products. He succeeded in this venture because 
of his good relations with his former patron, Bapak Sumadi, who backed 
him in case of financial difficulties. Even though he become the richest 
person in the hamlet, diversifying his business through trade, he still self-
limited his land accumulation. 
The middle peasant II category was dominated by the Semendos eth-
nic group. The number of households in this class category decreased by 
seven. These households lost a portion of their land as a result of having 
to pay the land administration fee. They subsequently left the hamlet and 
migrated to find other land for cultivate. 
The rich peasant category, which was dominated by the Bengkunat 
Marga ethnic group, from 11 households, was reduced to six households 
that sold all of their land to extra rural actors (Bapak Handoko). Only a 
few of these households continued to maintain their land. A new class of 
rich households emerged out of those households that used to be local 
vendors. For example, Bapak Zulkifli (belonging to the Bengkunat marga 
ethnic group) owned a small shop in Simpang Duren, and was able to 
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buy some piece of the land belonging to Bapak Warto, the son of Bapak 
Sulaiman, the landlord in Simpang Duren hamlet. After his father passed 
away, Bapak Warto sold all of his remaining land in Simpang Duren 
tothe extra rural actor (Bapak Handoko) and moved to Pintau where he 
served as the village secretary of Sukamarga. He (Bapak Warto) had a 
permanent house and farm near Pintau and the household derived their 
living from their farm and through his work as the village secretary. He 
also sent his daughter to study at the Wonosobo senior high school in 
Tangamus District, which was considered costly by peasants from the 
village. However, Bapak Warto’s elder brother, Bapak Wandi, replaced 
his father as the leader of Simpang Duren Hamlet. He inherited some 
plots of land from his father and planted coffee and cocoa, successfully 
and productively farming the land. 
Bapak Warto’s actions were emulated by several peasants in the mid-
dle class I category, such as Bapak Udin, Bapak Ismadi and Bapak Yadi. 
These households sold their land to the extra rural actor, Bapak 
Handoko, and moved back to Pintau. They tried to cultivate the land but 
did not have enough capital to mobilise labour. It was easier for them to 
do off farm jobs in Pintau, and sell the land to Bapak Handoko. To date, 
Bapak Udin has been working for government projects that regularly 
hire him for administrative work such as census, preparation for elec-
tions and supervising construction work. 
Bapak Handoko, as the manager of the KCMU palm oil plantation, 
became the landlord in the area two years after land redistribution oc-
curred. He accumulated 30 per cent of the area’s land, and by  2010 he 
had accumulated 35 per cent of the land in the hamlet, which he left 
abandoned. A total of 42.5 per cent of the land in the hamlet was owned 
by landlords (35 per cent by an extra rural actor and 7.5 per cent by two 
households, Bapak Wandi and Bapak Hartono). The emergence of land-
lords (these two households) is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 183 
 
Figure 4.5 
Land distribution among all beneficiaries and household class status in Sim-
pang Duren 2010 
 
Source: BPN Cadastral data (2002) & household survey (2010) 
 
4.7.2 Changes in Agrarian Relations Reflected by Changing Pat-
terns of Surplus Extraction  
From the portraits presented above, it is evident that some households 
were able to maintain their land and intensify their farming through cof-
fee, cocoa, pepper and vanilla cultivation. However, there were also 
some households that lost their land and sold it to an extra rural actor. 
At the same time, there were also households that were able to accumu-
late capital and more lands from those who had sold their land. The 
change in the agrarian structure occurred through a gradual process in-
volving several modes of surplus extraction (see Figure 4.6). 
 
4.7.2.1 Rent in Labour 
After the land redistribution had been completed, rent in labour relation-
ships for surplus extraction ended in areas that had been classified as 
private land.However, rent in labour also ended in areas that were classi-
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fied as state forest in adjacent forest areas that had been excluded from 
the object of land redistribution programme. The remaining forest out 
side Simpang Duren was designated as National Parks, where the forest 
ranger preferred to maintain the rent in cash and rent in kind relation-
ship with the landless peasant.  
 
4.7.2.2 Rent in Cash  
Rent in cash relationships for surplus extractions also ended after land 
redistribution as a result of there being no further available land in Sim-
pang Duren under individual ownership. All the land that in the past was 
allocated by the village leader and adat chief was now individually owned. 
The adat chief and village leaders could no longer provide other house-
holds with access to land through any other mode besides the buying 
and selling process in Simpang Duren hamlet. But outside Simpang Du-
ren hamlet (in the remaining forest areas), the adat chief and the village 
head still continue to practice rent in cash for those landless new comers 
that accessed land in the remaining forest area. They paid a certain 
amount of money to get the village ID card, which automatically gave 
them the same rights as village citizen (i.e.  vote in elections, access to 
land, and other government programmes), but these landless newcomers 
still needed to pay another rent in cash to the forest ranger to access the 
land in forest areas once a year  during the forest patrol. 
 
4.7.2.3 Rent in kind 
A third type of relationship relating to surplus extraction that ended after 
land redistribution was rent in kind that had been practiced by the police 
and military personnel during patrol and forest operation, that should be 
paid as rent by local communities in the form of wood, planks etc. This 
practice continued in areas that had been excluded from the land redis-
tribution program, and were considered as state forest area and designat-
ed as National Park. The rent has been paid in kind to the forest pa-
trol/guard of the National Park who regularly patrolled the forest 
boundary. The forest patrol/guard approached the households at their 
upland farms and selected good trees to cut as well as asking for coffee 
products. This was, therefore, the survival strategy of most of the land-
less households that could not obtain access to land in Simpang Duren, 
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especially new households that arrived in Simpang Duren after the land 
redistribution process had occurred. 
 
 Beside that, sharecropping (maro hasil) has expanded from the area 
close to the main village, to the hamlet of Simpang Duren. This has been 
practiced by the land lords and rich peasants to manage their lands in 
Simpang Duren which are cultivated by the landless and near landless 
peasants.  In the past this share cropping (maro hasil) has been practiced 
by landlords such as Bapak Sumadi, but after the land redistribution, 
during the shift from local agroforest to export-oriented crops some 
hamlet landlords, namely rich and middle level peasants, such as Bapak 
Hartono, Bapak Wandi and Kakek Sukanta, also recruited landless peas-
ant households to do sharecropping. 
 
4.7.2.4 Wages in Cash  
In Simpang Duren, the rapid development of wages in cash, together 
with the development of export-oriented crop cultivation, did not occur 
as in Garut. Wage labour in cash was not practised in Simpang Duren 
due to the limited availability of cash in the hamlet. Surplus extraction 
through wages in cash for most peasant households was still based on 
the previous pattern of working as daily paid labour for the PT KCMU 
palm oil company, while some households also worked off farm for 
government projects. Most government projects implemented in the 
hamlet and village related to infrastructure development, data collection 
and preparation for elections (at the national, provincial, district and vil-
lage levels). Beside these activities, political parties are quite active at the 
sub-district, village and hamlet levels, and have on occasion hired peas-
ants as paid labour for mass mobilisation.  
 
4.7.2.5 Wages in Kind 
Those who need to intensify their farming but do not have household 
labour utilise wage labour from outside the hamlet. In the past, labour 
was paid for with half of the land used for developing coffee farms. 
However, after the land prices increased three to tenfold with individual 
land ownership, the practice of maro tanah disappeared and was replaced 
with sharecropping (maro hasil). 
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The strategy of the peasant households (that has no upland rice), has 
been to fullfil their staple food needs through harvest labour shares 
(gacong) during the harvesting time on the irrigated rice farms in the main 
village of Sukapura or Sukamarga. This harvest share relationship (gacong) 
is classified as wage in kind relationship where the work has been done 
in a particular season, and peasant treated as farm labourer to the farm 
owner.  
 
4.7.2.6 Extraction via terms of trade 
Surplus extraction via terms of trade occurred in the past, particularly 
in the transactions of Bapak Sumadi, the trader in Sukamarga village, 
with Bapak Hartono in the hamlet. This pattern of surplus extraction 
relationship applied to peasants who sold export-oriented crops (rice, 
coffee, cocoa, vanilla and pepper) and exchanged these with agricultural 
products such as rice, a staple food and industrial products, (for exam-
ple, soap, cooking oil, batteries, cigarettes and cloth). 
Small shop owners, for example, Bapak Hartono, extracted the sur-
plus of the peasants through the difference in price charged at the ham-
let and the price exchanged at the nearest shop in the city (Bengkunat) or 
at the village level (Bapak Sumadi’s shop). The shop owner (Bapak Har-
tono), also runs a rice mill, selling rice and exchanges it for locally pro-
duced coffee. The price of coffee per kilogramme is Rp. 10,000 at 
Bengkunat, Rp. 9,500 in the village and Rp. 8,000 in the hamlet. The 
price of rice is Rp. 10,000 in the hamlet, Rp. 9,500 in the village and Rp. 
8,000 in Bengkunat. Bapak Hartono converts the value of 1 kg of coffee 
into 1 kg of rice, which means that he gains double terms of trade (Rp. 
2,000 from the coffee and Rp. 2,000 from the rice), that is, Rp. 4,000 
from a transaction entailing one kilogramme of each product. Bapak 
Hartono’s rice transactions as a result of his rented rice mill gains him 
further benefits. For 10 kilogrammes of rice milled, the mill owner re-
ceives 1 kilogramme of rice.  
Bapak Sumadi practises a similar system in the main village of Suka-
marga, but the price differences are lower because of his proximity to the 
nearest city/factory, and to rice production within irrigated farms. Dur-
ing the harvesting season, Bapak Hartono collaborates with Bapak 
Sumadi and shares the benefits from the double terms of trade in their 
small shops.  
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4.7.2.7 Usury 
Money lending is commonly practiced in the villages in the form of a 
guarantee that borrowers will sell their product to the traders at a much 
lower price (uang tancep). Lending money entails a risk of resulting in a 
cash liquidity problem, as mentioned by Bapak Hartono. To avoid this 
money liquidity in his business he only opens the shop during the har-
vesting periods of coffee, cocoa, pepper and vanilla (ngagung), and closes 
during times of famine (paceklik). In cases of larger amounts of money 
being borrowed, such as for wedding ceremonies, Bapak Hartono also 
acts as the avalising party (guarantor) if the person concerned wants to 
borrow money from Bapak Sumadi, and pay in agriculture products. 
This puts peasants in a difficult position if they require cash for cer-
tain purposes. Selling land to extra rural actors, such as Bapak Handoko, 
has become the easiest option for peasant households to access cash. 
 
4.7.1.8 Taxes 
As the land has been re-categorised under individual ownership, land tax 
is now due annually.  The tax system has changed from the past system, 
known as IPEDA and IREDA, whereby the same amount was levied for 
all members of the village, to the present system known as Pajak Bumi 
dan Bangunan (PBB).Tax is currently paid on each plot of agriculture land 
at the rate of Rp. 10,000 per hectares. Taxes invoice are distributed by 
the hamlet leaders and given, and paid individually by each peasant 
household to the government, either through the bank or through the 
sub-district tax office, at the district capital city. They are due annually at 
the end of September. There is also a separate labour tax, which entails 
the obligation to the hamlet to maintain public roads as the main access 
to the hamlet. Those who rely on these roads such as traders and the 
families of school children are willing to fulfil this obligation. The hamlet 
refuses to open the road to passing four-wheel vehicles or truck passing 
the village due to the consequences of the labour tax for maintaining the 
road. Maintaining a simple path that allows the passage of school 
children and motorcycles is considered as sufficient road maintenance. 
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Figure 4.6 
Surplus transfer mechanisms in Simpang Duren, after land redistribution 
No
Vil
Surplus 
Extraction  
Form
From the Hamlet 
HHs
Intra Hamlet To Village Actors To Extra Rural 
Actors
Notes
1 Rent in Labor
Peasant HH Not exist any more
2 Rent in Cash Peasant HH Not exist any more
3 Rent in Kind
Peasant HH Land Lord (Bp. 
Sumadi)
Landlord & Rich 
peasant (Hamid, Bp. 
Hartono, 
Bp.Sulaiman)
Share cropping (maro hasil)
4 Wage in Cash
Peasant HH PT KCMU, palm oil 
plantation, Gov.
projects
Daily paid labour (buruh harian)
5 Wage in Kind
Peasant HH Land Lord (at the 
main villages)
Share cropping (gacong)
6 Term of Trade
Peasant HH Traders (Bp. Sumadi) Exchange agriculture with 
agriculture and industrial product
Peasant HH Traders (Bp. Hartono) Exchange agriculture with 
agriculture and industrial product
7 Usury
Peasant HH Traders (Bp. Sumadi) Borrowing cash and returning 
agriculture product (uang tancep)
Peasant HH Traders (Bp. Hartono) Borrowing cash and returning 
agriculture product (uang tancep)
Traders (Bp. 
Hartono)
Traders (Bp. Sumadi) Borrowing cash and returning 
agriculture product (uang tancep)
8 Tax
Peasant HH State Land tax (PBB) Rp 10, 000 per plot 
of land including building & 
hamlet taxSurplus transfer from Landless near landless HH to Medium & Rich peasant HH  Surplus transfer from peasant HH to village traders and  landlords
Surplus transfer from peasant HH to extra rural actors
Surplus transfer from Village  Traders to extra rural actors
Source: interview 2008, 2010 & 2011 
 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has addressed two of the study’s basic research questions 
through its examination of patterns of exclusion and inclusion entailed in 
the forest redistribution processes that unfolded in Simpang Duren 
Hamlet. A key focus was on assessing to what extent this programme 
reached landless peasants in the area. The second question addressed in 
the chapter relates to how this process contributed to the formation of a 
new agrarian structure and agrarian relations. But before clarifying the 
answers to these two research questions, as in the concluding section of 
Chapter 3, there is a need to situate the land redistribution process at 
Simpang Duren either as a redistributive or a non-redistributive land re-
form, as emphasised by Borras (2007).  
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As noted in the previous chapter a redistributive land reform can be 
characterised as redistribution of power and land (including state land) 
without any compensation (Borras, 2007: 22). The historical context of 
the case revealed that land redistribution entailed appropriating state for-
est land from the control of the state-owned logging company, Int, and 
its redistribution by the state to the beneficiaries, all of whom were tillers 
in Simpang Duren hamlet, thus excluding extra rural actors. This was 
done without any compensation being paid by the state to Int. But a high 
price was charged to peasant households to cover all of the administra-
tion costs for obtaining land certificates for each plot. This cost covered 
the expenses of the committee to undertake the survey; adjudication 
process, cadastral survey and mapping, and issuing the certificates, with 
no components of compensation being charged to the state or to former 
land controllers such as Int. Using the definition provided by Borras 
(2007), this could be classified as redistributive land reform.  
The land redistribution process has passed through several stages of 
exclusion and inclusion that were addressed in the research questions, 
which have partly prevented the accomplishment of what Borras and 
Franco (2012) have defined as ‘land sovereignty’. This concept which 
was further elaborated by White, Borras and Hall (2012:20), can be de-
fined as ‘the right of working peoples to have effective access to, use of, 
and control over land and the benefits of its use and occupation, where 
land is understood as resource, territory, and landscape’. However, the 
distribution of land plots and titles resulting from the land adjudication 
process in this case show the inequalities involved in the process, which 
raises the question  whether this can really be considered a case of a land 
‘redistribution’ rather than simply a case of land titling, which perpetu-
ates the pre-existing pattern of access to land. Similar to the situation in  
Ciniti (Garut), there was not much actual redistribution on the ground, 
but I have continued to use the term ‘redistribution’, because this term 
has been used by both the government and the peasants. 
We now turn to the question of exclusion and inclusion. 
Exclusion and Inclusion based on policy regulations 
Patterns of exclusion and inclusion that were based on policies or 
regulation, as described by Burchart et al.(2002), were also found in Sim-
pang Duren. The area selected as an object of land redistribution was 
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defined by BPN and MoF, and new forest boundaries were established 
in Bengkunat sub-district. The land located inside of these boundaries, 
and selected as the object of land redistribution, was appropriated from 
Int and redistributed to the tillers. Conversely, land located outside of 
the boundaries of the selected object of land reform, asagreed upon by 
BPN and MoF, were excluded from the land redistribution programme 
and continued to be under the control of MoF. Similar to the Ciniti case 
(Garut), in Simpang Duren too, the tillers who cultivated the land target-
ed for land redistribution were included as beneficiaries to be awarded 
individual land ownership. However, those tillers who cultivated land 
outside the ascribed boundaries were excluded from participation in the 
land redistribution programme.  
 
Tillers versus landless and near-landless peasants and adat claims 
The land redistribution process used the term ‘tillers’ (penggarap) to de-
fine beneficiaries, and assumed that all the tillers were landless or near 
landless peasants. In the process of redistributing land in Simpang Du-
ren, the existence of several leaders that act as patrons (Bapak Sulaiman, 
Bapak Anto, Bapak Hartono, Bapak Yanto) for their followers, who 
consist from different ethnic groups: Javanese, Sundanese, Semendo 
(southern Sumatera), from the Lampungese non-marga bengkunat and 
from marga Bengkunat itself, and who were not all landless or near land-
less, became apparent. It was found that some of the tillers in Simpang 
Duren also had land, including irrigated rice farms and houses in their 
main villages. Due to the use of the operational definition of tillers, they 
were also eligible as beneficiaries of the land redistribution programme. 
On the other hand, all landless and near-landless peasants, who were 
outside the targeted area of land redistribution, as a result of their plots 
being located in forest areas, were excluded from the land redistribution 
process. This process, and especially the adjudication system that was 
defined and proposed by the adjudication team conducted in 2000, 
therefore, formalised existing tillers, who were able to dominate adat 
claims  left as fallow lands, but as a consequence, maintained and formal-
ised existing land inequality, which also maintained the agrarian struc-
ture.    
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Landless and near landless peasants versus absentee land owners 
There were no absentee land owners who received land during the 
land redistribution; all of the beneficiaries were from Simpang Duren 
Hamlet, and consisted of citizens from Sukamarga or Tanjung Kemala 
villages. But only three months after the land was redistributed, an ab-
sentee land owner (Bapak Handoko) was able to accumulate 30 per cent 
of the land under his own control and to exclude others from the land 
except for shifting cultivation. This process occurred through the facili-
tation of the hamlet and village apparatus as well as influence with BPN. 
 
Individuals, households and adat property 
Before the land was redistributed in Simpang Duren Hamlet, the land 
was controlled, managed and cultivated by household units, with the 
consent and guidance of the adat chief inside the marga bengkunat terri-
tory. The influence of adat chiefs through the village heads was crucial in 
the acquisition of consent for non-marga members (Javanese, Sun-
danese, South Sumatra and non-Bengkunat Lampungese peasants), and 
guided them as to where to open the land through the hamlet leader. 
Similar influences were central for the Bengkunat marga peasants who 
were only allowed to access the land of  their descendants. After land 
redistribution, the influence of adat chiefs and village leaders in the inclu-
sion and exclusion of other peasants in the Bengkunat marga territory 
and  village lands became meaningless. Ownership over the land had 
transitioned from the traditional tenure system to individuals based on a 
formal tenure system, and the administration of the land transferred to 
the BPN office.   
In the case of Simpang Duren, all the names in the BPN database sys-
tem were those of males, which is unsurprising considering that it was 
mostly men who had pioneered the area in the past, though using and 
cultivating it on a household basis. No women’s names were registered, 
reflecting the fact that women had already been excluded from an early 
stage of the process of land redistribution. The women were excluded 
from the pioneering phase in opening up the area for cultivation because 
of the traditional barriers that existed in the Bengkunat marga as well as 
the Semendo cultures. Opening up forests or secondary forests was con-
sidered men’s work. The Javanese and Sundanese peasants who came to 
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Simpang Duren were all men (married or single), and they brought in 
their families after they succeeded in acquiring and cultivating land. 
The situation in Simpang Duren indicated that households with more 
adult male members were able to register their lands more often than 
smaller households Most of the households were composed of young 
couples with small children, and these were smaller than those of older 
couples with more sons such as Bapak Sulaiman with two adult sons 
(Bapak Wandi and Bapak Warto).  
 
Tensions between age groups and diverse ethnic groups over land  
The tension between the older and younger generations, as experi-
enced in Ciniti,were not manifest during the current stage in Simpang 
Duren. This might however occur in future, after the next generation 
experienced a land shortage, with all  land being accessed through the 
market system. The adjacent forest land that had been freely accessed by 
young couples and newcomers became reserved land in the hamlet for 
youngster and landless peasants from other areas.  
Tension did occur, however, resulting from domination by ethnic 
groups in Simpang Duren in relation to land access. As discussed earlier, 
the collaborations of the peasants privileged their own ethnic groups. 
Sundanese tended to employ other Sundanese, and the same applied to 
Javanese, Semendo and Lampungese who were not from Bengkunat 
marga. The same situation also occurred if they sold their land. They also 
assessed land ownership and numbers of households by ethnic groups. A 
prevailing fear of the Lampungese and the Javanese ethnic groups in the 
area was that the Sundanese would dominate the land and bring in more 
Sundanese from the island of Java or from the nearest transmigrant are-
as. This may not be related to land control per se, but more to village 
politics in the era of democracy (one person, one vote). Domination by 
numbers (of adults) in Simpang Duren Hamlet relates to local votes dur-
ing the village election, legislative composition, selection of the district 
head etc. The strength of this argument is indirectly reflected in different 
perceptions of land domination relating to Bapak Handoko, a Chinese 
ethnic Indonesian who manages the nearest palm oil plantation. The 
peasants in the hamlet were not worried by this individual’s domination 
of the land because of his lack of influence in the hamlet and village poli-
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tics so far, and because he is seen as a potential land buyer by those who 
need cash.  
The second research question relates to how this process has contrib-
uted to the formation of a new agrarian structure and relations as dis-
cussed below. 
Agrarian Structure 
A change was evident in the agrarian structure both before and after 
land redistribution in Simpang Duren Hamlet. As discussed earlier, the 
land redistribution process could not prevent the rich and middle level 
peasant households from getting access to the land. At the same time, all 
of the landless households in Simpang Duren received plots as per the 
objective of land redistribution. Thus, there were no landless peasant 
households in the hamlet. As a result of the land redistribution process, 
four classes of households emerged in the hamlet: the near landless (1.3 
per cent), the middle class II category (34.7 per cent), the middle class I 
category (41.3 per cent), the rich  (8 per cent), with no significant  shift 
to extra rural actors (0%). During the subsequent eight-year period, fur-
ther new classes have emerged: the landless, landlord households and 
various skilled labour households. A significant rise in landless peasant 
households (26.7 per cent) was apparent in 2010, not only because of the 
‘dropping out’ of near landless and middle level peasant households 
(Scoones et al. 2012; Cliffe et al. 2011), but also because of newcomers, 
who came to the hamlet in the hopes that another land redistribution 
programme would take place in the area from which they might benefit. 
This is a common pattern on Sumatera Island, where more peasants mi-
grate to certain areas upon hearing that these areas have a land redistri-
bution program. This mostly occurred in the case of dispute settlements, 
after the media reported a rise in land conflict cases such as those in 
Mesuji (Lampung) and Bathin IX (Jambi). The emergence of three land-
lords in the area was also evident during the post-land distribution phase: 
one extra rural actor, who controlled more than 30 per cent of the land 
(Bapak Handoko), and two peasant households that were able to raise 
their class status from the middle peasant I category to that of landlord. 
One of these, Bapak Hartono, accumulated land from the Bengkunat 
marga peasants who sold their land and returned to their main villages, 
relying on their other land there. Bapak Hartono used the household 
savings (from the domestic work of his wife, Ibu Hartono, in Jakarta) to 
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establish a rice mill, and later a small shop for buying and selling agricul-
tural and industrial products.  
Most of the middle class peasants lost some portion of their land, 
which they had to sell to pay for certification. Nevertheless, they were 
still able to maintain their land as middle class peasants. They intensified 
their farming through the cultivation of diverse export-oriented crops. 
The middle (I and II) categories, which constituted 76 per cent of the 
total hamlet population and controlled 54 per cent of the land during the 
land redistribution process, were reduced to 60 per cent of the hamlet 
population, controlling 47 per cent of the land in the hamlet.  
 
Agrarian Relations 
 Agrarian relations in the hamlet also changed drastically after the re-
distribution of land and its conversion from public state land to individ-
ual land ownership. There were eight forms of surplus transfer (rent in 
labour, rent in cash, rent in kind, wages in cash, wages in kind, terms of 
trade, usury and taxes), as described by Deere and de Janvry (1979) prior 
to land redistribution. These evolved into five forms of surplus extrac-
tion after land redistribution occurred in 2001. After the Int permit was 
cancelled by MoF, feudal forms of surplus extraction (rent in cash and 
rent in kind) continued to be transacted between MoF, military and po-
lice personnel and peasants who accessed land in forest areas adjacent to 
the  areas of land redistribution. 
These forms of surplus extraction ended after the land was trans-
ferred from state to individual land ownership in 2001, even though the 
land owners were not yet equipped with individual land certificates as 
documented proof of land ownership.   
Agrarian relations changed radically from feudal relationships to mar-
ket transaction-based relationships. Within the hamlet, a form of surplus 
transfer based on terms of trade became the dominant expression of 
agrarian relations between peasant households that produced agriculture 
products and shop owners who sold industrial products and staple foods 
(rice) that they bought from the irrigated rice cultivators in the main vil-
lages (Sukamarga and Tanjung Kemala), or from upland rice cultivators 
in forest areas. Land became the new commodity, the value of which 
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increased tenfold after it was classified as individual private land, despite 
the lack of land certificates. This land was transferred between peasants, 
as well as to extra rural actors.  
For transferring surpluses through wages in cash, peasants relied on 
their employment by PT KCMU as daily paid labour. The other market 
relation was that of money lending to peasant households by the only 
shop owners in the vicinity, either Bapak Hartono in the hamlet or his 
mentor, Bapak Sumadi, located in the main village, with repayment in 
agricultural products. There are no credit unions, banks or other facilities 
for accessing credit in the hamlet.  
The new agrarian relations positioned those with capital at a higher-
class level as they could buy more land, mobilise labour and invest their 
capital in establishing small shops or producing agricultural products. 
There are also a limited variety of market relations in the hamlet entailing 
selling labour for various skills, such as working in infrastructure devel-
opment in the hamlet or helping with data collection for government 
projects. 
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Notes 
1The pasirah system (pasirahstelsel) is a village administration system, introduced in 1928, that recog-
nises the marga as a self-governing administration unit (Safitri, 2010:144). 
2See Colchester, Widjarjo, and Sirait (2003:132). 
3See MoF Decree no. 2003/1992 on the cancellation of PT Bina Lestari and MoF Decree no. 
9944/2002 on assigning the rehabilitation task to Int. 
4See Register 22, Koeboe Nitjik, 1938, on the process of forest delineation carried out during the 
Dutch colonial period, which excluded the five old villages from the forest area, and instead recog-
nised them as Marga Bengkunat land. Subsequently in the 1980s, this area was claimed by MoF as 
forest area (Register 22B) in the 1980s. 
5The Bengkunat sub-district government administration (kecamatan) oversees the Bengkunat Marga 
territory, led by Camat, a civil servant appointed by the head of the district. 
6Shorea javanica is a medium-sized to relatively large tree of  up to 40 m tall. Its bole is straight, cylin-
drical and branchless for up to 20 (max. 30) m, and its diameter is up to 150 cm. Shorea javanica is 
tapped for Damar resin. See http://www.worldagroforestry.org/ 
treedb/AFTPDFS/Shorea_javanica.pdf. 
7Damar agroforest, known as repong damar in Krui, on the West Coast of  Lampung Province, 
Sumatra, Indonesia, is a forest-like land use system that was developed by small holders to meet 
multidimensional objectives. From a conservation point of  view, the damar agroforest system 
affords environmental benefits. The forest-like structure of  agroforests allows for the conserva-
tion of  large sections of  natural forest biodiversity. From an economic perspective, this land use 
system provides a wide range of  income sources for farmers (rice, coffee and paper at the early 
stages, and dammar resin and other fruit and timber trees at the mature stage), their neighbour-
hood and the actors positioned along the damar trading chain. 
See:http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/Sea/Publications/files/report/RP0065-04.PDF. 
8The Kalpataru Award is issued once a year by the Ministry of Environment on behalf of the state 
to individuals, civil society organisations, as well as civil servants to those who innovatively protect 
the environment. This prestigious award has been awarded since 1980, Nominations are made by 
civil society and awardees are selected by a special committee. The Krui community was given this 
award in 1997 for their efforts to cultivate and sustainably manage dammar agroforests for the past 
100 years. 
9See Ministerial Decree no. 47/1998 referring to Kawasan Dengan Tujuan Istimewa (KDTI).This policy 
is the first to include community-based resource management in Indonesia since the ending of  the 
Orde Baru regime. See Fay et al.  (1999). 
10See Kusworo (2000) on DTL’s struggle in the case of Dwikora village. 
11The coffee agroforestry system practised in Lampung was mostly implemented by migrant peas-
ants from Java as well as from South Sumatera. This practice involved clearing forests, mostly pro-
tected forests, at higher altitudes,  and minimal mixing with other fruit trees as occurs between tim-
ber and dammar trees for their resin. Coffee farmers received little until much later when the local 
government realized that one third of the protected areas in Lampung Province were covered by 
monoculture and agroforest coffee cultivation, providing the backbone of upland household liveli-
hoods in Lampung. In 1998 after the political reform, MoF again requested ICRAF and state re-
search institutions to conduct social policy research aimed at providing recommendations on the 
future of coffee cultivation in Lampung. See MoF Decree no. 677/1999 on Community Forestry, 
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the first national policy that could be applied in all parts of  Indonesia to accommodate community-
based forest management, not only using indigenous management practices, but also applying new 
innovations in agroforestry. 
12FKPL jointly advocated the two approaches suggested by DTL, LBH and the PMPRD, YASPAP 
and Watala for redefining the forest area of Lampung Province, and especially excising settlements 
and farmland managed by local communities from state forest areas (FKPL, 1998). 
13MoF Decree no. 256/2000ordered the excision of 145,125 hectares of former forest areas to non-
forest areas, as requested by the provincial local government, and devolved the process of land re-
distribution to BPN, in collaboration with the provincial and district governments. 
14The separation of Pesisir Lampung Barat District, the youngest district in Lampung, from Lam-
pung Barat district, was enacted on  October 25,2012. Bapak Syahrun passed away in 2009 before 
Pesisir Barat became an independent district. 
15In 2003, Bapak Syahrun attempted to carry out a forest land swap between former forest land that 
he claimed was his land and land allocated for hatchery farms located within mangrove forests on 
the coast. The forestry office in Lampung Barat rejected the proposal due to the unclear status of 
the land that he claimed was his. He simultaneously received a payment installation from the com-
pany owning the hatchery that he used to prepare for his candidature as a Parliament member. The 
company registered a case in court, because he could not return the payment instalment that he had 
received from them. 
16The creation of Lampung Barat District was enacted by Parliament through Law no. 6/1991 on 
August 16,1991, but a decision was made to locatethe capital city not in Krui but in Liwa. This cre-
ated deep disappointment among the 16 marga leaders from Pesisir Krui. They later promoted the 
new district of Pesisir Lampung Barat and Krui became the capital city of the district in 2012. 
17This system is still practised in some areas in Jambi, Riau, South Sumatera and North Lampung 
forests, whereby forest areas are illegally opened up and converted to palm oil plantations. Capitalist 
peasants encourage labour to open up forests and divide the land in two parts in the form of palm 
oil plantation, without paying the costs of labour (Kusters Koen et al, 2014). 
18The Governor of Lampung passed decree no. G/283.A/B.IX/HK/2000, which stated that for-
mal forest areas would be redistributed with priority given to peasants who were tilling the land. 
Private sectors were given second priority after the tillers had received formal rights over the lands. 
19See Lampung Province Government Regulation no. 6/2001 
20According to a company staff member who was interviewed, this kind of practice was common to 
speed up the process of land registration, and occurred in the remaining 143,000 hectares of former 
forest areas located in Lampung province. 
21See Provincial Governor Regulation no. 14/2007 that further extended the land registration pro-
cess for another two years (till March 2009) and formed a special task force to speed up the process. 
At that time, the National Program of Land Reform had been announced and the local government 
and BPN were seriously looking for successful examples of land redistribution processes. This case 
was also used as an example of redistributing upland land to the tillers. 
22West Lampung and currently the new district of Pesisir Lampung district are considered to have 
the largest forest area cover in Lampung Province (Bappeda Propinsi Lampung 2001, Bappeda 
Propinsi Lampung 2013, draft RTRWP Propinsi Lampung 2013–2030). 
23Only 31 certificates (from 104 plots) which were owned by 10 households (out of a total of 75 
households) were released by BPN. However, this data was inaccurate with names and plots being 
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mixed up. The district-level BPN office, however, kept promising to speed up and rectify the pro-
cess of obtaining land certificates. 
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5 The Future of Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This last chapter offers conclusions emerging out of this study. It first 
presents an overall summary and compares similarities and differences in 
the process and result of the land redistribution as well as changes in 
agrarian structure  resulting from land redistribution in the two study 
locations. Second, it reflects more broadly on the future of upland com-
munities in Indonesia following the implementation of forest land redis-
tribution policy that promotes individual land ownership. The first sec-
tion shows the relevance of these cases in the context of future of forest 
redistribution in Indonesia, and the second section provides overviews 
of changes in the agrarian class structure and in agrarian relations, re-
spectively, in both sites (Ciniti in Garut and Simpang Duren in Lam-
pung). The third section questions the application of the evolutionary 
theory of land rights (ETLR)in the two sites, noting how national and 
local policies were geared towards individual land ownership. The fourth 
section outlines the general trajectory of the change from informal land 
ownership towards individual land ownership that is transforming the 
agrarian structure and agrarian relations in upland communities of Indo-
nesia, and the dilemmas that this process creates for both the govern-
ment and peasant movements. The fifth part suggests possible strategies 
to avoid these problems in the future that can be applied within several 
government programmes as well as in the civil society movement.  
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5.2 Contestation over forest areas in Ciniti (Garut) and 
Simpang Duren (Lampung) before the land 
redistribution 
 
In both the cases of Ciniti (Garut) and Simpang Duren (Lampung) there 
were contestations over land that were used and owned by the local 
community but claimed by the state, especially during the authoritarian 
General Suharto regime (1966-1998), as State Forest Land. These cases 
are representative of the massive land struggle of local communities 
against the Central Government, in particular against the Ministry of 
Forestry that expanded their claim over the land and allocated the lands 
to large-scale private and state forest companies, which happens in Java 
as well as in the outer islands.  The weakening of the Suharto regime in 
1997 and its subsequent collapse in 1998 has intensified the land strug-
gle, with peasants ‘reclaiming’ the land in different forms of movement. 
Some cases were addressed by the new reformed government post 1998 
through community forestry within the MoF forestry programme, and a 
few cases (including Ciniti and Simpang Duren in Chapters 3 and 4) 
were accommodated through land redistribution within the BPN pro-
gramme. There are still 30,000 villages (1/3 of the total villages in Indo-
nesia)  in forest areas whose problems remain unanswered, with lack of 
land clear tenure security and access to the land considered as illegal or 
labelled as encroachment on state lands.    
The process of land redistribution for local communities under indi-
vidual land ownership, as elaborated in the two cases, took different pol-
icy pathways. In Ciniti case the programme  disallowed absentee land 
owners in the rules and regulations, and in the Simpang Duren Case land 
was distributed through an adjudication programme which in the rules 
and regulations accommodated the socio-historical claims or factual con-
trol over the land. Both programmes (land redistribution and the land 
adjudication programme) were determined by the central and local gov-
ernment, where the process of defining the object of land redistribution 
were done at the central government (MoF & BPN) but the subjects of 
land redistribution were defined, and all the detailed administrative pro-
cess were determined, at the local government level. 
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5.3 Changes in the Land-Based Agrarian Structure 
In both the Ciniti and Simpang Duren cases, discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4, land redistribution was able to provide all households in the hamlet 
with access to land ownership that could potentially bring benefits and 
security to these households. In Ciniti most of the beneficiary house-
holds were local communities from surrounding areas, which came from 
the same ethnic group (Sundanese) dominant in the area, originating 
from the surrounding hamlets and villages. In Simpang Duren the bene-
ficiary households were dominated by non-Bengkunat and other non 
Sumatran ethnic groups, particularly the Sundanese and Javanese mi-
grants who had been living in other district of Lampung Province for 
several years, and moved to Simpang Duren several years before the land 
redistribution.  
A few years after the land was redistributed, landless peasant house-
holds had re-emerged in both cases due to the impact of open competi-
tion and surplus appropriation by other classes and the arrival of land-
less peasants from other areas. Using the terminology of Cliffe et al., 
2011, the ‘dropping off’ peasant households are those who for some rea-
son sold their plots and became landless. Some landless peasant house-
holds remain in the hamlet and work as sharecropper and paid labour, 
but there are also others that left the hamlet, looking for other job op-
portunities as paid labour in the nearest plantation estates, and others 
who found other job opportunities as agriculture extension workers or 
government officials in the village. 15 per cent of the landless class in 
both cases were new comers to the hamlets. They sell their labour as 
sharecroppers to the middle peasants and rich peasants, seek employ-
ment as paid labour in the nearest plantation and at the same time save 
their money looking for affordable plots of farm land to buy or occupy 
forest land for their own.  (See Table 5.1 in which this class is highlight-
ed in red). 
The cases also revealed that the (numerically) dominant class in this 
society, during the land redistribution process, and 10 years after its 
completion, were still middle peasant households (belonging to catego-
ries I and II).1However, their numbers in were reduced by between 30 
per cent and 15 per cent following the land redistributions. Where as 
previously, they constituted 81 per cent and 76 per cent of the popula-
tions in Ciniti and Simpang Duren, respectively, these percentages were 
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subsequently reduced to 58 percent and 60 percent. The total amount of 
land owned by these classes (middle peasant I and II categories) was also 
reduced by between 23 per cent and 16 percent of their former amounts 
(see Table 5.1 in which these classes are highlighted in green).  
Table 5.1 
Change in the class structure of households in Ciniti and Simpang Duren, 
based on landholdings before and after land redistribution 
 
Source: BPN Cadastral Map & household survey 2010 
 
Rich peasant households also emerged in both sites either during or 
after land redistribution, which reflects the fact that the land was not dis-
tributed equally, and that those who controlled more land before land 
redistribution under informal tenure, formalised this through individual 
land ownership. An examination of the actors from rich peasant house-
holds in both sites shows that these households were predominantly rich 
before the land redistribution. They maintained their wealth either 
through ownership of land in their own village/hamlet outside the areas 
No. Land-based 
class 
Ciniti
(Garut)
Simpang Duren 
(Lampung)
Before 
LR (%)
After LR Before LR 
(%)
After LR
1. Landless 
Peasants
0 9.3 0 26.7
2. Near landless 
Peasants
5.2 13.1 1.3 1.3
3. Middle Peasants 
(Category II)
50.4 30.2 34.7 28
4. Middle Peasants 
(Category I)
30.4 27.9 41.3 32
5. Rich Peasants 14 16.3 14.7 8
6. Landlords 0 3.2 8 4
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of the land redistribution programme, and their dominance in the pro-
cess of struggle for land redistribution, or through their large size. Some 
of these households were former beneficiaries of the land redistribution 
programmes which were able to accumulate more and became rich peas-
ant through their engagement in trading (opening small shops/kiosk in 
the village or hamlet) and those who were able to receive remittance 
household members working abroad. 
Eight to ten years after land redistribution in Ciniti and Simpang Du-
ren, this landlord class had emerged, constituting 3.2 to 4 percent of the 
population but owning a total of 30 to 42 per cent of the land in these 
areas (see Table 5.1 in which this class is highlighted in yellow). Only a 
few of these landlord households, however, were local households that 
were able to upgrade their status to landlords through trade as their main 
means of transferring surplus from other peasant classes in the hamlets. 
Most of them were absentee land owners who accumulated land using 
their own savings acquired from work in the nearest cities. 
 
5.4 Changes in Agrarian Relations 
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, before land redistribution took place in 
both sites, lands were considered by the Government as state forest are-
as and leased on concessionary terms to state-owned forest companies 
(PP and PT Int). By contrast, the local communities considered these 
lands as private lands under an informal tenure system of household use-
rights. Under these conditions of tension between the two tenure sys-
tems (state versus informal local tenure systems), feudal forms of surplus 
extraction through rent in labour, rent in cash and rent in kind were 
practised by the above two state-owned companies with regard to local 
communities that were considered as squatters in state forest areas. The 
communities, made up of different socio-economic classes, claimed the 
land and tilled it, maintaining, to a certain degree, this kind of feudal 
mode of surplus extraction. The nearby plantation estates (PTPN and 
PT KCMU) also maintained their extraction of surplus transfer from the 
lower classes of peasants (middle peasant, near landless and landless 
peasant households) through relationships based on wages in cash (daily 
paid labour). For this group of peasant households, this was the main 
source of cash income that they could earn in proximity to their hamlets. 
Some of the rich peasants in the main villages appropriated the surplus 
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of these peasant households through wages in kind or rentin kind rela-
tionships based on seasonal work (gacong), share-cropping (maro hasil), or 
sharing land (maro tanah). For peasant households, especially those that 
used to be landless, these modes of surplus extraction constituted im-
portant agrarian relations to obtain rice for their consumption and cash 
from selling export-oriented crops. These relationships enabled their ac-
cess to land within the informal local tenure system. 
Figure 5.1 
Changes in agrarian relations in Ciniti and Simpang Duren 
 
Source: Interview 2008, 2010 & 2011 
Some outside traders were enjoying advantageous terms of involving 
surplus transfer from local peasant households. These traders regularly 
came to the hamlet to buy agricultural products produced in the hamlet, 
and at the same time, they also sold industrial products. Some traders 
also practised usury with selected peasant households that required ac-
cess to credit and provided agricultural products in return. To obtain 
more surpluses from the terms of trade, the peasant households sold 
their agricultural products in the main village, where they could sell their 
agricultural products for a higher price, and where agricultural products 
could be bought cheaper compared with terms of trade with the outside 
traders who came regularly to the hamlet.  
No Form of 
Surplus 
Extraction  
From the Hamlet 
Households
(HHs)
To other HHs
in the 
hamlet/village 
or extra rural 
actors 
Before  LR (Ciniti &
Simpang Duren)
After  LR
(Ciniti & Simpang
Duren)
Notes
1 Rent in Labour
Peasant HHs Dominant Intercropping scheme     
(Tumpangsari ) discontinue
2 Rent in Cash
Peasant HHs Dominant Payment for each HHs to officials 
to get access to the land 
discontinue
3 Rent in Kind
Peasant HHs Dominant Share croppers (maro hasil)
4* Wages in Cash
Peasant HH s Regular Dominant Selling their time as daily paid 
labour to PTPN, andPT KCMU
5* Wages in Kind
Landless, Near 
landless and middle 
peasant HHs
Landlord Dominant Share croppers (gacong)
Skilled Peasants Non-existent Practised Carpenters, midwives etc .
6 Terms of Trade
Peasant HHs Dominant Dominant Exchange of agricultural with 
industrial products and other 
agricultural products
7 Usury
Peasant HHss Regular Dominant Borrowing cash and returning 
agricultural products (uang
tancep)
8 Tax
Peasant HH Per Household Per Plot Village development tax 
(Ipeda/Ireda) per HH charged for 
every plot (PBB)  paid to the state 
through local governmentSurplus transfer from landless /near landless HHs to medium & rich peasant HH s 
Surplus transfer from peasant HHs to village traders and  landlords
Surplus transfer from peasant HHs to extra rural actors
Surplus transfer from village  traders to extra rural actors *  Extraction surplus value in capitalist relation 
production, labour power sold for wage s
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The peasants also paid tax to the Government via the village head for 
their service in using the land, referred to as Ipeda/Ireda (Iuran Pem-
bangunan daerah or Iuran restribusi daerah). Each household paid the same 
amount, annually, collected by the central government, according to a 
certain allocation formula (for the collector, local government and cen-
tral government), and this was returned to the village and hamlet under 
several government programmes and basic services. 
Right after land redistribution occurred in both sites, where all the 
peasant households received their shares of the land, the feudal mecha-
nism of surplus extraction rapidly declined, except the rent in kind for 
some sharecropping scheme to develop export oriented farms (maro 
hasil) which still existed, and was replaced by market-related mechanisms 
of surplus transfer, such as wages in cash, wages in kind and terms of 
trade, as well as usury that penetrated the hamlet. Some forms of feudal 
surplus transfer (for example, rent in cash and rent in kind) were still 
found to exist in the margins of the hamlet, where forest boundaries 
were not clearly defined. But as forest concessions were revoked in the 
two respective sites, forestry personnel did occasionally extract surplus 
from the peasants occupying forest areas during forest operations.  
The wages in kind mode of surplus extraction became the main rela-
tionship existing between rich and middle class peasants and near land-
less/landless peasants. This practice was carried out with in villages 
where cash crops and export-oriented crops were intensified in both 
hamlets. Coffee, pepper, banana and maize production were intensified 
in Simpang Duren Hamlet based on an agroforestry pattern, while pro-
duction of rubber and banana trees was intensified in Ciniti Hamlet ac-
cording to a monoculture pattern.  
Wages in cash declined for almost two years after land was redistrib-
uted, a period during which most peasant households were intensifying 
their farm production. But after two years, the peasants sought cash in-
comes through wage labour in the neighbouring plantation. Two differ-
ent patterns prevailed in Cinitiand Simpang Duren. In Ciniti, land plots 
were bought, one by one, by one absentee landlord, and were planted 
with rubber and banana trees in a monocultural pattern. There were a lot 
of peasant households who sold their land to the landlord, and who 
worked as paid labour. Ten percent of the hamlet land was cultivated 
through paid labour. At Simpang Duren, there was also one dominant 
absentee landlord who bought land from peasant household. However, 
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this landlord did not develop the land, and opportunities remained for 
peasants to work as paid labour in the hamlet. Thirty percent of the 
hamlet lands were left abandoned by the absentee land lord.  
Terms of trade have become the dominant mechanism of surplus 
transfer for almost all peasant households that produce cash crops. Con-
sistent with the change of dominant agricultural products from rice to 
other cash crops, the terms of trade have changed from exchange of ag-
ricultural products (upland rice and other varieties of agricultural prod-
ucts) with industrial products (soap, cooking oil etc.). Several years after 
land redistribution, surplus extraction has also been limited to several 
export-oriented agricultural products (rubber and banana in Ciniti and 
coffee and pepper in Simpang Duren), which are now exchanged with 
industrial products and rice (as a staple food consumed by peasant 
households). Upland rice was replaced by rubber and banana plantations 
in Ciniti, and by coffee and pepper in Simpang Duren, with the effect 
that rice as a staple food was brought to the hamlet through small shops 
(kiosks, locally known as kios). 
Usury was also practiced in the hamlet by kios owners in both sites 
through the uang tancep relationship. Uang tancep became an informal con-
tractual relationship between peasant households and the kiosk owners 
for regular purchases of products according to predefined prices. Other 
kinds of usury were also being practised in Ciniti only four years after 
land redistribution. Money lenders from the cities come regularly to the 
village (bank keliling), lending their money at high interest rates. This 
money lending is arranged in loan instalments every two weeks, follow-
ing the banana-harvestingseason. There were no alternative credit facili-
ties for peasant households in the hamlet that did not require collateral. 
After land redistribution, the tax extracted by the government from all 
peasant households in both hamlets was based on land plots and house-
hold members who owned them. The amount has increased almost eve-
ry year, but is considered relatively low compared with the functions and 
benefits that could potentially be raised from the land.  
The study in both cases shown the change of agrarian structure to-
wards accumulation of land by the rich and land lord class as well as the 
emergence of the landless, near landless peasant, as well as the emer-
gence of other non-agrarian economy in the hamlet and the continuing 
numerical dominancy of middle peasant household.  There are also 
change of the agrarian relations which dominated by market surplus ex-
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traction mechanism. These changes of agrarian structure and agrarian 
relations reflect the processes of agrarian differentiation in the years fol-
lowing land redistribution, and the outcome is an emerging capitalist 
peasant community. 
 
5.5 Questioning the Application of the Evolutionary 
Theory of Land Rights 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the policy makers believed in the assumptions 
of the evolutionary theory of land rights (ELTR)  that land rights under 
informal or traditional land tenure systems would gradually evolve to-
wards individualisation following population increase and market inte-
gration. Unfortunately the Indonesian policy makers followed these as-
sumptions (that as we have seen earlier, have been much criticized by 
Platteau (1996) and others), and also followed the policies advocated by 
Prosterman and Hanstad (2003)  in designing land reform programmes, 
targeting communal and public lands to be redistributed under private 
individual ownership title, to  provide land  tenure security but at the 
same time create markets for the land, through land sale, lease, and 
mortgage.2 
 The Indonesian Basic Agrarian Law no. 5, 1960 (BAL) claims to be 
based on customary law (Article 5), as well as on the assumption that 
adat land law was also influenced by colonial capitalist society and feudal 
society (see explanation of BAL). BAL was created to replace and unify 
the colonial land law that recognised dualism of land law: a capitalist land 
law for western society that regulated individual land ownership (eigen-
dom) and leased rights for large scale production (erpfacht); and adat land 
law applied to local communities.Through a twelve-year process of for-
mulating BAL (1948–1960) the law established several kinds of land ten-
ure. Individual land ownership was recognised as the strongest form of 
rights, and lease rights from the state were the weakest rights (Article 
16a). Peasant household-based land ownership, and peasant union land 
ownership promoted by the main peasant union at that time, BTI 
(Barisan Tani Indonesia), (Tauchid, 1954; Asmu, 1962), is not accommo-
dated within the BAL 1960 and the customary rights (hak tanah ulayat) 
were not specifically mentioned in the BAL 1960.  The law makers be-
lieved that communal land ownership would evolve towards individual-
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land ownership, or revert to state land through a process of compensa-
tion (Harsono, 1974).  
In the implementation rules and regulations of BAL, this communal 
land ownership has never been further regulated. Right after the 1998 
political reformation, communal land ownership was regulated through 
the BPN decree no. 5/1999, which recognised customary land (tanah 
ulayat), though this was complicated by the requirement that recognition 
should be based on a local government regulation (perda). Communal 
land rights apply to all land except forest areas and areas that were al-
ready allotted under individual land ownership and leased rights. This 
regulation also allows for the conversion of communal land rights to in-
dividual ownership. Further, BAL requires that regulation of customary 
communal land should follow the times (mengikuti perubahan zaman), and 
that this process is irreversible (tidak dapat di bangkitkan kembali). Even 
though it does not specifically mention that the resultant change will be 
individualisation of land ownership, it is nevertheless ‘geared towards the 
new property rights in response to the desires of interacting person[s] for 
adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities’ and reconfirmed by the law 
makers’ assumptions.  
Likewise, the revised forestry law no. 41/1999 also recognises cus-
tomary forests that were owned by the customary community and classi-
fied as state forest. However, the Constitutional Court’s judicial review 
of this law in 2013 decided that customary forest was non-state forest 
(MK 35/2012). Even though this type of forest has been defined as pri-
vate forest, lengthy procedures have been required by the forestry law 
for recognition through the local government regulation (Article 67). Be-
fore the customary community could prove that they own the forest 
through this local government regulation, supported with maps, MoF 
claimed the forest as state forest and continued to release permits. This 
once again showed that MoF believed that the evolution of the custom-
ary land tenure would lead to the transformation (weakening) of custom-
ary land claims towards individualisation of household land tenure unit 
due to market penetration. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, practices on the ground resulted in the 
shifting of the land tenure units from state to household and to individu-
als inthe two sites. In the past in Ciniti, the concept and practice of 
communal customary land tenure form ended at the hamlet level. This 
occurred after the village was re-established by the peasants a few years 
 Experiences in Forest Land Redistribution in Indonesia 209 
 
after the DI-TII movement collapsed in 1960, and they were forced to 
recognize state forest land in 1974 (highlighted in red). But the peasants 
managed the land in a unit of household tenure  (highlighted in purple). 
At Simpang Duren (Lampung), the transformation of communal cus-
tomary land tenure form was regulated by the adat chiefs and village 
chief, abandoned in 1982.  (Highlighted in red in Figure 5.2 below). As a 
strategy for resisting the state claim in 1982, the adat and village chiefs 
invited newcomers to manage and control the land on a household unit 
alongside the household groups of those who claimed the land as ances-
tral land (highlighted in yellow in Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5.2 
Transformation of land tenure form in Ciniti and Simpang Duren 
Source: Interview 2008, 2010 & 2011 
In that period, the land tenure form evolved from customary communal 
form towards household tenure form in relation toMoF’s exclusive 
claims on the land as state forest areas in both areas. Further, the land 
redistribution process changed the form of land tenure to individual land 
tenure form, although in fact the land was accessed and managed under 
household unit. 
Form of  Land Tenure  
Unit of  Land Tenure (household)
Communal Land Individual LandHousehold Land
1955 1960 1974 1982 1999 2001 2011
Ciniti
Communal Land Individual LandHousehold Land
Simpang
Duren 
State forest 
claims in West 
Java
State forest 
claims in 
Lampung
Land 
redistribution 
at Ciniti and 
Simpang Duren 
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The trend in both sites has been to intensify farming through the cul-
tivation of export-oriented crops such as rubber, coffee and pepper, as 
well as local cash crops such as banana and parkia, immediately after cer-
tainty of land tenure was provided through individual land ownership. 
This supports the idea that peasant households need a certain degree of 
certainty regarding land tenure to enable them to invest in farming. The 
land that was under forestry claims and co-management with the state-
owned company did not provide them with certainty to invest in cultiva-
tion of long-term crops on their farms. The practice of traditional shift-
ing cultivation was the best solution in both sites, in terms of investing 
their family labour and capital. However, households from different so-
cio-economic classes (rich, middle category I, middle category II and 
near landless peasant households) were in competition with each other 
as well as with newly arrived landless peasants and rich absentee land 
owners under the individual land tenure form.  
The misinformation and miscalculation of farm inputs and yields, as 
well as the success stories of one or two peasant households prompted 
peasant households from different socio-economic classes to follow the 
same trend of focusing on export-oriented farming with less cultivation 
of local cash crops and staple foods. This shift has proved a trap for 
many middle class and near landless peasants, as they have fallen into the 
‘drop off’ category. They have lost their own supply of staple foods, rely-
ing on paid labour and staple foods from the market, working as tempo-
rary share croppers in the neighbouring village and ending up in chronic 
debt to those with capital. A similar situation is also apparent in other 
parts of the island in areas that did not undergo land redistribution pro-
grammes, such as the Lauje region of central Sulawesi studied by Li 
(2001). In these areas, monocropped cocoa owned by Lauje peasant 
households in plots averaging two to three hectares, were transferred to 
individual migrants from coastal peasant households who owned 10 to 
20 hectares of cocoa monocrops. This has occurred not through gov-
ernment programmes but through a piecemeal process of land purchases 
by rich peasant households from local peasant households.  
In practice, this free competition also allows the transfer of individual 
land ownership through a buying and selling market mechanism, decided 
by the individuals whose names appear on the land certificate. Despite 
the prohibition of sale and purchase of the redistributed land without a 
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permit from the BPN office, according to the rules and regulations, there 
are no mechanisms in place to prevent this from happening. There is 
also no mechanism to prevent land accumulation in the hands of the rich 
peasants, who subsequently became the landed elite in the hamlet. After 
the land was declassified as non-forest area and declared as an object of 
land redistribution, the prices increased tenfold (almost the same in both 
hamlets), providing a new market opportunity for land investment (Sim-
pang Duren) as well as for developing export-oriented farms (Ciniti). 
This enabled everyone (in practice) to buy and sell land individually, even 
absentee land owners. By 2010, 10 per cent of the total land in Ciniti and 
30 per cent of the total land in Simpang Duren was under the ownership 
and control of absentee land owners from the cities. There were no 
mechanisms for preventing absentee land owners with capital from ac-
cumulating land in both hamlets. Until 2010, more than 50 percent of 
the land was in the hands of middle class peasant households (categories 
middle peasant I and II), but the subsequent trend showed a progressive-
ly declining percentage of land, under the category of middle peasant I 
and II and increasing differentiation in terms of farm land area between 
peasant and non-peasant households. 
Surplus extraction also benefited shop owners, whose rapid increase 
indicated effective surplus extraction through buying and selling agricul-
tural products. The shop owners are predominantly peasants from rich 
and landlord households that accumulated not only land but also capital 
and diversified into other sectors such as money lending. Most of the 
rich peasant households relied on sharecroppers to develop their land as 
the cheapest way of intensifying their farming. 
Land ownership certificates could not be used to access credit due to 
several administrative requirements thatwere hardly fulfilled by the cur-
rent administration system. The state banks required not only land certif-
icates, but also proof of tax payment under the same name and the same 
plot of land, approved by the land agency office. The tax payment bill, in 
most cases, was in the name of the head of the household, and did not 
mention the particular farm plot (in the same administrative plot num-
ber). None of the peasant households in the hamlet have attempted to 
go to the BPN office in Garut or Liwa (a four hour trip by motorcycle), 
to ask for land certificates and tax approval for accessing credit. In both 
sites, peasant households rely for emergency cash on the bank keliling (in-
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formal money lender) which charges a high interest rate, and on money 
borrowed from the small shops, with the obligation to sell their products 
to them at predefined (low) prices. 
The premises of ETLR, namely, that individual land ownership ad-
dresses problems of tenure security, productive farm investment, access 
to credit and convenience for the government administrative system 
were only valid for some households in both sites, especially the better 
off households and absentee city-based landlords. Those from the lower 
socioeconomic classes, namely, the near landless and some middle class 
peasant households, were deprived and became landless only a few years 
after the land was redistributed. Only a few peasant households that 
were extra diligent, hardworking and thrifty could maintain their current 
situation. These households also derived other income from non-
farming activities, for example, remittances received from their member 
in the cities and running small shops that extracted  surpluses from other 
peasant households in the hamlet.  
 
5.6 A Trajectory of Indonesian Upland Communities 
As discussed in Chapter 2, since the 1998 political reform, Indonesia has 
gradually changed and is continually evolving its policies on land and 
natural resources from one-sided state claims on forests and their natural 
resources towards more populist and market-oriented approaches. The 
momentum of this policy change has fluctuated following pressure ex-
erted by civil society as well as that resulting from the political momen-
tum. However, several milestones are evident as described below. 
The Basic Forestry Law no. 5/1967 has been amended to Forestry 
Law no. 41/1999 that specifically mentions the rights of the customary 
community (Masyarakat Hukum Adat) to manage the forest area in their 
customary land (tanah adat), even though their customary forest was clas-
sified as a state forest area. There was consequently great hope among 
the political legislative members (Markus, from the PDI party, as well as 
Ali Akbar from PPP; see Dephutbun, 1999) that this amended Law 
would result in recognition and restitution of the rights of the customary 
community in managing their forests according to their own traditional 
wisdom. The Legislative Act (TAP MPR) no. IX, passed in the year 
2001, mandated the Legislative members and the President to review and 
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revise the unjust land and natural resources legislation, and implement 
agrarian and natural resource management reforms. 
Over the last five years, however, this populist legal reform has lost 
its momentum, especially during the early stages of decentralisation 
when the local (district) government was given the jurisdiction to resolve 
land conflicts, recognise customary communities, as well as release per-
mits for large scale and middle scale concessions (mining, forestry and 
palm oil). While most of the districts released permit relating to large-
scale concessions, only a few local governments, with support of civil 
society organisations, sought to address land conflict.  
In 2007, two years before the 2009 election, the government, through 
BPN, announced the National Land Redistribution Program (PPAN). 
This had a target of redistributing 8 million hectares of non-productive 
land including deforested forest areas, to landless peasants by the year 
2015. Its rationale was based on the prevailing situation wherein most of 
the productive land was under large scale private and state companies 
(56% of productive land assets were controlled by 0.2 per cent of the 
population), and the proportion of landless peasants in Indonesia rose 
from 30 per cent recorded in the 1993 agriculture census to 36 per cent 
in the 2003 agriculture census (Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011). It was hoped 
that the PPAN programme of land redistribution to the tillers would de-
crease the percentage of landless peasants in Indonesia by several points 
(BPN, 2008, internal document). Unfortunately, the programme never 
materialised on a national scale. Instead, the situation worsened, and the 
percentage of landless and near landless peasants has increased to 55 per 
cent, according to the 2013 agriculture census. 
In March 2013, Judicial Review no. 35 of Forestry Law no. 41/1999, 
regarding the status of customary forest, revoked the classification of 
customary forest as state land. This land is currently classified as non-
state forest, or under private ownership. However, to be classified as pri-
vate forest, there are still several administrative requirements for proving 
customary community status through local government regulations. 
JKPP, an NGO consortium of community mappers, projected between 
42 and 80 million hectares of customary forests in Indonesia that could 
potentially be classified as customary forests through this law, but which 
is currently delineated under state forest areas (JKPP, 2014). 
214 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change: 
 
 
A further law, Village Law no. 6/2014, was passed in early 2014. This 
gives autonomy rights to a village to be designated as a Customary Vil-
lage or an Administrative Village with the required customary institution 
structure or village administrative structure. This law gives a village the 
jurisdiction to manage its territories, including village owned forests, land 
and other natural resources (Article 76). It will be fully implemented 
within one year, and approved villages will also be able to manage their 
own annual budgets of 1.2 billion rupiah (approximately US$ 100,000).  
In 2014, MoF and the National Statistical Office, through its provin-
cial spatial planning department, claimed to have reduced the number of 
villages having areas overlapping with forests from 28,689 villages in 
2007 and 2009, to 18,239 villages in 2014 (MoF-BPS, 2014). This means 
that there are 10,450 upland villages that have had their land excised 
from state forest areas, and will be included in the land registration pro-
gramme under the BPN. As predicted by JKPP (2014) and Zakaria 
(2014), following the implementation of the Judicial Review no. 35/2012 
and the establishment of village autonomy under Village Law 6/2014, 
there will be more villages and customary forests excised from state for-
est areas, but still considered as forest area, that should maintain their 
forest functions. These communities will be trapped in the BPN’s land 
registration programme through a well established system of individual 
land ownership certification available at every BPN district office. How-
ever, legislative members are still debating the draft Land Law (Draft Un-
dang Undang Pertanahan), which will following the principles of the Basic 
Agrarian Law no. 5/1960 (BAL). According to Soemarjono (2014, pers 
comm. 12 April 2014), this law will accommodate communal land titling, 
which is not regulated in detail in the BAL, and it will also include the 
targets for land redistribution (Gunawan 2014). However, the current 
draft Act does not address the subject of land redistribution, the purpose 
of which is to change the unjust agrarian structure of rural society. Cur-
rently, the legislature is also working on a draft law on rights and protec-
tion of the customary community (Draft Undang Undang Perlindungan dan 
Hak-Hak Masyarakat Hukum Adat) and the BPN are working on the 
government regulation to regulate the communal land tenure form, as 
well as revising the regulation on land reform (PPAN). The law was 
promoted by the alliance of indigenous communities of Indonesia 
(AMAN), and promulgates communal land titling for customary com-
munities and the rights of the customary community to be protected by 
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the State, following the principles of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) (World Bank 2014). Ac-
cording to the agrarian researcher-activist Noer Fauzi Rachman 
(Kompas 2014a), the previous government under the Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (‘SBY’) did not seem to be willing to regulate the land rights 
of the masyarakat adat and initiate communal land registration. Conse-
quently, this administration has adopted a strategy of delaying tactics re-
garding initiation of the process of recognising and registering commu-
nal land, while supporting the individualisation of land titling. 
In the absence of a law, rules and regulations, as well as government 
offices that can accommodate the process of collective land registration, 
the pressure on peasants to acquire land tenure security within areas of 
land conflict is pragmatically following the mainstream course of formal-
ising the informal land tenure to individual land ownership.  
In 2013, Pokker SHK, a NGO in Central Kalimantan, reported that 
during the implementation of the Governor’s Regulation 4/2012, allow-
ing individual and communal ancestral land to be registered through the 
demang (adat chief), both the demang and the local government preferred 
to accommodate individual land claims rather than register communal 
ancestral land. The Perkumpulan Pancur Kasih director, Mateus Pilin 
(2013, pers. comm., 24 Juni 2013), observed that the customary commu-
nity that was being facilitated by his NGO to do community mapping 
succeeded in getting their communal land mapped, and some of these 
lands were recognized by the sub-district government. However, the co-
hesion of the customary community fell apart when the private palm oil 
companies began to negotiate with the local elites, one by one. These 
local elites have tended to release their communal lands, treating them as 
if they were their individually owned lands, to the private sector, which 
has ruined the cohesion of the customary community. 
This kind of trajectory has been observed in other parts of the Indo-
nesian uplands, not only under programmes of land redistribution in for-
est areas, as discussed in this study, but also in non-forested, post land 
conflict areas. In most of these situations, the NGO supporters and the 
local peasants or customary community movement were at the forefront 
during the conflict era, but were not able to sustain the momentum to 
prepare a long term vision after the land conflict. The slogan, ‘land for 
the tillers’ is widely used by most of the peasant movements to unify the 
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movement against private large-scale concessions, or against the state 
(Setiawan 2010). Changing an unjust agrarian structure was mostly con-
sidered from the external perspective of a community, viewed as a single 
entity, versus private/state actors, and not as an agrarian structure and 
agrarian relations that were internally unjust. 
 
5.7 Implications and Reflections for State Policy and 
Civil Society Movements 
The evolution of land rights towards private ownership, discussed 
above, was seen by the NGO supporters in both sites, and in other parts 
of Indonesia, as a natural internal process, and in some cases, NGO ac-
tivists were reluctant to intervene. This study has shown that the market 
and state both play an important role in engineering the evolution of 
land rights towards privatisation, rather than retaining their communal 
land tenure form or accomodating the household land tenure unit. The 
delaying tactics played by the previous government, to create a regulation 
that will establish a clearer process of land redistribution, create commu-
nal land rights titles, and secure the rights of the customary community, 
is a clear indication of the state’s reluctance to regulate this issue. Thus, 
changes in the process are determined by the demands of the market for 
the benefit of the private sector.  
It is apparent from this study that Indonesia’s upland communities 
need security of tenure for their land and farming systems, which could 
protect them from land appropriation by state and local players. Ap-
proaches to land redistribution under individual ownership, as practised-
so far, have not been appropriate for these upland communities that 
managed and posses the land in household unit. The upland peasant 
households that were the focus of this study have been forced to follow 
the free market route, which includes farm land as one of the commodi-
ties that has been internally contested by peasants and other absentee 
land speculators. This process has been formative of a capitalist peasant 
society in the upland areas. As revealed by this study, and also by other 
studies (see Chrisantiny, 2007) the government land agency (BPN) was 
unable to provide support to every individual peasant, especially in the 
upland areas, to register their plots. Both this study and Chrisantiny 
(2007) have shown that land redistribution cannot lead to the registration 
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of all lands. Only those who are sufficiently well off were able to acquire 
individual land certificates. 
The civil society movement led by peasant organisations and unions 
that have been promoting land reform and redistribution should careful-
ly examine the results of the land redistribution process several years af-
ter it occurred. Those in the civil society movement who promote 
recognition of adat rights through communal land ownership should also 
observe internal processes of elite capture. 
In this situation there is a need for civil society organisations to work 
with peasant organisations and customary communities to create a long-
term vision that extends beyond conflict resolution to enable local com-
munities to identify problems relating to an unjust agrarian structure and 
to agrarian relations that are both internal and external to the communi-
ties. This requires us to be aware that agrarian differentiation is not a 
natural process, but a socially constructed process that needs to be ad-
dressed from the early steps in the land redistribution and its land tenure 
choices. With good understanding of the trajectories of agrarian differen-
tiation resulting from the design and implementation of land redistribu-
tion – as in the two cases we have studied -  local communities should 
design their own land redistribution process. This would enable the local 
community through its own local leadership to periodically conduct land 
redistribution, and decide when the land redistribution should be done. 
This is particularly important, as an unjust agrarian structure will reap-
pear as a result of market penetration and exploitative agrarian relations. 
Knowing that there are always limitations to government rules and 
regulations, it is necessary to prepare a complete set of rules and regula-
tions as well as build the capacities of state organisations to run genuine 
land redistribution programmes that are suitable for the pluralistic Indo-
nesian situation (in Java, the Outer Islands, forests and non-forest areas 
and customary and peasant communities, upland and lowland communi-
ties). There is also a need to rethink generic rules and regulations accord-
ing to clear principles for regulating the process. 
It may be that individual or communal land ownership tenures are 
not the critical need of upland communities, but rather local autonomy 
of communities and a clear vision of local leadership to regulate the land 
redistribution process. With a good understanding of the problematic of 
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agrarian differentiation arising from this study, there are several policy 
implications that needed to be developed. These include: 
1. Communal land tenureship that can accommodate pluralistic lo-
cal tenure forms and protect household farming units.  
2. Guarantee of land allocation for all peasant households with 
maximum land holding under the control of peasant household 
units. This is important to limit accumulation by rich peasant 
households. 
3. Sufficient allocation of land for women and youth as an incentive 
for them to farm and cultivate the land in their village or their 
ancestral land. A special effort is needed to emphasise women 
and youth as they are more innovative and will continue farming 
the land in the future. 
4. Allocation of local budgets (that is, village funds under Law 
6/2014) to buy back village or ancestral lands that were sold or 
released to absentee land owners, and the subsequent allocation 
of these lands for productive use. 
5. Creation of consensus in allocating land for tillers, not under 
ownership, but under contractual bases with the village or adat 
communities. This should be periodically reviewed and allow for 
redistribution among the landless peasant households.  
6. Creation of a comprehensive village or adat community land da-
tabase with clear planning regarding the community’s future. 
This should not only address the social aspects, but also econom-
ically viable and environmentally sound planning. 
With this clear vision and planning conceptualised at the local level, 
there is a need to incorporate the lessons learned lesson in the draft land 
law, draft law on the protection of customary communities, rules and 
regulation on land redistribution, and communal land tenure. Local au-
tonomy at the village level, as defined in the Village Law no 6/2014 
means that village communities should be given the authority to lead the 
effective functioning of local land redistribution mechanisms, and these 
obligations should be clearly written into the implementation guidelines, 
including processes and mechanisms for resolving land conflicts. 
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1The classes in these two sites were grouped in different ranges, which were locally acknowledged in 
both sites. 
2Roy Prosterman is the founder of RDI (Rural Development Institute) or LANDESA that also 
supported by the USAID for the Land Law Initiatives Programme in Indonesia; see also similar 
recommendation in Prosterman & Mitchell, 2002. 
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 Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Table of household survey (example) 
No. Name Code Name 
Gender 
& Age Ethnicity 
Origin & 
fam. rela-
tion 
Member 
of HH 
Status 
before LR 
Plot 
number 
at LR, 
size 
Plot at 
survey, 
2010, size 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.  A1/B1 M/F, 40 Sundanese Ranca-
herang/ 
brother A2 
Member 
HH to 
Code-
name, 
…member 
Landless, 
Near 
landless, 
Middle 
Peasant, 
Rich, 
Land Lord 
3/1,2 ha 2/0.8 ha 
2.          
No Occupa-
tions 
 
Trans-
fer 
Address Status dur-
ing LR 
Notes     
 11 12 13 14 15     
1 Farm-
ing/ 
Non 
Farm-
ing/Besi
de 
Farm-
ing… 
Sold to/ 
buy 
from 
In the 
hamlet 
/village 
district/ 
others 
Activist/ 
not in-
volved/ not 
in the ham-
let/ enter-
ing hamlet 
(year)  
     
2.          
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Appendix 2 
Table Key Informants 
No Name Position 10 years after LR Gender Origin 
Date of In-
terview 
From Ciniti Hamlet    
1 Radin Landless M Lengkong 16 July 2008, 
6 Feb 2010, 13 
April 2011  
2 Bapak & Ibu Toto Landless M & F Rancaherang 16 July 2008, 
7 Feb 2010, 15 
April 2011  
3 Bapak & Ibu Daryo Landless M & F Citoe 17 July 2008, 
7 Feb 2010, 15 
April 2011 
4 Bapak Ibnu Landless M Lengkong 18 July 2008, 
6 Feb 2010, 14 
April 2011 
5 Ibu Aam (widow) Near Landless F Karees 2 August 2008, 
13 Feb 2011  
6 Bapak & Ibu 
Momon 
Middle Peasant I M & F Rancaherang 19 July 2008, 
14 Feb 2010, 
21 April2011 
7 Bapak Pepen Middle Peasant 
II 
M Bendungan 20 July 2008, 
13 Feb 2010, 
19 April 2011 
8 Bapak & Ibu Suaep Middle Peasant 
II 
M & F Karees 17 July 2008, 
13 Feb 2010, 
18 April 2011 
9 Bapak Agus Middle Peasant I M Bendungan 16 July 2008, 
15 Feb 2010, 
18 April 2011 
10 Bapak Nano Rich Peasant  M Rancaherang 19 July 2008, 
20 Feb 2010, 
15 April 2011 
11 Kang Ija Middle Peasant I M Rancaherang 18 Feb 2010, 
11 April 2011 
12 Bapak & Ibu Suraji Middle Peasant 
II 
M & F Rancaherang 18 Feb 2010, 
10 April 2011 
13 Kang Atim  Landless (non 
beneficiaries) 
M Jakarta 16 April 2011 
14 Ibu Eutin (widow) Near Landless F Cioa 17 April 2011 
15 Bapak & Ibu Oding Rich Peasant M & F Sukmajaya & 
Lengkong 
8 April 2011 
16 Bapak Mahmud Rich Peasant M Lengkong 17 Juni 2008, 
15 April 2011 
17 Bapak Nanang Land Lord             
(non beneficiar-
ies) 
M Pameungpeuk 9 April 2011 
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No Name Position 8 years 
after LR 
Gender Ethnic group Date of Inter-
view 
From Simpang Duren Hamlet    
1 Ibu Masyati  Near Landless, 
widow 
F Bengkunat 10 Aug 2008, 
22 Jan 2011 
2 Bapak & Ibu Wandi Landless M 
&F 
Lampungese 8 Aug 2008,24 
May 2010, 23 
Jan 2011 
3 Bapak & Ibu Har-
tono  
Rich Peasant  M & 
F 
Javanese 9 Aug 2008,23 
May 2010, 22 
Jan 2011 
4 Kakek Sukanta Near landless M Sundanese 10 Aug 2008, 
24 May 2010, 
23 Jan 2011 
5 Bapak Anto Middle Peasant I M Semendo 11 Aug 2008, 
20 May 2010, 
22 Jan 2011 
6 Bapak Hamid Middle Peasant 
II 
M Lampungese 19 May 
2010,24 Jan 
2011 
7 Bapak Hendra Middle Peasant I M Semendo 19 May 2010, 
23 Jan 2011 
8 Bapak Udin Near landless M Bengkunat 21 May 2010, 
25 Jan2011 
9 Bapak Suwondo Landless M Javanese 21 May 2010, 
26 Jan 2011 
10 Kang Anta Landless M Sundanese 25 Jan 2011 
11 Bapak Sularso Middle Peasant I M & 
F 
Javanese 23 Jan2011 
12 Bapak Sumadi Rich Peasant M Javanese 24 Jan 2011 
13 Bapak Handoko Landlord 
(non beneficia 
ies) 
M Indonesian 
Chinese  
5 Feb 2011 
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